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2 COLUMNS 
I 
MARGINS 
WarOfWords 
Our new editorial column will fea· 
ture a range of guest writers over 
coming months. 
The London Guardian's Hugo 
Young recently observed that the 
debate over the Gulf war in Britain 
was fatally impoverished in com-
parison with the vigorous war of 
opinions in the United States that 
preceded Congressional approval 
for the use of force in the Gulf. 
Young is on record as supporting 
the US position in the Gulf. What 
concerned him was the prevention 
of the very possibility of debate 
about the vital issues involved by 
the bellicosity of the British media. 
· In Australia, of course, there has 
been another impediment to a real 
debate over the Gulf crisis: the ex-
istence of a Labor government in 
Canberra has stifled the possibility 
of partisan discussion in the par-
liamentary arena. Yet it has to be · 
said that the electronic media-
ironically, perhaps, because of its 
reliance on packaged news grabs 
from the US networks-has been 
less bellicose than in any recent con-
flict (if one can distinguish bel-
licosity from sentimental 
patriotism about 'our boys in the 
Gulf'). 
Of course, this has not been a 
universal phenomenon. Talkback 
radio has been its usual splenetic 
self. And the '~uality' dailies such 
as The Austral~an and the Sydney 
Morning Herald have given full rein 
to their conservative think-tank 
'commentators' to rationalise as 
huffily as possible what they take to 
be the motivations of the White 
House. At the same time, however, 
the supposedly crass and populist 
commercial networks have been 
giving full vent to the very public 
unease which has become our own 
homegrown, if belated, public 
debate on the Gulf. 
One notable characteristic of this 
debate in Australia, as elsewhere, is 
that while the pro-war party has 
espoused a reasonably consistent 
perspective, the anti-war lobby is 
extraordinarily divergent in its 
views. Of course, this diversity is in 
many ways a good thing. Yet it 
needs to be admitted that not all of 
the arguments put forward by 
people in the anti-war lobby are 
congenial to those with a concern 
for consistent Left principles in in-
ternational affairs. 
The strongest sentiment in the anti-
war camp has been a sincere and 
thoroughly sensible horror at the 
destruction of human life and the 
environment wrought by war. This 
has led many in the anti-war lobby 
to stress horror of war in general as 
the central tenet of the anti-war 
case. Yet, particularly on the Left, 
such arguments only go so far. Few 
on the Left would countenance, for 
instance, urging the ANC or the 
Filipino NPA to give up their admit-
tedly bloody armed struggles on 
pacifist grounds. 
Again, many in the anti-war lobby 
stress the unloveliness of the 
Kuwaiti re~e and the arbitrari-
ness of pohtical boundaries in the 
Middle East to lessen the 'problem' 
of Iraq's annexation. Yet by the 
same logic the entirety of Eastern 
Europe, other than the USSR-
none of whose states had any real 
legitimacy other than as colonies of 
the USSR-could have been 
re~arded as up for grabs by Western 
mtlitary power over the four 
decades after 1945. 
Nor are Middle Eastern states 
somehow any less legitimate than 
nations in general, as often seems to 
be implied. After alL colonialism 
has determined the national boun-
daries and political heritage of 
nearly all of Africa, much of Asia, 
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and most of Latin America-
probably of two-thirds of the 
population of the world, in fact. Or 
again, if it is the undemocratic na-
ture of the Kuwaiti regime which is 
seen somehow to lessen its 
legitimacy, could not this equally 
serve to justify another US adven-
ture against Cuba? 
Finally, some in the anti-war lobby 
seek to refute the US position by 
downplaying the integrity of the 
UN's role-arguing that it has be-
come a 'tool of US interests'. To 
veterans of the 1930s who remem-
ber the great struggle by the Left 
behind 'collective security' to repel 
the advance of Hitler's war, this has 
a bitter ring. In fact, there has never 
been such diverse and wide-rang-
ing international support behind 
any effort to repel national aggres-
sion, ever. The real problem isn't 
that this was an 'American 
crusade'; rather, that the tenuous-
ness of that international alliance 
behind sanctions strengthened the 
hand of those who supported ex-
pulsion through war sooner, rather 
than by sanctions later, lest the al-
liance collapse. 
Why was the alliance tenuous? Ul-
timately, because of the lack of a 
community of interests between the 
Western and Arab members of the 
coalition, other than a dependence 
of the latter on the former. In short, 
the Arab governments alongside 
the West in the Gulf do not have 
support on the streets for so doing. 
A real and durable international al-
liance against the annexation of 
Kuwait and in favour of sanctions 
would have required, among other 
things, a new deal for the Middle 
East in which Western behaviour in 
the region and neo-imperial!sm 
were not perceived as synonymous. 
This, of course, is more than the US 
will currently stand for. It would, 
however, rrovide a better and wor-
thier goa for the anti-war camp 
than some of the arguments which 
have, from time to time, been 
mouthed in its name. 
DAVID BURCHELL is ALR's 
nwtaging editor. 
PROFILE 
Wendy_ Fatin 
She was an activist in the women's 
and peace movements of the 1970s, 
but today Wendy Fa tin, as the Min-
ister for Local Government and 
Minister Assisting the Prime Min-
ister on the Status of Women is an 
I 
ambitious, hardworking and prag-
1matic member of the Hawke government. 
I 
I 
I 
Like many others in the women's 
movement, the 49-year-old Fatin has 
moved from street marches in the 
1970s to participating in the system 
in the 1990s. 
Of course this has meant com-
promises. Fa tin, like most of her col-
leagues in the Left realised early in 
the Hawke government's first term 
that if they were to have any in-
fluence at all on the essentially con-
servative Labor government's 
direction, they would have to be 
pragmatic. 
"You either stand on the outside and 
take a purist view or you get into it," 
says Fa tin. 
Because the Left has been prepared 
to be realistic, Fatin says it has had 
eome influence on the government 
and that its most important role is to 
generate ideas to ginger the govern-
ment as well as acting as a bridge 
between the government and 
groups outside Canberra. 
One of the greatest dangers of the job 
is the inevitable isolation of Canber-
ra. A founding member of the 
Women's Electoral Lobby, Fatin is 
acutely aware of now losing touch 
and takes great ~ains to maintain 
contact with femmists, greens and 
other groups outside parliament. 
Door knocking during the 1990 elec-
tion campaign, she was shocked at 
the level of voter disdain and 
cynicism with federal politics and 
she vowed there and then to try to 
improve relations with the grass 
roots. 
Despite demands on her time, she 
also stays in touch with reading. 
Some of her formative influences in 
politics were Germaine Greer and 
Gough Whitlam and now she says 
she gets a lot of stimulation from 
reading women writers such as Mar-
garet Atwood and Elizabeth Jolley. 
as well as the writings of Judge Mary 
Gaudron. And she wants very much 
to make headway on issues like 
domestic violence which affect large 
numbers o£ women who are outside 
the women's movement. Other 
priorities are child care, equal pay, 
and women's education, training 
and health. 
Despite the pressure for confor-
mism. Fa tin has somehow managed 
to keep an idealistic aura around her 
and she is an unfashionable op-
timist. One of her top priorities is for 
the feminist movement to redefine 
its agenda for the 1990s, to avoid 
what she calls the "yuprie pes-
simism" about the women s move-
ment in the 1980s. 
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Instead o£ being bogged down in 
doubts about wnether women really 
want a larger slice of the cake, she 
thinks the rrevailing economic or-
thodoxy o the level playing field 
should be subjected to sophisticated 
feminist analysis. 
Fair enough, but she is still some-
what theoretical about just what the 
new women's agenda should be. 
Fatin has long been seen as one o£ 
the more promising female mini-
sterial contenders and back in 1987 
was pressed by her Left colleagues 
to throw in her hat for a position. 
Declining then for personal reasons, 
in 1990 Fatin beat her factional col-
lea~e Jeanette McHugh to get a 
jumor ministerial spot. 
She thinks that women now have 
the edge over men in electoral 
popularity because they are seen by 
voters as being less aggressive and 
gladiatorial than men. 
Although she decries the still small 
number of women in federal 
politics, she says the ALP's affirm-
ative action policy of the 1980s did 
change things as women gradually 
began to be more involved in the 
party organisation which controls 
pre-selections of candidates. 
She joined the ALP in 1972 just 
before Whitlam was swept to power, 
mainly because o£ his promise to 
end the Vietnam war, against which 
she had been fighting for some time. 
Since then she has been active in the 
party organisation, including a stint 
on the West Australian branch ex-
ecutive. She also worked for John 
Wheeldon, Minister for Repatria-
tion in the Whitlam government, 
before winning the seat of Canning 
in 1983 with a huge swing. In 1984 
she won the new seat of Brand. 
And her future? Much obviously 
depends on the prospects for the 
government's and her re-election. 
But one thing is for sure: she will 
always be a gradual but persistent 
reformer-either in or out of 
government. 
Louise Dodson. 
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Danny Boy 
· · · And ca /( 1-hese prawf\s ? ... 
~~ese arenl fhe sorf of prqw"s 
fh~f MQde Aurl-ntl,·a ~reaf ... 
They cheered, the 30,000 who converged on 
Melbourne's Bourke Street on the first Friday of 
January. Danny Johnson stood on a platform and 
they cheered when he said interest rates should be 
reduced by four or five or six percentage points. 
They screamed "No!" when Danny Johnson asked 
they if they wanted Paul Keating to be the next 
Prime Minister. 
How did this happen to Danny 
Johnson? How did he get to the point 
where he was introduced to the ador-
ing, teeming throng by Australian 
Small Business Association national 
director Peter Boyle? How did he get 
to the point where he was able to lead 
a march that included placards warn-
ing of the Fabian Society conspiracy 
and one that read: "Armed forces 
against inept government"? How? 
Demolition Danny, the little feller 
from Warracknabeal in western Vic-
toria, a small businessman. All he did 
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was send a letter to his local paper 
denouncing the Kirner and Hawke 
governments. All he did was give 
voice to the pain and frustration of all 
the "little people" and the people in 
the bush. 
The angels visited Danny Johnson and 
they were draped in the pages of 
Rupert Murdoch's Herald-Sun 
newspaper. Danny Johnson, the sort 
of person that newspaper editors 
would normally snub at a sodal func-
tion, became very useful. In the quiet 
news time before Christmas, he was 
perfect front-page news for the Herald-
Sun which, under its new editorial 
management, could not be accused of 
looking favorably at anything 
emanating from the Labor movement. 
Johnson was calling on Victorians to 
stand up and be counted, to destroy 
the Kirner government, to destroy 
union bosses, to denounce all 
politicians, to march on Melbourne, 
the home of all this eviL 
For the Herald-Sun, anxious to tap into 
anything that makes Labor look bad, 
Johnson-bald, bearded and in his 
40&-was beautiful. It was one of the 
great partnerships; the Herald-Sun 
provided the publicity, anti-Labor 
groups of all shades did the organis-
ing. But they were almost too smart 
for themselves. After the Melbourne 
rally on 4 January, there was virtually 
nowhere else, in political terms, to 
talce the protest. 
Certainly, the Herald-Sun made the 
most of the impressive turnout. (One 
of its journalists, a former radio talk-
beck host, penned a glowing piece, 
claiming that the march was made up 
of "ordinary" Australians, that the 
•rent-a-crowd elements were on 
holiday". Where do they go, and do 
they get concessions for travelling in a 
group?) A couple of television jour-
nalists the following day, reporting on 
Johnson's claim that unnamed people 
had urged him to enter politics, even 
lilcened him to Lech Walesa. 
But, in truth, the so-called Save 
Australia rally-and whatever similar 
demonstrations the Small Business 
Association can organise in other 
capitals-will produce nothing of 
lasting benefit. Everyone lcnew that 
Joan Kirner's government commands 
little more than 30% support (that is, 
most Victorians hate it). What it 
showed was that many of the people 
trying to point out the problem should 
probably be pointing to themselves. 
Let's share some of the thoughts of 
Danny Johnson, as told to an Age 
reporter. "I am not clever enough to say 
we want this or we want that. I need 
people to help me say what we want as 
policies. I am not qualified to do it all 
myself,'" he said. He hoped the rallies 
would attract people with answers. He 
did not know what the right policies 
were. On whether the "right"' policies 
would be painless policies, he said: "I 
just cannot answer that. I would hope 
so, but I don't know ... Alll want is just a 
better deal for Australia and 
Australians." He blamed the Kirner 
government for not fighting harder to 
reduce interest rates. On how to cut 
interest rates without adverse trade ef. 
feels, he said: "That's a very hard ques-
tion for me to answer ... lf they can run a 
great country as America at 10% (rates), 
then surely something can be done 
here."' 
Mr Johnson blamed the federal 
government for the national debt. At 
the suggestion that most of the debt 
was private corporate debt, he said: 
"Who lets big corporations borrow 
more than they can ever hope to 
repay? I don't know what the answer 
is. All I am saying is there have been 
so many disasters, so many people 
BRIEFINGS 5 
burnt, that it's got to be looked at. "I 
just want good honest representation, 
sensible policies, not squandering 
taxpayers' money ... All I want is a 
government who can just implement 
the correct policies to restore the 
economy. I don't know why you keep 
hammering at me when you obviow. 
ly lcnow I have not got the answers. I 
am exactly what the papers say I am: 
a demolition contractor. All I want to 
do is wake people out there who can 
give you answers." 
As the Americans say, 'there is no 
there there'. Not one idea. Sorry, there 
was one idea; that was to tell the world 
he had no ideas. The Labor cause is 
very ill in Victoria. The political wheel 
has turned and looks fixed to favour 
the conservative forces for many 
years. But the Save Australia rally was 
a politically unrealistic, futile exercise. 
The marchers have petitioned the ViC-
torian governor, Dr McCaughey, to 
sack the Kirner government, but their 
attitude towards the only person who 
can replace Kirner-Libera} leader 
Alan Brown-was a disgrace. They 
told him they didn't want him at the 
rally but made certain he had to tum 
up. Then they abused him. Alan 
Brown is by no means a lovable figure, 
but the television pictures of him 
being harangued by one marcher 
were enough to make you want to 
send the Liberal leader a 'Best Wishes' 
card. That's how bad things can get in 
Victoria at the moment. 
SHAUN CARNEY Ia a joumaU.t with 
lJieA&e-
Rural Revivalism 
Danny Johnson was the prophet of a simple faith, 
declaring, .. I'm just starting something that I hope 
will bring to the fore the right people who can 
institute the changes we need to get this country on 
the right track." 
Sixty years ago, during the Great 
Depression, the Advance Australia 
News Service espoused exactly the 
aame naive faith in the Ouytn Mail: 
One is convinced that if we 
had honourable men at the 
head of our govemmentJ and 
honourable men in places of 
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importance, honourable 
leaders in Australia, they 
could sweep away un-
employment without the 
slightest difficulty. 
Several commentators have already 
remarked on the parallels between the 
two periods. Since the January rally, 
there has been some talk that Danny 
Johnson's rural movement heralds a 
6 BRIEFINGS 
return of the proto-fascist movements 
which menaced labour in Victoria and 
New South Wales during the Depres-
sion. 
As is now well-known, thousands of 
ex-soldiers and .. loyal citizens" joined 
vigilante outfits to protect Australia 
from communisl'l\ most of them con-
vinced that violence might be neces-
sary if Australia were to be saved from 
the socialism of the Lang and Scullin 
Labor governments. 
In the Riverina, a populist leader 
named Charles Hardy held the na-
tional headlines for a few weeks. He 
was hailed in the mainstream press as 
"the Cromwell of Riverina"-a 
revolutionary title if ever there was 
one. 
Like Danny Johnson, he talked of 
Anzac, lower taxes, an end to politics 
and the evils of Labor. In his efforts to 
"save Australia"' he called for the 
secession of Riverina from Lang's 
New South Wales and for the creation 
of a provisional government of ex-
perts, supported by local branches set 
up on quasi-fascist lines. 
But how far do the parallels between 
the two periods extend? And what are 
the differences? 
Then, as now, world commodity 
prices were falling. Banks were 
foreclosing on debts, unemployment 
was rising and farmers were blaming 
Labor governments, trade unions and 
socialists for their difficulties. And 
then , as now, rural people were bitter 
in the knowledge that city folks and 
city politicians seemed to have no idea 
of the hardship of life in the bush. 
The secret armies were not the only 
conservative response to labour 
during the depression. While the 
militia enlisted in private, a public or-
ganisation, the All for Australia 
League, began signing up "'citizens". 
It appealed to patriotism, decency and 
male pride. 
On 2 Mard\1931, the All for Australia 
League was introduced to Danny 
Johnson's hometown of Warrack-
nabeal. The organiser was a Mr F M 
Thompson. In words that Danny 
Johnson was to echo 60 years later, 
Thompson explained that the new or-
ganisation was "a non-political or-
ganisation'". It was .. the voice of the 
people ... a plain organisation of 
Australian citizens, formed for 
patriotic purposes"'. In short, he 
declared, it was" an Australian politi-
cal vigilance committee"'. 
Now clearly, there is a menacing con-
struction which could be placed on 
those final words. Thompson was 
well aware that secret, paramilitary 
units of the so-called White Army had 
recently been formed in country 
towns throughout that region. But 
Thompson was one who saw the 
dangers of vigilante violence and who 
believed that the Labor governments 
could be ousted by conventional 
political pressure. In fact, he warned 
off White Army members, telling 
them that: 
AU over Australia meetings 
are being held by serious, 
sensible people, talking of 
rebellion and secession. This 
should not be going on in a 
country such as this. 
In my book on these events I've told 
the story of how the White Army ac-
tually mobilised throughout the Mal-
lee-Wimmera on 6 March, only four 
days after Mr Thompson's speech. 
The mobilisation was probably a mis-
take, a sign of the indiscipline inherent 
in the militia's decentralised struc-
ture. But the scale of the stand-to indi-
cated how widespread were the fears 
and misapprehensions which in-
duced conservative men to resort to 
extremist action. 
Since the early 20s, paramilitary 
citizens' groups had been used as 
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strike breakers. But, as we now know, 
they never intervened in the political 
process itself. Mr Thompson got his 
way. The All for Australia League 
transformed itself into the United 
Australia Party-the non-political 
party. 
When the conservatives finally forced 
elections in New South Wales and 
Canberra, they were able to mobilise 
the disaffected "citizens" behind the 
conservative cause. They won an elec-
tion by depicting Labor as a bunch of 
liars, criminals and traitors, and 
unionists as the dupes of communists. 
Plan B-the plan to mobilise the secret 
armies--proved unnecessary. 
In my view, those who talk of a re-
emergence of the secret armies are 
guilty of sensationalism. The fanners 
of Victoria are not about to fix 
bayonets and march on Spring Street, 
And if some did, they would achieve 
nothing. Too many of the objective 
conditions which provoked the male 
citizens of 1931 to enlist in covert 
militias are absent. Their Australia 
was divided by racism, by industrial 
unrest and by the immeasurable 
trauma endured by returned soldiers 
and the women who cared for them. 
Throughout the 20s, ideologues of 
both the Left and Right attacked 
liberal democracy. There were 
acolytes of both Stalin and Mussolini 
who advocated violence as the sole 
road to salvation. Each was an incite-
ment to the other to use force. 
These preconditions are far less evi-
dent today. But that is not to li8Y that 
the forces which assembled for the 
march on 4 January can be written off. 
They overtly challenge the attempts to 
create a just, pluralist society which 
has come so far since World War Two. 
As the banners of the marchers made 
plain, the politics of respectable thug-
gery are still capable of stirring loyalty 
and passion. If the conservatives were 
able to tum this kind of 'me-only' 
patriotism into votes, the result would 
be the politics of red-neck 'common-
sense', a politics which vilifies con-
cern for wage justice, the 
environment, women's rights and 
multi-culturalism as so much tom-
foolery-or as something worse. 
MICHAEL CATHCART Ia the author of 
Defending the National T11ckshop (1988). 
Gulfest 
By now the media- and everybody else- have 
woken up to the fact that the anti-Iraq war is a TV 
war . .,The first war ever to begin on live TV," as one 
reporter gleefully put it. It has worked wonders for 
the ratings of the debt-beleaguered Ten network and 
established once and for all the supremacy of CNN' s 
style of coverage, forcing the other US networks to 
imitate it. 
But while the media fill in the dull 
patches by reporting about the media 
reporting the war, we are entitled to 
uk whether the usual liberal soul-
•rching about war, censorship and 
the media really goes far enough. As 
television entertains us with the Pen-
tagon-controlled pool footage, per-
haps we should entertain the 
hypothesis that the media have be-
come a dangerous weapon in war 
rather than its liberal conscience. 
At the black CNN reporter in Bagh-
dad with the unlikely name of Ber-
nard Shaw and a magnificent baritone 
voice said: "Wherever xou are in the 
world, ask yourself, why are the 
governments of Iraq and the US al-
lowing this report from Baghdad to 
get out of here to you'." 
·TV was implicated in the process 
which led to war. In competing with 
each other the US networks fought to 
implicate themselves in the 
diplomatic endgame towards war. 
American ABC's Ted Koppel dined 
with the Jordanian royal family, then 
MCUred an exclusive briefing from the 
Iraqi foreign ministry to pass on the 
message he had elicited from Jordan. 
Not to be outdone, Dan Rather went 
after and got an exclusive interview 
with Saddam for CBS. The political 
talldng heads followed news-anchor 
celebrities into the fray. Bush sent Iraqi 
1V an eight-minute video tape put-
ting the US position; Saddam replied 
by sending US TV networks a 90-
minute video. On the eve of the US 
counter-invasion of Kuwait, James 
Baker, George Bush and Iraq's Foreign 
Minister Tariq Aziz all appeared live, 
while pre-recorded Saddam was 
beamed from Iraqi TV. When a 
diplomatic letter can take three days 
from out-tray to in-tray, why not go 
live on CNN and blast off a diplomatic 
retort and a propaganda release for 
the general public simultaneously? 
New media technology is reducing 
the time between diplomatic moves 
and counter-moves, not to mention 
the time between diplomatic gambits 
and publicity stunts. 
The politicos and the military fight too 
to present their chosen images. The 
Bush campaign was stage managed 
by Sig Rogich, a former Las Vegas ad-
vertising man with interests in 
property and casinos. Rogich had a set 
specially built at Dhahran for Bush's 
pre-war warm-up visit, complete with 
neat rows of F-15 and F-16 warplanes 
lined up in shot as a backdrop. Rogich 
stage-managed images of Bush walk-
ing tall against desert sunsets, Bush 
the war veteran talking man-to-man 
with the troops. Given that last 
November US polls showed 50% of 
the US population were opposed to 
the war, this expensive spectacle had 
its uses - support for the Bush war 
went up to 60%. 
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The Pentagon has also found out how 
to use TV as a weapon. One wonders 
if it is any accident that the US 
airstrikes seemed to be timed to make 
the US east coast evening news. Peter 
Smark in the Sydney Morning Herald 
and other veteran journalists have 
begun reminiscing about how in Viet-
nam journalists 'told the truth' about 
the war, thus hastening its end. Which 
just goes to show what a slim grasp on 
history much journalistic writing dis-
plays. Only a few independent jour-
nalists stood against the tide of 
imperial opinion. Just to be on the safe 
side, the Pentagon has greatly 
restricted media access to its dirty lit-
tle wars- not to mention the com-
plete lack of coverage of those fought 
by the CIA. 
Given the multinational nature of the 
anti-Iraq force, an office- called the 
Joint Information Bureau (Jffi) has 
been set up, whose purpose is to 
manipulate what we see from the 
Gulf. To my knowledge only John Pil-
ger, writing in the London GUilrdian, 
has acknowledged its existence and its 
purpose. That the JIB would use the 
media to convey an 'acceptable' ver-
sion of the war was evident even 
before it began. TV news showed pic-
tures of hundreds of military 
transport aircraft landing in the Gulf. 
The fact that in this hastily prepared 
invasion planes were being 
despatched half-full was not men-
tioned. 
In going in to battle with each other 
for ratings, the media happily sur-
render to the demands placed on them 
by the military machine. Even when 
they firmly believe they are shooting 
in the cause of liberal good sense and 
free speech, they violently defeat that 
objective by turning the moral need to 
know into sheer fascination. 
Meanwhile we flip channels from the 
tennis to the news and back again, to 
keep track of the score. 
McKENZIE WARK regularly writea a 
colwnn on the media for ALR. 
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Just the 
JOB? 
The recession has left one of Labor's proudest claims, job 
creation, in tatters. But did it have the impact the 
government claimed? Peter Saunders argues that a new 
strategy of job creation is needed to attack the new poverty 
of the 90s. 
[i he post-war welfare state was premised on, and for three decades flourished within, an economic context of full 
employment. The high levels of un· 
employment that followed the oil shocks of the 
70s and continued throughout the 80s put an end 
to that. Welfare capitalism was in crisis and the 
power of vested interests portrayed that as a 
crisis of welfare rather than a crisis of capitalism. 
With increased unemployment came increased poverty 
among working-age families and its derivative, the prob-
lem of child poverty. Along with evidence of increasing 
rates of poverty in the 80s has come renewed doubts about 
the impact of welfare state programs. The New Right have 
seized upon those doubts to argue the case for the disman-
tling of the entire apparatus of the welfare state and for an 
end to such forms of social engineering. Yet the economic 
backcloth of the 80s and 90s differs substantially from that 
of earlier decades. 
One aspect which has particular relevance in the current 
context relates to the changing role and nature of the labour 
market. The relationship between work and welfare has 
always been central to the interface between the state and 
market sectors of the economy. But the implications for 
welfare of the changing nature and patterns of work have 
not, until recently, been given much attention by welfare 
specialists. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the one dear finding 
to emerge from decades of poverty research in Australia 
and overseas is that joblessness is a major cause of poverty. 
The preferable way to avoid poverty, or to escape poverty 
for those affected by it, is through joining the waged labour 
force. In the absence of any form of guaranteed income 
arrangement, paid work is the best means by which people 
can achieve financial independence and adequate living 
standards. 
All of which suggests that the employment record of the 
Hawke ALP government ought to have made major in-
roads into poverty in this country. Why is it, then, that 
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welfare groups and religious leaders have emphasised that 
poverty has been on the increase in recent years, a percep-
tion which, according to a recent opinion roll, appears to 
be widely shared in the community? I the economic 
downturn sparked by the oil shocks of the 70s caused 
poverty to increase through unemployment, how can the 
80s have bt?en characterised by both rising employment 
and rising poverty? 
While not actually claiming that poverty has fallen, the 
government has not been backward in emphasising that 
the extra jobs created since 1983 have had major positive 
effects on social justice in general and on poverty in par-
ticular. In the 1989 report Touoards a Faira Australia, Social 
Justice Measures, Eco11omic Statement, the government ar-
gued that employment growth since 1983 has been " ... a 
major achievement in advancing social justice and remov-
ing people and families from poverty". A similar point was 
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made a year earlier in a report by the Office of EPA C: "Since 
1983 over one million new jobs have been generated: 
employment growth of this order yields major benefits in 
poverty alleviation." 
Certainly, growth in employment under the Hawke 
government has been impressive, in both historical and 
international terms. Between August 1983 and August 
1990, for example, total employment (full-time and part-
time) increased by over 1.5 million or by more than 25%. 
ln proportionate terms, the growth in employment in the 
seven years since 1983 has been the same as that achieved 
in the 16 years up to 1983. In fact, there is no seven-year 
period since 1960 that has produced anything like the rate 
of job growth experienced in Australia since 1983. 
Australia's employment record has also been impressive 
in international terms. Between 1983 and 1989- the latest 
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year for which comparative data are available • employ-
ment grew in Australia by 3.4% a year on average. The 
corresponding figure for all OECD countries was 1.2%, 
little more than one-third of the Australian growth rate, 
and only in six countries was average employment growth 
2% a year or more. On this dimension at least, Australia 
tops the OECD league table. 
Of the new jobs created in Australia since 1983, around 43% 
have gone to males and 57% to females. Almost 38% have 
gone to married women, about which more later. Close to 
two-thirds Oust over one million) of these new jobs have 
been full-time, with the remaining one-third part-time. 
There has thus been a continuation of longer-term trends 
in the structure of the waged labour market-a rise in the 
importance of female workers in general, of married 
women in particular, and of part-time as against full-time 
work. 
The relative importance in the waged labour market of 
full-time male workers has been of declining importance 
for some time. In the mid-60s, over67% of all workers fitted 
this category. By 1983, that percentage had declined to 
below 60% and by 1990 it was below 54%. Furthermore, 
while only 760,000 wives were in paid employment in 
1966, this figure had doubled by 1983 and then accelerated 
to approach two million by 1990. Many of these women 
had husbands who were themselves employed. Charac-
terisations of family working life as comprising a male 
breadwinner with a financially dependent wife confined 
to domestic duties are becoming increasingly irrelevant to 
most couples. Since 1983, the number of families in which 
two or more members were in paid employment rose by 
just over half a million. In contrast, the number of families 
with no member in paid employment also rose, albeit by 
only 32,000. 
These figures point to the accelerating growth of the two-
income family and also suggest that those who have been 
excluded from the paid workforce have not enjoyed their 
share of the fruits of the job expansion since 1983. In fact, 
despite the increase in employment of 1.58 million be-
tween 1983 and 1990, the level of unemployment fell by 
much less, from 687,000 in August 1983 to 469,000 by 
August 1989, rising again to 587,000 by August 1990. In 
broad terms it has thus taken the creation of almost three 
extra jobs in order to reduce the ranks of the unemployed 
by one. 
The employment record under Hawke has not resulted in 
significant inroads into the ranks of the unemployed. In-
stead, the extra job opportunities have attracted new 
entrants into the labour market and helped to absorb the 
growth in the population of working age. Far more jobs 
have gone to workers from families who were already able 
to rely on a regular wage, than have gone to those whose 
families were without any wage income. These observa-
tions suggest that the impact of employment growth since 
1983 on poverty (and other dimensions of economic and 
social inequality) may well have been far less than has 
often been claimed by government ministers and bodies 
like EPAC. 
Research I have been undertaking recently tends to con-
firm this suggestion. Briefly, what that research attempts 
to do is to estimate the impact of changes in the labour 
market since 1983 (including the growth in employment) 
on the number of families in poverty. I took as my measure 
of poverty the Henderson poverty line developed by the 
Poverty Commission in the mid-70s and named after its 
chairperson, Professor Ronald Henderson. A family's 
poverty status was determined by whether or not its after-
tax income was above or below the Henderson poverty 
line. In order to estimate family incomes in 1982-83 and 
1989-90 I relied on the income distribution model 
developed by my colleagues Bruce Bradbury, Jennifer 
Doyle and Peter Whiteford (see ALR No. 117). The model, 
based on the 1986 Income Distribution Survey undertaken 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) simulates the 
distribution of income in other years by taking account of 
the patterns of changing demographic structure and 
labour market participation, and of changes to income 
levels (including social security pensions and benefits) and 
income tax payments. 
Results from the model indicate that, when measured 
using the Henderson poverty line, the overall poverty rate 
rose from around 10% of families in 1982-83 to almost 13% 
by 1989-90. The poverty rate among children also in-
creased slightly and was estimated to be over 15% in 
1989-90. So much for the 1987 promise to end child poverty 
by 1990. 
But perhaps the more interesting results arise when the 
model is used to estimate what the poverty rate would 
have been in 1989-90 if labour market conditions had 
remained exactly as they were in 1982-83. A comparison of 
these results with the actual poverty estimates for 1989-90 
provides an estimate of the impact of labour market change 
on poverty over the period. Such a comparison shows that, 
despite the impressive growth in employment described 
earlier, the impact on poverty has been small-far smaller, 
I must admit, than I had expected when I started this work. 
The results suggested that less than 40,000 working age 
families have been moved out of poverty purely as a result 
of labour market changes since 1982-83. 
Admittedly, the model and methods used in this research 
are very much in their infancy. The estimate is thus best 
seen as no more than that-an estimate. But while, as 
always, there is uncertainty as to the precise magnitude of 
the impact, it seems unlikely that the estimate is widely 
inaccurate. If that is the case, then it seems that the employ-
ment record of the Hawke government has indeed had 
only a marginal impact on poverty among Australian 
families of working age. And if that is true, it raises a 
number of interesting issues for the social security system 
and its interaction with the labour market. 
It is useful first to spell out the factors leading to the weak 
associations between employment and poverty implied by 
the estimates just described. One matter that needs to be 
emphasised at the outset is thatwhile labour market status 
is characteristic of individuals, much of conventional 
poverty research treats poverty status as a characteristic of 
families. Issues relating to the distribution of power and 
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resources within the family are thus ignored in mainstream 
poverty research-a limitation which feminists have been 
quick to criticise. While the distinction between in-
dividuals and families may be relatively unimportant in a 
world in which each family has only a single (normally 
male) labour force participant, it clearly assumes far 
greater significance when more than one family member 
becomes attached to the waged labour force. That indeed 
is what has actually occurred over the last three decades as 
the number of families with multiple wage earners has 
increased. Jobs that go to people in families already able to 
rely on a wage have, in the vast majority of cases, no impact 
on poverty among families. This phenomenon thus 
provides one explanation for the weak association between 
employment and poverty. 
But it is not the only one. At least two other factors are 
worth noting. The first is the continued growth of part-time 
work, which may have resulted in families who have to 
rely on a single part-time wage income not having suffi-
cient resources to leap the poverty threshold. The second 
factor is the existence of low wages themselves which 
again, particularly for larger families, may mean that wage 
incomes remain below poverty levels. Both explanations 
are disturbing, in that they suggest that an increasing 
number of families may be moving from a life of poverty 
while out of work and receiving social security to a life of 
poverty while in work and receiving low wages. 
It is also worth noting that the weakening association 
between employment and poverty will operate in both 
directions. Just as a high rate of employment growth will 
have a relatively small impact on unemployment and 
hence on poverty, so too will a far lower rate of employ-
ment creation. Some workers who lose their jobs as 
employment falls will belong to families containing 
workers who will continue to remain in paid work. The 
impact of the current recession on poverty may thus be 
less severe than is implied by previous recessionary 
experiences. 
The problem of the working poor-the group, incidentally, 
at whom the family assistance improvements introduced 
by Brian Howe in 1987 were mainly directed-may thus 
be increasing rather than declining. Indeed, some have 
argued that the increase in family allowance supplement 
(FAS) payments in the last few years has allowed 
employers to cut wages to the low paid and has thus 
contributed both to more inequality and to increased 
poverty. That may be true, but such evidence as we have 
indicates that the take-up rate of FAS is quite low, with 
perhaps as few as one-third of eligible families actually 
receiving their FAS entitlements. This in turn suggests that 
any major impact of FAS on the level of wages seems 
unlikely, although there is a need for further research in 
this area. 
To argue that the increased waged labour of married 
women has weakened the association between employ-
ment and poverty is, of course, not to take any normative 
position on the desirability of this development. I am 
certainly not suggesting that this trend is undesirable, far 
from it. Indeed, we know from the research of feminists like 
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jane Millar that were it not for the wages earned by married 
women, poverty among families would be considerably 
greater than it actually is. The argument is rather that the 
kinds of reasoning and policy design that might have made 
some sense in an essentially patriarchal labour market 
have little relevance in today's labour market conditions in 
which two-income couples are increasingly common. In 
such a world, previously established links between 
employment and unemployment and hence, recalling that 
unemployment remains a major cause of poverty for work-
ing age families, between employment and poverty, may 
simply no longer hold. 
To illustrate some of the consequences for social security 
policy of these developments, I will consider two ex-
amples. The first relates to the increased prevalence of 
"Despite the 
impressive arowth in 
employment ... the impact 
on povertv has 
been small. " 
part-time work, the second to the labour force behaviour 
of the wives of unemployed men. The general trend 
towards part-time work has already been noted. Between 
1966 and 1990, the proportion of all jobs that were part-time 
increased from 10% to over 21%. In proportionate terms, 
part-time work among males increased faster than among 
females, although part-time work is still dominated by 
female labour with females accounting for almost 80% of 
all part-time workers, well over half of them being married 
women. The latest ABS Labour Force Survey also indicates 
that the vast majority of part-time workers actually prefer 
part-time to full-time work, with less than 28% of males 
and 16% of female part-time workers indicating that they 
would prefer to work more hours if they could. It would, 
however, be of interest to know how many of those cur-
rently working part-time are doing so through financial 
necessity rather than as a matter of choice. This would 
require information on whether part-time workers would 
prefer (or could afford) not to work at all. 
Our tax system still tends to encourage part-time work, 
primarily because the progressivity of the rate structure 
means that a lower proportion of income is paid in tax at 
lower income levels. For single people, it is mainly the tax 
threshold which provides such encouragement, this be-
coming of increasing relative importance as taxable income 
declines. For couples, the tax system still provides a slight 
financial incentive for both to engage in part-time work as 
opposed to having one full-time worker. This now also 
results primarily from the progressivity of the rate scale 
and not from the tax threshold, because the gain arising 
from having access to a second tax threshold in two-income 
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families is virtually offset by the loss of the dependent 
spouse rebate. Overall, however, the tax system certainly 
does not discourage part-time work, and may encourage 
it in the case of couples who wish to share domestic tasks 
and responsibilities. 
The same cannot be said for the social security system. 
Hence the existence of poverty traps tends to discourage 
part-time work relative to full-time work. Benefits are 
withdrawn dollar-for-dollar over a large range of income, 
which means that extra earnings have no effect whatever 
on total income and may, in some instances, actually 
reduce it once account is taken of taxation and the loss of 
fringe benefits. It seems that the advantages that many 
couples have of being able to choose packages of paid work 
and domestic work arrangements which suit them best are 
denied those who are forced through joblessness onto the 
social security system. 
The second issue relates to the incentives influencing the 
paid-work decisions of the wives of unemployed men. 
Despite the trend towards increased participation of mar-
ried women described earlier, the participation rates of the 
wives of unemployed men are well below those of the 
wives of employed men. The latest ABS figures, for June 
1990, indicate that over 64% of the wives of employed men 
are themselves are employed, while only 21% of the wives 
of unemployed men are in employment. The unemploy-
ment rates of the two groups of wives are also vastly 
different, at 2% and almost 17% respectively. One does not 
have to search far to discover that the culprit is again the 
structure of income support for the unemployed, specifi-
cally the operation of the income test. 
The way in which the income test on unemployment 
benefit discriminates against couples was brought out in a 
paper by Jocelyn Pech presented to last year's Family 
Research Conference at Ballarat. She argued that: 
A couple who are both looking for work are of-
fered no tangible encouragement by the social 
security system to do so. They are paid no more 
in benefit than a couple with only one jobseeker 
and are subject to the same income test. Their 
benefit entitlements are structured according to 
the model of a sole breadwinner with dependent 
spouse, although such a structure now reflects the 
reality of only a minority of couples' working 
lives. They are treated as a single labour market 
entity, when most couples demonstrably do not 
operate as a single entity in the labour market. 
Even more worrying than this is the fact that often when 
the husband becomes unemployed, the wife also leaves 
the labour market, in part because the income test causes 
their combined income to fall only slightly as a conse-
quence. But that in turn makes the prospect of the hus-
band finding a job which is sufficiently well paid to 
compensate both for his loss of benefit and the loss of 
the wife's earnings even more unlikely. What starts as a 
temporary setback for one partner can thus become a 
permanent financial disaster for both members of the 
couple. A cycle of deprivation is established and be-
comes extremely difficult to break out of. 
It is certainly true that the Social Security Review has 
succeeded in some areas in providing the basis for reforms 
which have improved the integration of the social security 
system into the labour market. The examples just dis-
cussed illustrate, however, that there is more to be done in 
this area if our social security system is to better reflect 
changing social values and patterns of labour market be-
haviour. To overcome the kinds of problems just discussed 
will. of course, cost money. In the current climate of con-
tinued fiscal crisis and impending economic recession, 
they seem an unlikely prospect. But even if that were not 
the case, such examples raise fundamental questions relat-
ing to the underlying assumptions about financial depend-
encies and the efficacy of increasingly income-tested 
payments which strike at the heart of the principles on 
which our social security system is based. 
The estimates described earlier suggest that general 
employment growth has not proved to be a very effective 
strategy for targeting employment opportunities to the 
poor and jobless. For a government in which targeting has 
been the driving force behind social security reforms 
designed to trim the welfare budget, there is a need to face 
the contradictions between the rationale for these reforms 
and the apparently poor targeting achieved by its job 
growth record. But the issues raised by these contradic-
tions go deeper than that. They raise fundamental ques-
tions about how the changing nature and role of paid work 
should be reflected in the provision of support for the 
jobless, as well as for the role of labour market policies in 
the fight against poverty. 
None of this is to deny that labour market programs 
designed specifically for the unemployed, the disad-
vantaged and other marginalised groups might not meet 
with more success. Indeed, the consensus from overseas 
research on specific labour market programs is that they 
can work and, in the right circumstances, that they do 
work. But those circumstances require a commitment of 
effort and resources necessary for success. They also re-
quire acceptance of the view that such interventions are 
necessary and rejection of the view that the market will 
resolve such matters automatically. Without these, labour 
market programs will continue to serve at best as a pallia-
tive rather than a cure of the underlying problems as-
sociated with joblessness and marginalisation. 
Most important of all, if labour market programs are to 
succeed they need to be consistent with contemporary 
social values and work practices, not based on out-dated 
conceptions of what constitutes work or dependence. 
Employment growth since 1983 has not made a major 
inroad into the size of the reserve army of poor working 
age families, the need to introduce new labour market 
initiatives designed specifically for the jobless is all the 
more urgent. Paid employment may be the ultimate solu-
tion for these people, but many seem to have missed out 
on the extra jobs generated since 1983. 
PETER SAUNDERS is director of the Social Policy Research 
Centre at the University of NSW. 
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ALR is in need of a new layout artist/ graphic designer to help produce the 
magazine each month. The rates of pay ore modest but the hours con be extremely flexible 
-to suit the applicant. Some desktop publishing experience is essential, preferably using 
Ventura Publisher on the PC, but training could be arranged for someone who has used 
other programs. 
If you'd like to know more please ring Kitty or David on (02) 281 7668, during office hours. 
TAKE ACTION AGAINST 
THE GULF WAR 
Across Australia, thousands of people 
have expressed their opposition to the 
Gulf War and Australia's involve-
ment in the conflict. 
There are many ways in which you 
can voice your opposition. Contact 
these numbers for further information 
ADELAIDE 
Gulf Peace Action Committee Ph. 08 2316982 
AUCE SPRINGS 
Coalition of Peace Groups Ph 089 526782 
BRISBANE 
Gulf Action Committee Ph. 07 275 1806 
HOBART 
No Gulf War Group Ph 002 341 1416 
CANBERRA 
Students United Against War Ph. 06 252 2347 
MELBOURNE 
Network for Peace in the Middle East Ph. 03 663 4961 
Suburban Actions for Peace Ph. 03 663 4961 
NEWCASTLE 
Newcastle Peace Group Ph. Bob Berghout 049 680 
4091 
PERTH 
Ph. Bevan Carter 09 481 1244 
SYDNEY 
Network for Peace Ph. Eileen Baldry 02 519 5002 
Bring the Frigates Home Coalition Ph 02 2818390 
WOLLONGONG 
Coalition for Peace in the Gulf Ph Doreen Burrow 
042 741337 
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Politics 
DESPAIR 
The Gulf war is causing massive devastation. But the 
Gulf crisis has already remade the region. 
ALR assembled a roundtable discussion of experts before 
the outbreak of war to speculate on the new face 
of the Middle East. 
ob Springborg teaches in politics at 
Macquarie University; Michael 
Humphrey teaches Middle East studies 
at the University of Western Sydney; 
Clive Kessler teaches in sociology and Asian 
Studies at the University of NSW; and Ralph 
Pettman teaches in government at Sydney 
University. The discussion was chaired by Stan 
Correy, a journalist with ABC Radio's Back-
grouud Briefiug. 
Whoever wins in the confrontation between the 
allied forces and Iraq in the Gulf, how will the Arab 
world be changed by the invasion of Kuwait? 
BOB: In the first place, a new alliance structure has been 
formed between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, an alliance 
that will try to draw within its orbit a variety of the weaker 
Arab states. On the other hand, the Iraqis have been able 
to solicit some support from weaker, more marginal ac-
tors-the Yemenis, the Jordanians, and the Arafat wing of 
the PLO. But that group really doesn't have anywhere to 
go if Iraq doesn't come out of this in a strong position. 
Various countries are watching and waiting to see what 
exactly happens, and will to a greater or lesser extent throw 
in their lot with the Egypt-Saudi-Arabia-Syria triangle, 
assuming that they come out of it in fairly good shape. 
That will further distance the Arab regimes from their 
publics. It would be an alliance backed up of course by the 
United States. It will therefore further exacerbate domestic 
political tensions within those countries and between the 
rich and the poor Arab states. 
I've read comments that the Arab world now is very 
much as it was at the end of the Ottoman Empire 
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Looking to the future: (left to right) Stan Correy, Bob Sprmgborg, Cl1ve Kessler, Ralph Pellman and Michael Humphrey 
just after the First World War. Is the whole region up 
for grabs? 
MICHAEL: I think talking in terms of a new conservative 
alliance probably gives too much solidity to the relation-
ships between states. The consequences of the present 
conflict are a huge Pandora's box. The irony is that it is 
totally built on American and European military and 
economic power. Despite all the previous alliance struc-
tures in the region, none of these states were able to defend 
themselves in military coalitions, so there will be a strong 
underpinning of American military backing in any Middle 
East alliance from now on. 
So the Americans are a bit like, say, the British and 
the French after the First World War? 
MICHAEL: No, I think the national identities are much 
more discrete now than they were at the end of the First 
World War. Whatever the arrangements of the states and 
boundaries and decisions about future national identity, 
the reality is that the Pan-Arab movement has been 
eclipsed by the nature of military, technological and 
economic arrangements in the region, which emphasise 
local national identities over Pan-Arab ones. Kuwait in 
particular had internationalised itself, both in terms of its 
foreign and increasingly non-Arab workforce, and in terms 
of its downstream marketing of petroleum products. 
RALPH: I think it's important to look at the larger context. 
What we're seeing overall is the privileging of the state, 
and the ideology of statism, by both sides in this conflict. 
TI1is is a long-term process. Behind statism is nationalism, 
the attempt to create that organic 'we' feeling that's sup-
posed to inhabit these odd and arbitary territorial lines on 
the map, and which Hussein has been busy building up 
behind his paper ramparts. 
The paradox, then, is that behind all this statemaking you 
have the dramatic internationalisation of the world 
economy. We can say on the one hand sovereignty is dead, 
but on the other it seems all the more important on a 
day-to-day basis. So you get these curious fault-lines run-
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ning across the world. And in addition you get people on 
the margins, the periphery, trying to fight back against this 
monolithic statemaking. 
CLIVE: Whatever the outcome of this crisis, what's hap-
pened already has changed the pattern of both internation-
al alliances and domestic politics in the region. Think of 
what the possible outcomes might be. If Saddam Hussein 
prevails, this will give a tremendous boost to those who 
have supported him and have a massively destabilisng 
effect on many of the regimes in the region. The consequen-
ces throughout the region of his defeat in war would be 
enormous. You would then have a radicalisation not of 
optimism or hope, but a radicalisation of despair, such as 
we saw in the Middle East after 1967. 
Is one of the difficulties for an Arab solution to the 
problems of the region, and for their desire to have 
control over their destiny, the fact that they have 
60% of the world's oil resources? Whoever wins, 
that fact still remains and makes the region impor-
tant to the world economy. 
MICHAEL: Phrasing the question in terms of ' the Arabs' 
is part of the problem, because ' the Arabs' in general don't 
have the oil. Particular states do, and their arrangements 
in terms of maintaining their own regimes' stability and 
their control over those resources are not with other Arab 
states; they are with the international economy and inter-
national military alliances. 
One of the slogans from the anti-war camp is 'No 
Blood for Oil'. Yet a lot ofblood has been shed over 
oil. And presumably one of the key questions that 
people have to consider is what can the Arabs do 
about this problem. 
MICHAEL: The Middle East remains a dependent region. 
You could describe the states as rentierstates. And they are 
hardly able to embark on development and industrialisa-
tion programs for which they cannot use the oil money as 
development capital. Therefore they remain dependent on 
those international alliances. 
RALPH: You may have to call them state-makers rather 
than states. But you're looking at a small elite in each state 
who relate either to each other or to the world economy as 
a whole. That's where this language becomes a bit of a trap. 
What lies behind the term 'Iraq'? There's one man, Saddam 
Hussein, but there are many millions of Iraqis who are very 
diverse. They don't all agree with Saddam Hussein-
though a lot of them do. 
BOB: We should see this as part of a 200-year history of 
Western intervention in the region and, in the course of that 
involvement, it has always been the case that various 
parties, groups, tribes and now states have attached them-
selves to those external actors to enhance their power at 
the expense of their neighbours. As a result of the economic 
dependence that Iraq incurred during the eight year war 
against Iran, America's assumption was that Iraq would 
then be subordinate in the same way that Saudi Arabia or 
Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates or Egypt were. But 
Saddam Hussein rejected that and decided to adopt the 
radical and mobilisational power of Pan-Arabism to try to 
challenge that inevitability. And that's why the United 
States has reacted so strongly to him and so now they have 
to try to destroy him. They would prefer not to destroy 
Iraq, because the oil has to be sold. Iraq has a large out-
standing debt; it is in a subordinate position; it would 
simply be another Saudi Arabia if Saddam Hussein was 
not there. 
Will there be any payoffs for the Arab states who've 
come to the party with the West? Can a linkage be 
made with the Palestinian question, for instance? 
BOB: Yes, there will have to be, because Israel has become 
an obstacle for the West in the subordination of the Arab 
states. Regardless of how the conflict with Saddam Hus-
sein ends, there is going to be some effort to confront the 
Shamir government and the threat it poses to the West's 
conceptualisation of the proper Arab order. 
Can that be done? Can you defuse Yizhak Shamir 
and can the Israelis be brought to the party to defuse 
the problems in the Arab world? 
RALPH: They don' t seem to me to be in a very com-
promisisng mood! 
CLIVE: They definitely aren't. The continuance of the 
Shamir government has indeed become an obstacle to the 
US pursuit of its own policies and interests in the Middle 
East. And the embrace of Syria by the US as part of the 
anti-Iraq coalition changes things considerably. There's the 
question of how well King Hussein in Jordan manages to 
walk the tightrope between the Palestinians in Jordan and 
the Israelis. Israel will come under pressure to make some 
kind of gesture toward reconciliation with the Palestinians. 
That would then bring home the inevitability of a Pales-
tinian settlement both to the Shamir government and to 
Israelis more broadly. 
MICHAEL: The power of the state in the Middle East is 
much more solid than we often allow. But if we look at the 
Middle East, one of the distinctive things has been the 
continual emergence of soda! and political movements 
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epinst the state and across state boundaries. Neither a 
cdcnial nor a decolonial solution has not been effective. US 
lnlervention in the world has not been markedly successful 
Iince the 60s in securing its alliances and the loyalty of its allies 
by military means. And that's been nowhere more dramatic 
than in the Middle East. On the occasions when it has directly 
lnlerwned-and specifically in Lebanon-it's just turned 
1M nm away, because the costs are so high. Only six or 12 
months ago we would have been looking at Islamic fun-
damentalism as the major threat of the region. But the reality 
II that since the attempted mobilisation of Pan-Arabism by 
Slddam the key feature of the region is again the mobilisation 
ohodal movements by Pan-Islam. We cannot assume that 
because an alliance emerges between the Saudis and the 
E&YPtians-and the Egyptians get paid off by grants and 
additional development funds-that this is anything but a 
temporary solution. 
Given that the Americans have now established a 
military presence in the region, and given their past 
record in dealing with their 'colonies', can Americ.t 
actually cope with this new colonial role? What is 
the view from Washington of what to do once this 
crisis has been settled? 
lOB: This crisis has underlined the reality of two Middle 
Euts-there is the Gulf, and there is everything else. The 
Gulf was declared by President Carter as an area of vital 
llrategic interest for the US, and now we have the fruition 
1011\e ten years later of the policy of incorporating the Gulf 
into Europe as a vital area of American strategic interest. 
AJ far as the rest of the Middle East is concerned-the 
~hery, if you will-the US doesn't care very much. 
They wrote off Lebanon and Libya; they have written off 
Slddam. Most of the periphery doesn't. have oil. It means 
that Israel now has to accommodate itself to a subordinate 
role, because there is no place for Israel in the security 
atructure of the Gulf. The Americans want the Pales-
tlanians finessed out, too. The settlement is going to be 
between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Jordan, and ul-
timately Israel and Lebanon. And the US is going to seek 
tobrobr a series of bilateral deals ofthat sort. Butit is going 
lo ensure that the Palestinians remain subordinate to these 
ltate-to-state relations. 
So they aren't really serious about changing the 
boundaries: they want to keep the states as they are? 
WVE: The history of this goes back to the 1920s, when the 
principal player in the Middle East was Britain. In the 
emerging politics of Palestine there was a very complicated 
biangle between the emerging Zionist movement, the 
British and King Abdullah of Transjordan. And all of them 
had at least tacit agreement to sort out the relationship 
between the Zionists and the Palestinians as a matter of 
ltates, in which the Palestinians would be a people but not 
a state; they would be spoken for by others. And that has 
been a constant theme in the Middle East ever since. But so 
long as people go on trying to find a solution to the Pales-
tinian problem without a Palestinian state of some sort, the 
problem will not go away. And eventually Israel is going 
lo be compelled to find a solution that disengages the 
Israeli-Palestinian problem from the game of states now 
played between it and the other existing Middle Eastern 
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states - a game which previously worked to Israel's ad-
vantage and now works to its disadvantage. The question 
is whether Israeli politics is going to allow such an option 
to emerge and allow it to prevail. 
RALPH: Bob's strategic map of the region is a convincing 
one. But when you look at it you have to say: where do the 
Palestinians go? They're really not going to go away. You 
can politely organise these bilateral deals between state-
makers and hope to stick a Palestinian state in somehow. 
But it's tantamount to stuffing jellyfish into pigeonholes. 
People fight back in all kinds of ways, not just against the 
tyranny of statemaking as we've seen it practised in the 
Middle East, but also against that modernisng logic that's 
built into capitalism worldwide- that quartet of key values: 
individualism, rationalism, centralism, materialism. But 
people don't necessarily want to live like that: they also 
want to be communal, idealistic, divine. How do we read 
these things into this very convincing strategic map? This 
is why the map will ultimately not be the clear reading of 
the conflict you would like. 
Every other region of the world has now had its 
perestroika. Can there ever be a perestroika in the Anb 
world?lt seenu to me there were a few experiments with 
political difference--elections in a few places-but that's 
been stopped now by events, particularly the invasion of 
Kuwait. 
BOB: No, because the Americans now see this as the key 
to unlocking many of their ambitions. The liberalisation of 
South America is vital to American national interests there. 
Likewise in the Middle East it is very important for the 
legitimacy of their presence. The regimes under their 
umbrella now are seen as fragile and transient: much better 
to liberalise. From the other end, of course, there's a 
tremendous desire for liberalisation on the part of the Arab 
masses. How you get these two ambitions to work together, 
and at the same time preserve the regimes that are in 
control of the various states: that's the difficulty. The 
regimes want a token liberalisation; the Americans want 
one that goes rather further; while those on the ground 
want a fullblown one. 
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There is another problem. The Middle East is the lagging 
part of the world, both politically and economically. If we 
look at developments in Latin America and Asia, we see 
that the Middle East still has the second highest birthrate 
in the world after sub-Saharan Africa. Its rate of ~n­
dustrialisation again is greater only than sub-Saharan 
Africa. Its levels of political democracy are near the most 
backward. The Middle East, which was one of the most 
developed parts of the world at the turn of our century, is 
now one of the least developed. 
Clive: 
"The greater the setbacl<s 
in the region, the more 
people are driven to a 
politics of identity." 
Are the Arabs themselves to bbme for that? Or is it 
because of the Western presence over the years? Can 
Arab political culture actually deliver tlut kind of 
liberalisation7 
CLIVE: The impulses towards liberalisation, modernisa-
tion, participation and a politics of citizenship appropriate 
to the region are important, but they're only half the pic-
ture. The other half is that the greater the setbacks and 
reversals of modernisation, and the more adverse the con-
sequences of the subordination of the Middle East in the 
world political order, the more people are driven to take 
refuge in a politics of identity, of authenticity; a politics that 
invokes some notion of Arab unity which is powerful 
precisely because it doesn't have much reality. One of the 
consequences of this process is that this Islamic politics of 
identity has not had as its only adversary the West 'out 
there': it has had a closer adversary in the Westemisers 
within. And the whole cause of modernisation, secularisa-
tion, the redefinition of Islam in ways that modern Mus-
lims would see as being authentic, but which are 
displeasing to traditionalistic Muslims-that whole 
process as gone backwards, particularly over the last 30 
years. And this is something which is characteristic not 
only of the Middle East but also of large parts .of the Islamic 
political world. I am not confident of the prospects of the 
revival of an Islamic politics which sees the essential Is-
lamic message as egalitarian, activist, participatory, eman-
cipatory-all of which is what modern Muslims claim the 
Islamic political project has been, going back to the time of 
Muhammad the Prophet. That interpretation of Islam, and 
that basis for Islamic politics, has had the ground cut from 
under it. And to the extent that the creation of such a culture 
is to some extent in the interests of the United States, I think 
the US actions in the current crisis may well have been 
self-defeating. 
Some revisionist Arab intellectuals are very critical 
of the sorts of pan-Arab slogans which have 
dominated Arab political discourse for the past ten 
or 20 yean. They talk about the need for a new 
political language, one which would replace pan-
Arabism and its various slogans. What do you think 
of that kind of call7 
MICHAEL: Even if you wanted to argue that pan-Arabism 
is bankrupt. or has no mobilisatory potential, the reality is 
that the nature of the region make ideas such as pan-
Arabism and anti-Israeli sentiment very potentforces. And 
that is part of the distinctiveness of the Middle East. When 
Saddam Hussein says he will lob chemical weapons at 
IsraeL it actually causes rumbles within the conservative 
Arab states in the international alliance against Saddam. 
So we have a big problem in imagining the possibility of 
another discourse without Pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism still 
has a mobilisatory potential in this region which, say, 
pan-Africanism or Latin-Americanism have never had. 
So you disagree with the revisionists who call these 
things empty slogans? 
MICHAEL: Pan-Arabism certainly hasn't achieved any 
specific institutional or political reforms in the Middle East. 
But it still has great power, and it won't go away, for the 
same reason that Palestinian nationalism won't go away. 
So this attempt to deal with the problems of the region by 
recourse to military and political alliances between states 
runs in the face of these incredibly destabilising elements. 
That's the dilemma and the terrible danger of the situation, 
because this is such a highly militarised area. One big 
problem in discussing the liberalisation of politics and the 
state is that these rentier states are built around economies 
which have jnjected huge amounts of money into 
militarisation, to a large part generated by the relationship 
between Arabs and Israel. And they are not inclined to 
liberalise, but rather to command through military institu-
tions and alliances. I don't see a potential for liberalisation. 
You can look at the developments within Iraq and its 
confrontation with Kuwait as part of a logic of state 
development fuelled by and running along the tramlines 
of oil revenue and militarisation. And Iraq achieved its 
current level of militarisation by means of the war with 
Iran. 
BOB: What's hindered political debate in the Arab world 
is lack of success. The Arabs cannot point to any great 
success that gives them confidence in a particular model. 
I'm not going to argue that the state system is going to 
sweep all before it. Nor am I going to argue the opposite 
proposition. that the Arab masses through mobilisation by 
Islam or some other ideology are going to redraw the 
borders of the Middle East. I think the success of one or 
other of the models that are available will then breed 
further success, and ultimately one will triumph. In the end 
we come back to economics. What's standing in the way of 
Arab economic development is the phenomenal net drain 
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out of the region since the great oil boom of 1973. 
is because the major oil-exporting states with 
tions-the chief example of which is 
tawait-have invested vast sums of money overseas. It is 
that the Middle East is going to develop 
there is such a major capital outflow. And the West 
that export of c.apital. 
The Americans are a black hole in the world 
-""my, sucking in funds from all over the world because 
massive deficit, accumulated from printing money 
to pay for the Vietnam War and their own domestic welfare 
programs. They need all the capital they can get, from the 
Middle East, from Latin America. So what you're seeing is 
America colluding with particular national elites to keep 
Ibis kind of arrangement going. 
MIOIAEL: I agree that the question of retaining capital in 
the region and limiting the outflow is important. But part 
ol the problem is that one of the key industries that has 
been associated with this export of capital is armaments. 
IALPH: You might actually have the local elites asked to 
produce some real development for ordinary people in 
these countries! 
a.JVE: It comes back to the curiously ambiguous charac-
llr of the Kuwait crisis. On the one hand, for better or for 
worse, we have an international order of states, within 
which people are not being entirely hypocritical-though 
they may be self-serving-when they protest that one 
member of this order shouldn't be able to march in and 
obliterate another. But if you want to uphold in a realistic 
worldly way the sanctity of states, Kuwait is a very poor 
alate through which to defend this particular principle. 
There is no civil society, there is no proper notion of citizen-
ship. It survived by virtue of its economic involvement 
witn the world order. So does one support military action 
to support such a state? I for one am very ambivalent. 
A number of times in the discussion we've come 
~ck to this point Military action is not going to 
10lve any of the key problems of the region. But 
there is a crying need for massive economic action. 
Should that perhaps be the starting point of any 
negotiations which result from this conflict? 
Q.JVE: I disagree with Bob to some extent because I feel 
that economics, while important, is not fundamental to the 
situation. If there is to be an alternative to war, then it will 
only be if people begin to create the circumstances in which 
alternatives can be pursued. That involves economics, but 
the primary requirement is some kind of social and cultural 
transformation of the nature of those political entities, of 
the notions of political action and participation and citizen-
ship. Only within that context will change take place. 
MICHAEL: It could well be galvanised by war, however. 
The irony is that to maintain the status quo, it would be 
much better not to have a war. A war could generate 
dramatic political transformations, though in a chaotic and 
unpredictable way. 
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BOB: I think these transformations could well be a setback. 
For example, I think the Arab-Israeli conflict is an enor-
mous red herring. A conflict will rekindle that issue and 
encourage everyone to think that if that issue is resolved 
then the whole problem of the region is over. 
MICHAEL: On the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I 
agree absolutely that it' s not central, and that its resolution 
is hardly going to solve the problems of the Middle East. 
But the political and diplomatic reality is that the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict has been the core around which militarisation 
has occured in the region, and around which alliances have 
been formed. I don't think you can ignore this question of 
the regional balance of power. 
BOB: But as I mentioned earlier, the US has found its new 
alliance structure in the Gulf, and within it Israel will play 
no role. This makes the Israelis as nervous as hell. They see 
the writing on the wall. And that's why they want a war 
which destroys all of this. They want a very bloody war, 
that's lon~-lasting with high consequences. And that's 
what they're going to try to facilitate. And the Americans 
certainly don't want that. 
So in a way Saddam's invasion cleared the decks, 
and not necessarily to the disadvantage of what the 
Americans wanted in the region. Because it gave 
them a chance to cement their new alliance? 
BOB: That's right. There's even a point of view that the US 
set Saddam up for this. Whether it's true I don't know. 
RALPH: I want to believe Bob, because it's so plausible. 
This strategic chess game is a very attractive metaphor. It's 
intriguing: you do this, and then that happens, and then 
you've lost your queen, check, checkmate. But it has its 
dangers, too. All these plans seem to make sense from a 
distance. We're pattern-makers; we want to see clarity. I 
don't think the resolution of this crisis is going to be as clear 
as that, either. Some Americans are trying to achieve one 
thing; some are trying to achieve another. You get momen-
tary resolutions of their own conflicts in a policy. We put it 
all together and we call it world affairs. And we think we're 
clever about it. 
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Setback 
The sudden departure of Margaret Thatcher has stopped 
British Labour's revival in its tracks. Its desire to rid 
itself of the past has left Labour's policy cupboard bare, 
argues Mike Ticher. 
rn leven years in opposition have done extraordinary things to the British Labour Party. Following the bitter splits of the early 1980s and electoral 
humiliation in 1983 and 1987, Neil Kinnock has 
imposed internal discipline, overhauled the 
party's marketing strategies and jettisoned many 
of the Left's most cherished policies. Unilateral 
nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the 
European Community are well and truly off the 
agenda. With the debacle of the 1979 'Winter of 
Discontent' in mind, Labour's union links are no 
longer stressed. 
Until Mrs Thatcher's demise, the leadership concentrated 
on keeping its head down, not making mistakes, and 
relying on the unpopularity of the government to see them 
through to a victory which the polls suggested was not 
entirely improbable. The party's image was fundamental-
ly negative. It was decidedly not the old Labour Party. It 
was obviously not Mrs Thatcher. But few people could say 
with any confidence what the essence of the new party 
was, or how it would behave once in power. 
This essentially ~active strategy was undone by the 
tumultuous events in the Conservative Party in November. 
Labour's lead in the opinion polls was shown to have been 
a chimera, a reaction against Thatcher rather than for 
Kinnock. Now the realisation has dawned, with less than 
18 months to go before the next election, that the party has 
to define and explain its policies and values if it is to 
convince a sceptical electorate that it is a credible alterna-
tive to a Major-led government. HWe need no longer to be 
the party of negation and can take the occasional risk of a 
party on the offensiveH, said Shadow Health spokesperson 
Robin Cook. 
During the Tory leadership election, the opinion was ex-
pressed on many occasions that a victory for Micha~l 
Heseltine would be a disaster for Labour, because his 
outlook would be perceived to be too close to the Labour 
agenda. Since his 'polities' amounted to not much more 
than a half-baked commitment to review the poll tax, and 
a vague espousal of intervention in the economy, this did 
not say a great deal for Labour's own clarity of thought or 
presentation. 
Labour's dilemma, however, is not simply a question of 
'left or right'. It has unambiguously rejected the old dog-
mas of the Left, but needs to find a radicalism of a different 
hue if it is to escape incorporation into a new, essentially 
Thatcherite consensus, not to mention further ignominy at 
the polls. The most condse expression of the form this 
radicalism might take is the aspiration to be a modem, 
European, social democratic party. But of course this 
means different things to different people. 
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The proposals contained in Labour's most recent policy 
document, 'Looking To The Future', reflect some recogni-
tion within the party that Britain has become at best a 
thoroughly second-rate European state, at worst an embar-
rassing anachronism to its EC partners. Its strong emphasis 
on education and training is one example - the participa-
tion of British 16-18 year olds in the education system 
stands at 35%, compared to the European Community 
average of 85%. 
However, it is constitutional reform which is shaping up 
to be the biggest battleground within the party as it works 
out the meaning of being 'modem, European and social 
democratic'. The salience of the issue has been dictated by 
two factors; firstly, the growing significance of Britain's 
relationship to the EC; secondly, by Mrs Thatcher's fiercely 
centralising administrations, which allowed her to 
strangle local government (or, in some cases, simply 
abolish it), ignore regional dissension (most notably in 
Scotland) and trample opposition within the parliamen-
tary system. 
The fundamental question for a Labour Party contemplat-
ing power in the 90s is whether it should seek to exploit 
this huge power of the centralised executive to force 
through its own reform program, or whether it should aim 
to change the very nature of British government-through 
decentralisation, devolution, a written constitution, the 
introduction of a second elected chamber to replace the 
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House of Lords, commitment to institutionalise individual 
rights and the introduction of a proportional voting sys-
tem. Put simply, the first option takes a confrontational 
approach; the second seeks a new consensus, economically 
between management and labour, and politically through 
a new centre-left alliance. 
The pressure for such reforms has come largely not from 
the parliamentary party, but from such quarters as the 
cross-party organisation, Charter 88, the liberal intellectual 
joumal Samizdat and the pages of the New Statesman & 
Society and Marxism Today. Their efforts have been reflected 
to a certain extent within the new Labour program. A 
parliament for Scotland and assemblies with lesser powers 
for Wales and the English regions are now firmly on the 
agenda. The House of Lords will go. In comes a Freedom 
of Information Act, although no general Bill of Rights, 
largely because of fears of giving too many powers to the 
judges in Britain's antiquated legal system. Proportional 
representation, despite a large move in favour of it at the 
1990 Party Conference, is still shunned by the leadership. 
One of Labour's fiercest critics on these issues is Paul Hirst, 
Professor of Social Theory at Birkbeck College in London. 
He firmly links Labour's half-hearted approach to con-
stitutional reform with its ambivalence over Europe: 
"There is an ideological vacuum at the heart of Labour's 
program, and therefore their approach to policy is 
piecemeal. Labour has now committed itself to European 
Monetary Union, but if it's going to do that it should also 
commit itself to a program of political union. One of the 
reasons why Labour is pulling its punches on this is that 
it's obsessed with power at Westminster. Despite the 
proposals for devolution and regional government, it real-
ly doesn't have a strategy in which greater regional 
autonomy, greater European political integration and the 
powers and functions of Westminster are meshed 
together." 
Certainly many Labour MPs do retain their faith in the 
power of the central executive to push through a radical 
Labour agenda. Left-winger Chris Mullin sees no need 
even for a second chamber of parliament: "The trouble is 
that the more democratic you make [any replacement for 
the House of Lords], the more you take power away from 
the House of Commons, which we've struggled for the last 
11 years to get control of." He decries the fact that" control 
of a part of the economy has been surrendered to the EC", 
and is equally lukewarm about power moving away from 
Westminster in the other direction, to local and regional 
government: "There is a commitment to decentraHsation, 
but history does record that when people inherit power, 
they rarely give it away voluntarily. The only example I can 
think of from recent history is Mr Gorbachev, and some 
would argue that it hasn't done him much good." 
Where Labour has adopted measures which would 
mitigate central power to some extent, its attitude towards 
them has been characterised by grudging acceptance of the 
inevitable rather than any urgency to push the debate 
forward themselves. So while the leadership's position on 
European integration has essentially been to stay one jump 
ahead of the Tories, there has been no real debate in the 
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party on the principles underlying Britain's long-term in-
volvement in Europe, despite widespread dissension from 
a fully integrationist stance. Hence Chris Mullin's rather 
reluctant pragmatism on Europe, an attitude which is by 
no means confined to the Left: "The party as a whole was 
against entry into Europe, but that's a fait accompli now, 
people accept that, like it or not, we've got to work out how 
to live with it, but I mustn't pretend that I'm happy with 
the way things are going." 
Scottish devolution is another prime example of how the 
party has had to be prodded into action, rather than taking 
the initiative. With Labour holding some 49 of the 72 seats 
in Scotland, it is clearly a vital area to them electorally. Yet 
their very dominance becomes a problem when Scots per-
sistently vote overwhelmingly Labour, only to find them-
selves subject to a succession of Tory governments. The 
disillusion with Labour has occasionally surfaced in spec-
tacular fashion, such as at the by-election in the Glasgow 
seat of Govan, which the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
took with a 33% swing against Labour in November 1988. 
Paul Hirst sees the issue as a microcosm of Labour's 
general unwillingness to embrace wholesale reform: "It's 
quite clear that the Scots are absolutely determined to 
secure a large measure of national autonomy. If Labour 
fails to deliver, they'll try to find somebody who can, and 
that somebody will probably be the SNP. So even from the 
most narrow point of view, bankrupt party self-interest, 
they ought to see the need to put constitutional reform 
upfront. But Labour is scared about Scotland. Scotland is 
well to the Left of Britain, and it's now solidly nationalist. 
From a Westminster perspective this just appears as a 
problem, rather than a bonus. Scotland hasn't sunk into 
being a declining province of Westminster, dominated by 
a dependency culture and low aspirations, which would 
have guaranteed it as a Labour bailiwick for ever. It's 
actually undergone a political and cultural renaissance. 
Labour cannot see that as a positive thing, they can only 
reactto it."' 
Those who share the 'Westminster perspective' of Chris 
Mullin have been tagged by David Marquand (author of 
Tire Unprincipled Society and a former member of the SOP) 
as the "power-hoggers" of the Labour Party. Marquand 
maintains that "the party as a whole may be social-
democratic in aspiration, but it is not yet social-democratic 
in mentality .. .It does not yet realise what support for fur-
ther European integration entails [nor] has it abandoned 
the traditional Labour reverence for the bankrupt institu-
tions of the central British state." 
One who might be expected to show less reverence than 
most, is Labour's spokesperson on Local Government, 
David Blunkett, a former leader of Sheffield City Council. 
He takes a historical view of the current tension: "The first 
majority Labour government in 1945 inherited highly-
centralised war-footing powers, and that was quite a con-
trast to Labour's program prior to the Second World War, 
when its strength lay in building from the bottom through 
the development of constituency parties, trade unions and 
local councils. The party was diverted from its historic 
roots in local institutions when people felt there was a 
necessity for speed of action to create the welfare state, to 
overcome the impact of poverty and degradation by acting 
from the centre. With the resurgence of local government 
as an issue in the last ten years- ironically because of Mrs 
Thatcher's assault on it-has come an enormous fear from 
some parliamentarians, a very great suspicion as to 
whether it can be trusted. I think at the moment we're on 
the very edge of whether a Labour government is willing 
to decentralise and whether it's willing to enter a new 
relationship with Europe." 
Paul Hirst seizes on the "myth" of 1945 to berate the 
'power-hoggers': "[Deputy leader] Roy Hattersley's argu-
ments, for example, are that constitutional reform, and 
proportional representation in particular, would prevent 
'the great reforming Labour administration, like 1945'. 
Now, what the Labour Party did in 1945 is interesting, 
precisely because it had been prepared in a bi-partisan 
manner. It took on board the radical liberal ideas of Keynes 
and Beveridge and there was a broad, long-prepared social 
consensus in favour of certain changes. The idea that an 
ordinary Labour administration, without some massive 
sea-change of opinion in the country is going to act as a 
decisive government is sheer bloody baloney. So this argu-
ment for defending the existing structures depends ab-
solutely either on traditional hard Left Labour illusions, or 
on an entirely cynical manipulation of the myth of decisive 
government by the Right." 
(Continued after tire China supplement) 
---------------------------
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D tis tempting to describe the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square, culminating in the 
bloody massacre of 4 June, as the 
spark that lit the wick of the bomb 
that eventually exploded Eastern 
.Europe and ended the Cold War. 
As far as the communist world goes, 
China hasn't done too badly. It has 
had its economic reforms-its tmen 
door policy-for the last ten years, 
and for a time even talked about 
political reform. But still, like all the 
other stalinist regimes, the Chinese 
leadership has lost its way and 
popular support. Tiananmen was 
not a triumph for the Chinese leader-
ship but rather a watershed. 
In this special supplement on China 
we examine the positions the leader-
ship has adopted in ideology, 
economics and foreign and social 
affairs since the massacre. A major 
theme running through the pieces is 
that the leadership is running out of 
ideas; it looks to the past for solu-
tions for the future. The attempts of 
the ancient leaders, and their 
younger proteges, to appear united, 
firm and confident are working for 
the moment, but are fooling nobody. 
Most know that the handful of old 
men-Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, 
Wang Zhen, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, 
Yang Shangkun-are holding on to 
power by a thread, and that events 
will move rapidly upon their deaths. 
In some ways Tiananmen has meant 
the eclipse ofDeng Xiaoping. Where 
Deng was once hailed as the author 
of economic reforms, it is now 'Chen 
Yun Thought' that is credited. Chen 
Yun finally controls economic 
policy; he thought it would be suffi-
cient to 'cage' (plan) the 'bird'(they 
call it a commodity economy, but it 
bears an uncanny resemblance to a 
market economy). but fundamental 
problems like inflation, unemploy-
ment and supply of raw materials 
remain. 
Certainly the austerity measures in-
troduced in September 1988 eased 
these problems, but cannot provide 
permanent solutions, especially 
when the leaders are keen not to fuel 
discontent among the people.In the 
past year the economy has begun to 
grow again, but growth has annoy-
ingly occurred in the private sector, 
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the very area the government had 
wanted to kill. 
In the area of international relations, 
too, China seems devoid of initia-
tives. During the Cold War era, 
China was the "third force" that 
balanced the superpowers, a positon 
which afforded it a measure of 
respect and prestige on the world 
stage. UntilTiananmen, China was 
perceived by the West as being scar-
cely communist at all, and everyone 
was eager to do business. Now 
China, while still wanting to con-
vince the West that its • door is open', 
wants to persuade the remnants of 
the communist world that it, per-
haps alone, holds the true faith. Last 
year it dismissed the changes in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as 
"serious setbacks in the develop-
ment of socialism". 
If only affairs of state were a game of 
wei qi ~o), the old men could play 
to theirneart's content. In the mean-
time China waits while the old men 
fiddle. 
-Kitty Eggerking 
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n n the wake of the dramatic events ol June 1989, the reshuffled leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has moved to reinforce its tar-
nished legitimacy through breath· 
ing new life into the official 
ideology, marxism-leninism and 
Mao Zec!ong thought. 
In doing so, the triumvirate of Deng 
Xiaoping, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin 
has not so much had to formulate 
new ideological themes as resurrect 
slogans, values and concepts which 
were already part and parcel of 
Chinese marxism, but whose in· 
fluence had declined as a result of 
the pragmatic economic policies 
pursued throughout the 1980s. 
These economic policies witnessed 
in agriculture a return to a 
household-based production sys· 
tern and the dismantling of the com· 
munes; in industry increased 
Out of 
steam 
For all intents, the Chinese leadership is energetic and 
united. But it is a fragile mask, plastered with tired 
slogans and contorted ideology, writes Nick Knight. 
prerogatives to managers and an em-
phasis on profitability, the en-
couragement of private ownership, 
and the opening of the Chinese 
economy to investment and technol-
ogy transfer from the capitalist West 
There can be no doubt that the 
retreat from socialism in China in 
the economic realm, and the 'get 
rich' mentality fostered by the CCP, 
led to a high level of cynicism among 
the population at large and among 
many intellectuals and party cadres 
towards the party's rhetoric on 
ideological issues, and it is in the 
face of this cynicism that the party 
leadership is now pushing the need 
for political and ideological educa-
tion to counter the unhealthy ten-
dencies which its own economic 
policies have engendered. 
These exhortations to renewed 
ideological rectitude are premised 
on the formulations contained in the 
resolution on party history passed 
by the sixth plenum of the eleventh 
central committee in June 1981. This 
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resolution, while commenting nega· 
tively on the policies and ideas of 
Mao Zedong during the last two 
decades of his life, reiterated that 
marxism-leninism and Mao Zedong 
thought remained the guiding and 
official ideology of the CCP. Mao 
Zedong thought is the "crystal-
lisation of the collective wisdom of 
the Party", "a scientific system " to 
which many of China's leading 
revolutionaries, especially Deng 
Xiaoping, have made a significant 
contribution. In Dang's hands, Mao 
Zedong thought has been employed 
as legitimation of an economic 
reform program which Mao himself 
consistently opposed during his 
own lifetime. 
To achieve this, Deng has stressed 
the importance of "seeking truth 
from facts" (a slogan which Mao en-
dorsed but which can be used to 
justify any set of policies, depending 
on which 'facts' are emphasised}, 
and the establishment of a form of 
socialism with Chinese charac· 
teristics (again, an open-ended con-
ception which can be redefined to 
auit the policies of the day). 
The notion of Mao Zedong thought 
u a developing system of thought to 
which other Chinese leaders can 
contribute has allowed it to be readi-
ly mobilised by the current leader-
lhip in defence of its actions in the 
wake of the events of mid-1989. In 
particular, the current leadership 
bas drawn on those themes within 
Mao Zedong thought compatible 
with a continuation of the economic 
reforms and a stress on social 
stability and party leadership. In 
other words, despite some flirtation 
with increased centralisation of the 
economy towards the end of 1989, 
Li Peng and Jiang Zemin have made 
it clear that the general thrust of the 
reforms of the 1980s, including 
opening China to the world, will 
continue. What will alter will be a 
tightening of party leadership, an 
increased emphasis on political and 
ideological work, and the inculca-
tion of values which will reinforce 
the social stability which the 
economic reforms themselves 
threaten. 
This can be seen clearly in the sort 
ofvalues being promoted. One of the 
most significant of these is 
patriotism. Li Ruihuan, a member of 
the standing committee of the 
party's Politburo, emphasised the 
importance of patriotism in a major 
speech in May 1990 on political and 
ideological work. He commented: 
"Under the present new historical 
situation of building socialism in 
Ollna, our emphasis on the impor-
tance of ideological and political 
work is intended to inspire the 
people to cultivate a dedicated and 
profound sense of patriotism for our 
peat motherland and enhance their 
national pride and confidence." 
Education in patriotism is to be car-
ried out in primary and middle 
schools. in organisations such as the 
Communist Youth League and 
Young Pioneers, and in party cadre 
schools; and this emphasis on 
patriotism, particularly among 
CUnese youth, is clearly intended to 
undercut the appeals to patriotism 
expressed by students of tho pro-
democracy movement prior to June 
1989, a movement now roundly con-
damned as counter-revolutionary 
and not at all patriotic. 
It is also very clear that a conscious 
attempt is being made by party 
loaders to link the idea of patriotism 
with the concept of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. To achieve 
this, the Chinese populace is being 
reminded ofthe virtues exhibited by 
the party and the sacrifices it made 
during the anti-Japanese War of 
1937-45. The Yan'an spirit incor-
porates the values of patriotism, 
frugal living and hard struggle, self-
reliance and a willingness to 
sacrifice oneself for the collective 
good, party discipline, and a com-
mitment to the study of marxist 
theory and to its integration with the 
realities of China's revolutionary 
struggle. Party cadres are also being 
reminded of the importance of the 
mass-line, a principle for party 
leadership formulated by Mao 
during the Yan'an period, which in-
sists on close contact between 
cadres and masses, something 
which the present party leaders 
admit has been neglected during 
recent years. A further experience 
from the Yan'an period to be revived 
is the party rectification campaign of 
1942-44, during which cadres un-
derwent intensive education in the 
party's history and policies, and in 
the sinified marxism endorsed by 
Mao. Tho push for the study of mar-
xist theory sanctioned by this earlier 
campaign is being reproduced in the 
context of the current party con-
solidation campaign in which 
cadres are exhorted to study mar-
xism and to rectify bad styles of 
work. 
The Yan'an spirit has thus been used 
as a multifaceted model for emula-
tion over the past year. Another 
model from the Maoist past which 
has had new life breathed into it is 
Lei Feng (see box). 
The struggle against 'bourgeois 
liberalisation' has been one of the 
most evident aspects of the response 
of China's leaders to the events of 
1989 but, as with exhortations to 
learn from Lei Fcng, the current 
leadership is resuscitating an al-
ready existing campaign rather than 
launching a new one. 'Bourgeois 
liberalisation' is perceived as an 
ideological trend which is hostile to 
socialism and excessively sym-
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Lei Feng 
is reputed to have been a young 
soldier whose life in every 
respect constituted a model of 
socialist probity; his thoughts, 
recorded in a diary, 
demonstrated boundless 
devotion and loyalty to 
Chairman Mao and the party; 
his actions, from the most 
menial to the ultimate sacrifice 
of his life in the people's cause, 
represented the ideal of 
subjection of self to the pursuit 
of the collective good. Mao 
Zedong launched the first 
'Learn from Lei Feng' campaign 
in 1963, and since then the 
model hero has been trotted out 
from time to time. While the 
campaign proceeded fitfully 
and without much apparent 
success during the 19130s, it has 
moved into top gear since June 
1989 as the party leadership has 
attempted to counter the 
negative influence of bourgeois 
liberalisation , a trend of 
thought within Chinese society 
which it regards as primarily 
responsible for all the 
deleterious ideological and 
political manifestations which 
culminated in the 
"counter-revolutionary turmoil" 
of mid-1989. 
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The 'four 
cardinal 
principles' 
involve keeping to the socialist 
road, upholding the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, 
upholding the leadership of the 
Communist Party, and 
upholding marxism-leninism 
and Mao Zedong thought. 
* pathetic to Western concepts of 
freedom and democracy, a trend 
which has become increasingly per-
vasive during the 1980s. As Wang 
Renzhi, director of the party's 
propaganda department, com-
plained in a speech in February 
1990, "advocates of (bourgeois) 
liberalisation began with concocting 
and peddling all kinds of reaction-
ary views gradually to erode and 
seize extensive ground in the realms 
of theory, literature and the arts, 
journalism, publications, and 
education". 
What is interesting about Wang's 
analysis of 'bourgeois liberalisation' 
is that he attempts a class analysis of 
its origins; the 'middle class', 
generated by the increased 
prosperity brought about by China's 
economic reforms, is the social base 
from which this ideological trend 
has sprung. Consequently, not only 
should the phenomena of 'bourgeois 
liberalisation' and the 'counter-
revolutionary rebellion' of 1989 be 
looked at with a "marxist class view-
point and using a class analytical 
method", it should be countered 
through the use of class struggle. In 
suggesting the need for class struggle 
to combat 'bourgeois liberalisation', 
Wang and other leaders have 
reiterated a formula coined by Mao 
in 195 7 at the time of the 'Hundred 
Flowers' campaign: while the large-
scale class struggles of the past have 
by and large come to an end, class 
struggle will continue to exist 
"within certain limits for a long time 
to come and many even grow acute 
under certain conditions". It is 
somewhat ironical, however, that 
while Wang recognises that the 
economic reforms ofthe 1980s have 
had an impact on China's class struc-
ture, producing what he describes as 
a "middle class" responsible for 
generating the ideological trend of 
'bourgeois liberalisation', neither he 
nor any of the other Chinese leaders 
has challenged the essential thrust 
of those reforms, choosing rather to 
combat the unrest and dissatisfac-
tion the reforms have caused 
through increased ideological and 
political education, and tighter 
party control over political and cul-
tural life. 
If 'bourgeois liberalisation' has been 
roundly denounced as all that is 
negative, the 'four cardinal 
principles' have been projected as 
the fundamental and unchallen-
gable values which will safeguard 
socialism in China. These principles 
had been a major theme in the 
speeches and writings of Deng 
Xiaoping throughout the 1980s, and 
had been employed previously as a 
counter to the negative impact of 
'bourgeois liberalisation', although 
they were progressively honoured 
more in the breach than in the obser-
vance. However, the threat posed by 
the democracy movement of 1989 
has seen a stiffening of resolve on the 
part of China's leadership to ensure 
that they do in fact represent the 
guiding principles which govern 
political life in China. Consequent-
ly, Deng Xiaoping's past writings on 
this topic have appeared continually 
in the Chinese press, and virtually 
all pronouncements on ideological 
matters contain reference to the 
centrality of the 'four cardinal 
principles'. They have clearly be-
come the touchstone by which af-
fairs in the realms of art, literature, 
education, journalism and politics 
must be conducted and will be 
judged, and anyone deviating from 
them runs the risk of being branded 
guilty of 'bourgeois liberalisation'. 
The upheavals of 1989 and the 
crushing of the pro-democracy 
movement have thus resulted in a 
return within the ideological realm 
to what are regarded by China's 
leadership as the fundamental 
truths of marxism: and these truths 
are being disseminated through a 
major campaign to study marxist 
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theory. Cadres and soldiers are once 
again obliged to undertake political 
education, and to study the works of 
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and 
the classics of marxism. Similarly, 
because there has been much con-
cern over the ideological standard of 
tertiary students, political education 
classes have been reintroduced to 
the curriculum, and at Beijing 
University first-year students are 
now obliged to undertake a year-
long course in military and political 
training before embarking on their 
specialist courses. 
However, one wonders how effec-
tive in the long-term this pressure by 
the party's leadership to study mar-
xism-leninism and Mao Zedong 
thought will be. The root cause of the 
ideological trend of 'bourgeois 
liberalisation' which it finds so 
threatening can be traced back, in 
my view, to the climate created by 
its own economic reforms of the 
1980s, a climate in which corruption 
flourished, in which the values of 
competition and consumerism were 
endorsed, and in which increasing 
inequality was accepted as a neces-
sary price to pay for economic 
modernisation; opening to the 
capitalist West and the destruction 
of collectivist institutions and ethos 
were similarly rationalised by refer-
ence to the imperative to expand 
China's productive forces at 
whatever cost. 
The contradictions and tensions 
generated in the economic realm 
were inevitably reflected in the 
ideological realm, and gave rise to a 
deep dissatisfaction with the party's 
political and ideological leadership. 
It remains to be seen whether the 
party can, for any sustained period, 
persist with much the same mix of 
economic policies while insisting 
on its ideological rectitude through 
appeals to marxist theory. If the 
party manages to do so, it will be 
through its increased reliance on 
coercive measures, for the greater 
the gap between its economic 
policies and its ideological rhetoric 
the more it will be compelled to 
resort to repression to compensate 
for its loss of legitimacy in the realm 
of ideology. 
NICK KNIGIIT teaches in Asian and 
International Studies at Griffith Univer-
sity, Brisbane. 
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Despite careful stage management, China presents 
many faces. Here, Beverley Hooper explores the 
contradictions. 
~ 
ithin barelr, a week of 4 
June, Be1jing news-
papers announced 
that normality was 
returning to the city after a short 
period of anti-government tur-
moil. Buses and subways were 
operating as usual and citizens 
were going about their everyday 
business. 
By early July, visitors-both Chinese 
and foreign-were again being 
photographed on the Tiananmen 
rostrum, snack-bars were reportedly 
doing good business and cinemas 
were claiming rising attendances. 
This marked the start of the social 
masquerade which has officially 
been perpetrated in China since the 
events of May-June 1989. 
But the veneer of social normality 
has been a thin and sometimes 
transparent one, barely disguising 
widespread popular disaffection 
which has prompted the post-
Tiananmen leadership also to 
present a second-and contradic-
tory-image of China in the early 
90s. 
In Beijing the surface image of 
everyday normality and even of con-
tinuing socio-economic liberalisa-
tion is so pervasive that it is 
sometimes difficult to conceive that 
this is where 'it all happened'. True, 
there has been an official assault, as 
in the earlier campaigns against 
spiritual pollution (1983) and bour-
geois liberalisation (1 987), on por-
nography, bars and their 
euphemistically-named 'hostesses' 
(acknowledged as a front for pros-
titution), and the more suggestive 
Western films. 
But there has been little more than a 
hiccup in most of the familiar-if 
sometimes frivolous-barometers of 
post-Mao liberalisation: private 
markets, tea houses and coffee 
shops, evening fairs, disco competi-
tions and fashion exhibits. On 
television there's the American 
Dynasty-style soapie, Falcon Crest, 
British drama with The Profes-
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siona/s, and a modern version of an 
old Chinese custom: TV 
Matchmaker. 
Popular magazines such as Culture 
and Life, The Young Generation and 
a host of women's magazines have 
continued to feature the consumer-
oriented and increasingly in-
dividualistic society of the post-Mao 
reform era. There are articles on the 
latest bedroom furniture, leisure ac-
tivities and, above all, love and 
romance (though rather less on sex 
than in the first half of 1 989). These 
themes are matched in full-page ad-
vertisements for everything from 
inner-spring mattresses to Princess 
beer and a host of beauty products: 
guaranteed to make you look 
younger and more attractive. 
In their portrayal ofpost-Tiananmen 
social normality, officials and the 
media have consciously utilised 
particular social groups. Young 
children, one of the most pervasive 
propaganda weapons in the PRC, 
were most cynically and blatantly 
used in the immediate aftermath of 
28 China Supplement 
4 June. Front-page newspaper 
photographs featured happy well-
dressed youngsters welcoming the 
occupying soldiers with water-
melons, enamel bowls and even 
violin recitals. Since then they have 
been a regular object of media atten-
tion, enjoying themselves at sum-
mer camps, boating with their 
families on Beihai, and studying en-
thusiastically in their classrooms. 
The use of foreigners for both 
domestic and overseas propaganda 
purposes has only substantiated the 
arguments used by some govern-
ments and individuals against con-
tinued visits. Within days of 4 June, 
Chinese and English-language Beij-
ing newspapers featured photo-
graphs, allegedly taken after the 
suppression of the protest move-
ment, of tourists chatting and laugh-
ing with soldiers on the Great Wall. 
By late July foreign tourists-who 
were much rarer than the media sug-
gests-were reportedly making such 
statements as "Beijing is as normal 
as the capital of any other country". 
Over the past 18 months, not just 
tourists but foreign business people, 
teachers and students arriving in 
China have received heavy media 
coverage to illustrate both the al-
leged return to normality and the 
persistence of China's 'open door' 
policy. 
Glamorous young women have been 
a major vehicle for portraying im-
ages not just of social normality but 
of continuing socio-economic 
liberalisation. A world removed 
from her baggy-clothed, fresh-faced 
predecessor of Cultural Revolution 
days, the fashionably dressed and 
well-groomed glamour girl of the 
post-Mao era-whether as cover-girl 
or advertising model-has served 
the interests of modernisation and 
consumerism instead of those of 
revolutionary fervour. Despite the 
assault on so-called bourgeois 
liberalisation, the use of cover-girls 
on popular magazines and 
glamorous models advertising 
everything from eye makeup to 
washing machines continued un-
abated after June. Some of the most 
striking 'cultural artefacts' of post-
June China, indeed in the history of 
the PRC, were the 1990 calendars 
featuring glossy colour pin-ups and 
disco dancers. These were on sale 
not only in private markets but in 
branches of the official New China 
Bookstore, strung up wall-to-wall 
like dazibao (large character 
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posters) in the Cultural Revolution. 
This was social distraction par ex-
cellence. 
A major aspect of the portrayal of 
social normality and liberalisation 
has been the persistent focus on 
Tiananmen Square. Far from at-
tempting to distract attention from 
the square which, in most people's 
eyes, had become a powerful symbol 
of both popular protest and official 
brutality, China's leadership has 
taken pains to reclaim it for itself. 
Once again, children have been 
heavily utilised. Barely two weeks 
after the bloodshed, 10,000 Young 
Pioneers held a 'love the Party, love 
the socialist motherland' theme 
meeting in the square which, ac-
cording to media reports, had been 
refurbished with over 2,700 square 
metres of lawns and 17 5 metres of 
hedgerows. The cover ofthe October 
issue of the magazine Chinese 
Children featured a highly stylised 
drawing of two saluting Young 
Pioneers against a backdrop of 
Tiananmen. The continuing official 
campaign to reclaim the square as a 
focus of social normality has in-
cluded the staging of everything 
from a mass 'paint-in' (on 400 metres 
of paper) to a group ballroom danc-
ing competition featuring 3,000 dan-
cers. 
It is somewhat ironic that the people 
of Beijing, of whom a substantial 
proportion had become personally 
involved in the protests from mid-
May 1989, have themselves con-
tributed to the social masquerade. In 
the aftermath of 4 June, they once 
again donned the mask of public 
compliance, reverting to a situation 
that has been more 'normal' than 
unusual in post-1949 China. Some 
of the older generation had learnt the 
lesson of removing the mask during 
the 100 Flowers movement in 1957, 
at that time in response to official 
pressure, only to find themselves 
denounced and incarcerated as 
'poisonous weeds'. During the 
Cultural Revolution, the public 
mask-sometimes even when com-
municating with one's own 
children-had become essential to 
survival. It was only in the heady 
years of the 80s that people tenta-
tively began lifting the mask and not 
until May 1989 that such large num-
bers, carried away by the sheer 
ment, discarded it completely. Their 
bravado was short-lived as state 
authority was reasserted and they 
had little alternative but to mask 
their private thoughts once again. 
This time, though, the mask of 
public compliance has been almost 
visibly transparent. The inhibitions 
that most Chinese had during the 
Mao era about revealing their 
private face to foreign colleagues, for 
example, have largely evaporated-
in all but the most ritual official 
situations-in an atmosphere of al-
most total contempt for the current 
regime. Academic colleagues and 
their relatives, for example, eagerly 
tell personal stories of corruption 
throughout the system, most par-
ticularly at the top. They discuss not 
just whether the Communist Party 
has any future but whether it has 
really been beneficial to China. Most 
of all, they express their sense of 
despair about China's present and 
even its long-term future, and ex-
pend a great deal of energy-as well 
as money~n personal efforts to ob-
tain jobs or scholarships for themse 1-
ves, and particularly for their 
children, in Western countries. 
Faced with such sentiments, China's 
so-called hardline leadership has 
resorted to making sustained efforts 
to instil 'correct socialist principles' 
among the population. At a time 
when communism elsewhere has 
been disintegrating, China's 
ideological clock has been turned 
back to the 60s and early 70s. This 
has resulted in the incongruous jux-
taposition of the discredited 
ideological stereotypes of the Mao 
era against the consumer-oriented 
images of socio-economic liberalisa-
tion: model socialist workers against 
pinup girls; thrift and clean living 
against advertisements for colour 
TV sets, washing machines and cos-
metics. 
Anyone with memories of Mao's 
China cannot help but have a strong 
sense of dejll vu as, one by one, the 
old 'socialist spirit'slogans that were 
drilled even into foreign students in 
Olina-in 1975 we learnt to recite 
them off by heart-have been 
revived. CCP General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin has urged the revival of 
the Yan'an spirit of self-reliance and 
arduous struggle that officially char-
acterised life at the communists' 
pre-revolutionary base in north 
China. Mao's call for industry to 
'learn from Daqing', China's model 
oilfield, has also been revived, along 
with a campaign to revive the 
Daqing spirit of hard work and self-
sacrifice. 
The past 18 months have also seen 
the re-emergence of the model 
socialist worker, with well-
publicised ceremonies being held in 
the Great Hall of the People to 
present awards to citizens ranging 
from a 16-year-old Inner Mongolian 
acrobat to an 84-year-old university 
professor. According to Premier Li 
Peng. the award recipients are 'na-
tional heroes, the backbone of the 
people, the mainstay of society and 
prop of the People's Republic' . 
Even that most model socialist of all, 
Lei Feng, has been recycled, despite 
the ridicule that accompanied his 
previous reincarnation in the mid-
70s. Since March last year, when a 
three-day 'national forum on learn-
ing from Lei Feng' was held in Beij-
ing, a fresh generation of Chinese 
youth has been told about the vir-
tuous young soldier (see box on page 
25). 
The major targets of ideological 
revival, however, have not been 
school children or marketing assis-
tants but intellectuals, a group 
regarded as ideologically suspect 
throughout most of post-1949 
China; the younger echelon, of 
course, dominated the 1969 protest 
movement. (In China, the term 
' intellectual' basically describes 
anyone who has graduated from 
senior high school, although it is 
also used more narrowly in terms of 
academics and professionals.) Since 
Tiananmen, academics and stu-
dents, in particular, have again been 
attending regular 'political 
education' sessions where they are 
enjoined to "realise that the leader-
ship of the Communist Party and the 
socialist system are indispensable to 
Chinlt 's prosperity". 
'Participation in labour'-another 
familiar slogan from Maoist and par-
ticularly from Cultural Revolution 
days-has also been revived. 
Television broadcasts feature smil-
ing intellectuals, including party 
cadres, strengthening their ties with 
the masses . Bemused peasants 
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watch their urban brothers (and oc-
casionally sisters) helping with the 
grain harvest and no doubt recalling 
earlier days of the unpopular 'down 
to the countryside' movement. 
The official rhetoric of success is as 
dated as the slogans. Predictably, the 
media claims that those people who 
had temporarily been led astray by 
Western culture and ideology, as 
well as by the likes of Fang Lizhi 
("the scum of the Chinese intellec-
tuals"), have realised the error of 
their ways and are now 'firmly ad-
hering to the four cardinal prin-
ciples of maintaining the socialist 
road'. Students who previously 
could not keep their hands off books 
by Sartre and Freud have reportedly 
returned to Marx. Privately - and 
sometimes not so privately - intel-
lectuals and students tell a different 
story, dismissing the outdated 
rhetoric as the ramblings of a bunch 
of geriatrics stubbornly clinging to 
powerfor themselves and their fami-
ly entourages. 
As China enters the 90s, the social 
images portrayed are probably more 
contradictory than at any time since 
1949. The dramatic juxtaposition of 
images of the post-Mao reform era 
and those of the Cultural Revolution 
decade makes one realise just how 
far Chinese society, at least in some 
respects, has changed in the course 
of little more than a decade. What 
the conflicting images reflect more 
than anything else is the present 
leadership's lack of direction and 
complete ideological bankruptcy. 
But the images are probably too in-
compatible to co-exist for very long. 
Tho question is, of course, who will 
win out: the model socialist worker 
or the pin-up girl? 
BEVERLEY HOOPER teaches in 
Humanities, Murdoch University, WA. 
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An historian friend of mine 
once remarked: "History's like a 
whore: anyone in power can 
screw her!" 
-Zhang Zhenglong. 1 
fter some two decades 
as a People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) propagan· 
dist and writer, Zhang 
Zhenglong, an army officer in the 
Shenyang Military Region, under· 
took a study of the War of Libera-
tion in the north-east of China, the 
bloody civil war that led the Com-
munist Party to power in 1949. 
White Snow, Reel Blood, a 600-
page, often-emotional account of 
the party's north-eastern cam-
paigns, appeared in late 1989. The 
shocking revelations it contains 
about the party and army-includ· 
ing details of PLA officers' involve· 
ment in opium smuggling-caused 
an immediate sensation, and it is 
said to have sold particularly well 
A small 
malter 
of truth 
During the heady 80s historians raked China's 
rich past, unearthing many surprises. Now, as 
Geremie Barme suggests, official histories again 
prevail. 
in Beijing. In mid-1990, however, 
according to an army source, 
Zhang was put under investigation 
and the book sparked a purge of 
the army publishing industry. 
Zhang had been in an ideal position 
to investigate the story. As a trusted 
member of the armed forces in the 
north-east he found many local old 
military men and civilians willing to 
speak to him. Years of writing 
reportage, a form of investigative 
journalism popular in China since 
the mid-1980s, gave Zhang a confi-
dent and fluent style. And the boom 
in publishing of the late 80s that led 
publishing houses to search out new 
and sensational books encouraged 
him to believe-like so many 
others-that he enjoyed a new 
freedom of expression. An official 
imprimatur was given to the project 
when the PLA Publishing House in-
cluded his book in a series on the 
revolutionary wars. 2 
White Snow, Red Blood presents an 
historical account of the party's 
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army that conforms entirely with 
what the population learnt about the 
PLAin June 1989. For many army 
people the most controversial aspect 
of the book is the detailed account of 
the martial feats of the 'renegade' Lin 
Biao, the military commander of the 
campaign (who was later designated 
Mao Zedong's chosen successor, 
only to die mysteriously in 1971), 
and an objective description of 
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army. 
However, for the average reader the 
most devastating section of the book 
must certainly be Part 14, "City of 
Death", which describes in chilling 
detail how, in 1948, the PLA laid 
seige to Changchun, the provincial 
capital of Jilin, and starved it into 
submission. An estimated 150,000 
civilians are said to have died in this 
stand-off between the Communist 
and Nationalist forces that was pre-
viously described as a "bloodless 
victory". 
Despite the explosive nature of the 
material and the author's provoca-
tive anti-war commentary 
throughout the narrative, the book 
continued to be sold for some 
months surviving for a time the 
general purge of the publishing in-
dustry initiated by the party in 
August 1989. Even the leading pro-
aovemment apologist 'intellectual' 
He Xin praised the book in conver-
ution with this writer and cited its 
continued sale as proof that the cul-
tural purge was aimed at specific 
•turmoil-related" elements only. 
Then in August 1990 came the 
rumours of Zhang's work being sub-
ject to internal review, and the 
detention of the bead of the PLA 
publishing house for questioning. 
By November the Hong Kong and 
Taiwan press reported the rumours 
and published excerpts from the 
book. 
Zhang was fully aware of the danger 
of pursuing independent historical 
research in China. Some of his in-
formants were all too mindful of the 
explosive nature of their knowledge. 
Zhang, however, was anxious to get 
them to speak before it was too late. 
•nme is no longer our friend" he 
reflects in his introduction, written 
in February 1989. He compares 
some of the reticent old soldiers 
(some reveal that they have the in-
formation he wants, but they can't 
possibly tell him) to the black box or 
ftlght recorder in an airplane dis-
uter. "Imagine that after incredible 
difficulties you actually manage to 
locate the black box only to discover 
you can't open it!" While many 
other writers were attracted to his-
torical topics as a kind of escapism, 
Zhang says, he had found in history 
numerous "forbidden zones" and 
"dangers lurking at every tum". 
•Sometimes I just wanted to run 
away." He even speculates about the 
need for "political insurance" for 
China's reportage writers, if indeed 
any insurance company would sell 
IUch a policy. 
By revealing so many unsavoury 
details of the supposedly most 
glorious chapter in the PLA's history, 
Zhang has so tarnished the image of 
the party's 'Great Wall of Iron' that 
no amount of insurance could have 
kept him safe. 
Historical writing and research in 
China enjoyed a period of unrivalled 
development in the 1980s. Many 
saw a key to understanding and 
dealing with the dilemmas of con-
temforary China in the past, espe-
cial y in the history of the last 
century. Although the party 
presented its own definitive view of 
post-1949 history in a document 
released in 1981, a body of works 
that constitutes the basis of a 
'parallel' history gradually appeared 
throughout the 1980s. 
One reason for this is that many 
older cadres and party apparatchiks 
who survived the party purges or 
reappeared after years of ignominy 
were not satisfied with merely 
having their names cleared, or 
having a lifetime of effort affirmed 
solely in the vague and abstract for-
mulations of a Central Committee 
document. They wanted to tell their 
own story. While state-supported 
publications were soon filled with 
the often lugubrious and elliptical 
memoirs of these elderly worthies, 
publishing houses forced to rely on 
book sales to survive produced 
volumes claiming to reveal fuller 
and more intriguing versions of the 
recent past. Mao Zedong's personal 
life and tales of 'court' intrigue 
during the Cultural Revolution were 
among the richest veins mined by 
publishers in the late 1980s.4 
Developments in tho Soviet Union 
also had a crucial impact on at-
titudes towards history. As Wen 
Yuankai, a leading Chinese thinker, 
said in January 1989: 
The bold measures which 
Gorbachev has taken since 
assuming office have had an 
extremely profound and subtle 
effect on China. Nearly all the 
reforming socialist nations are 
presently re-examining their 
ALR : FEBRUARY 1991 
China Supplement 31 
own histories, including the 
great Stalinist purges. Every day 
new details are revealed, not 
only in the Soviet Union but in 
other countries as well, 
including China. This has made 
China reflect deeply on its own 
past.5 
With the increasing publication of 
documentary materials and per-
sonal recollections, autonomous 
views of the past began to emerge, 
confounding the party's interpreta-
tion of events and even challenging 
its legitimacy as the sole source of 
historical truth. Investigative jour-
nalists, previously interested 
predominantly in contemporary is-
sues, also began to delve into the 
past, and from the mid-1980s 
produced some of the most widely-
read works. Of these writers, the 
woman journalist and fiction writer 
Dai Qing is perhaps the most out-
standing. 
Dai produced long investigations of 
two "historical mysteries" which in-
volved the silencing and eventual 
death of outspoken intellectual 
critics of the party. One was Wang 
Shiwei, the main object of attack in 
the ideological struggles in the 
party's wartime guerrilla base of 
Yan'an in the early 1940s. Dai uses 
this case-the first cultural purge 
carried out by the party-to dissect 
the nature and style of such cam-
paigns, revealing in the process that 
Wang was beheaded in 194 7. The 
other was Chu Anping, a journalist 
and famous liberal who spoke out 
against the party's monopoly of 
power in 1957. He disappeared in 
the early days of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966. Both remain un-
rehabilitated. Dai 's writings, part of 
a longer series of historical inves-
tigations, had one main thrust. As 
she put it: 
.. .I'm writing for the sake of the 
present. If it weren't for this I 
wouldn't bother writing about 
these cases. In my opinion the 
situation is exactly the same 
today, that's why I wanted to 
tell the truth about these 
incidents; so people can read 
about them and think: how 
come nothing's really changed, 
why hasn 't there really been 
any progress? 
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Dai was also involved in collecting 
data on the Cultural Revolution with 
Su Xiaokang, a journalist who was 
one of the main script writers of the 
controversial 1988 tele-series River 
Elegy, and now an exile in Prin-
ceton. Some of this material ap-
peared alongside Dai's study of Chu 
Anping in early 1989, although the 
magazine in which it was published 
was banned in August of that year. 0 
History-related works that have 
been outlawed since the massacre 
range from the serious, such as 
Dai's writings, to the sensational 
such as Su Xiaokang's account of 
the Lushan Conference of 1958, 
which many see as the prelude to 
the Cultural Revolution, and Yan 
Jiaqi and Gao Gao's history of the 
Cultural Revolution, and even the 
sacrilegious such as Their Strug-
gle-from Marx to Hitler. 
Independent historical writing both 
contributed to and profited from the 
ideological collapse of China in the 
1980s. On 13 May 1989, a petition 
signed in Shanghai by a group of 
poets and literary critics declared 
publicly that writers had a "right to 
history". Different from any of the 
other appeals supporting the stu-
dent demonstrators in Beijing, it 
read in part: 
Writers must have the freedom 
to analyse, explain and publish 
their views on all aspects of 
Chinese reality both historical 
and present, in particular 
political incidents. For a party 
official to use his position or 
administrative powers to 
restrict or interfere with writers 
or deprive them of their 
freedom of expression or 
publication is not only an abuse 
of power, but illegal. 
The rewriting of history has been an 
important feature of the party's ef-
forts at self-justification since June 
1989. The official description of the 
carnage of the Beijing massacre as a 
riot by hooligans is the most obvious 
case in point. The media has also 
been used extensively to prove the 
'historical necessity' of party rule 
and socialism in China. The most 
notable example of this has been On 
the Road, a four-part documentary 
series first screened in August 1990. 
Glossing over the "errors" of party 
rule, it affirms that China's salvation 
lies in socialism. There have been 
other such programs, like Love for 
the Republic, which deals with the 
commitment of scientists to the 
motherland, and The Spirit of 
China. 
Old war films from the early 1950s 
have also been shown in prime 
viewing time as part of the revolu-
tionary re-education of the youth of 
the nation. Much publicised newer 
films include a tale about Deng 
Xiaoping's youthful military career 
(Bose qiyi1, and an epic-length ex-
travaganza on the founding of the 
People's Republic (Kaiguo dadian). 
As 1990 was the 150th anniversary 
of the first Opium War, much was 
made of the blood shed by patriotic 
martyrs and revolutionaries for the 
cause of national independence. 
The message is simple: the blood 
debt of the past is so great, no citizen 
today has the right to renege on the 
final choice of history for China: 
marxism-leninism. 
The response to the sprouts of inde-
pendent history writing that ap-
peared in the late 80s among 
orthodox party historians is perhaps 
best reflected in comments the lead-
ing ideologue Hu Qiaomu made on 
8 March 1990 at a national meeting 
on party history. Hu, the man direct-
ly in charge of overseeing the 
production of an official party his-
tory for the 70th anniversary of the 
founding of the party this year, said 
that" ... the study of party history .. .is 
not oriented to the past; it is to con-
front the present and face the fu-
ture ... Like other areas of the party's 
ideological work our endeavours are 
concerned with supporting the 
leadership of the party, it is part of 
the struggle for the socialist 
enterprise in China. "In other words, 
the task of history or historiography 
is didactic; history is to be used to 
illustrate, not to establish, the truth. 
In that speech Hu Qiaomu attacked 
the activities of feral historians like 
Dai Qing and Su Xiaokang in a clas-
sic passage of double-think: 
Our struggle is that of science 
against anti-science, the 
struggle of truth against lies. 
Originally the true face of 
history was like this, but 
inimical forces are dead-set on 
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obliterating, distorting and 
slandering the truth about the 
past revolutionary struggles of 
the party and the people. It is 
. for this reason that we must use 
a scientific attitude, scientific 
methodology and scientific 
proofs to elucidate the various 
basic questions of our party's 
history. 
Hu has been an active practitioner of 
the "science" of history since the 
1940s. It is said he helped compose 
the key 1945 resolution that outlines 
the life of the party from 1921 which 
one observer remarked is little more 
than a "history of Mao Zedong". He 
also had a guiding hand in the 1981 
document with its highly fic· 
tionalised view ofpost-1949 history. 
Taken together these documents 
now form the basis for the official 
party history. Hu's general attitude 
to inconvenient historical source 
material is illustrated by his instruc-
tions to archivists some years ago to 
buy and hide away the memoirs of 
Zheng Chaolin, a famous trotskyite 
jailed from 1952·1979. The book, 
published for limited circulation in 
China, contained personal details of 
the lives of revolutionaries now 
enshrined in the party's pantheon. 
Hu Qiaomu has also been one ofthe 
architects of the party's "creation 
myth", the "Yan'an spirit" which is 
still touted as the bedrock of party 
rule. In Yan'an, now referred to u 
the "holy land of the revolution", the 
party evolved a Chinese version of 
the stalinist political purge and 
solidified a hierarchy under Mao 
Zedong which, despite the vicis· 
situdes of the past 40 years, has 
remained essentially unchanged. 
The eminent elders who still rule 
China are cadres from the Yan'an 
period. 
The party leaders have taken anum· 
ber of steps to ensure that Yan'an 
traditions-notably self-reliance 
and hard struggle-keep the nation 
hamstrung. To help promote the 
deadening spirit of the past, a new 
Yan'an Spirit Research Institute wu 
established in Beijing in mid-1990. 
In late 1989 "Awards for the Elite of 
Useful Old People" were also 
created, not long after the Beijing 
massacre. These awards are to en· 
sure that "the older revolutionaries 
who have been through the baptism 
of fire will live happily ... and con· 
tinue to contribute to the society". 
At the same time "golden citations" 
for "Good Children who Revere the 
Aged" were also established. To 
vouchsafe the loyalty of its young 
people the revolutionary party that 
took as its cause a total break with 
the crushing traditions of the 
Chinese past is in its own old age 
relying increasingly on "ancestor 
worship" and filial piety with 
socialist characteristics. 
In the summer of 1988 Zhang 
Zhenglong, who was writing White 
Snow, Red Blood, was inspired by 
the news from the Soviet Union that 
high school history examinations 
were being cancelled and texts 
revised. He reflected on the relation· 
ship between the makers and in· 
heritors of history in China: 
That final war [of 1948] laid 
waste to the black earth of the 
north-east. But since then what 
has continued to defile it7 As 
it's the grown-ups who've 
thrown the family chronicle 
into chaos, how can we ever 
hope that our children will 
continue it?...If you expect 
sincerity from your children, 
you must be honest yourself. 
The dissident historian can thus be 
as threatening as the political ac-
tivist or pamphleteer. 
GEREMIE BARMt Ia a research ICholar 
at the ANU, Canberra. 
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111411 party and army hiatory have been beDDed 
Into the 
wrong 
hands 
Ben Kiernan examines the less than inscrutable 
motivations behind the latest Australian and Chinese 
initiatives on Cambodia. 
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n the tenth anniversary 
of the Khmer Rouge ac· 
cession to power in 
Cambodia, Deng 
Xiaoping shocked those who saw 
China's foreign ~licy as deter· 
mined by a fear of Soviet encircle-
ment. He said the USSR may •still 
retain the bases provided br, Viet· 
nam•-the former US m1litary 
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay-1f Mos· 
cow _stopped supporting Hanoi in 
Cambodia. 
China had outlined its priorities. 
Beijing's policy was less defensive 
against the Soviets than forward-
looking, aimed at Southeast Asia, 
and locked in rivalry with Hanoi. 
Thus, after the Chinese invasion of 
Vietnam in February-March 1979 (in 
which Beijing lost 60,000 killed and 
wounded), Deng proclaimed that "it 
is wise for China to force the Viet-
namese to stay in Cambodia, be-
cause that way they will suffer more 
and more ... ". 
The German China specialist 
Rudiger Machetzki has pointed out 
that from 1977 to 1980, only 5% of 
China's anti-Soviet commentaries 
appeared in domestic Chinese 
media. Even in 1980, after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, all but 40 
out of 2,400 Chinese condemnations 
of the USSR were for foreign con-
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sumption only. By 1982, no more 
than one-third of the Chinese army 
was deployed facing the long Soviet 
border. 
China had put three conditions-
'obstacles'-on normalisation of its 
relations with the USSR: Soviet 
troop reductions along China's 
northern border, withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and an end to support 
for Hanoi in Cambodia. In 1982, 
however, China made clear its 
priority demand: "the first signs of a 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cam-
bodia would be sufficient to 
facilitate progress in Sino-Soviet 
talks". On 17 April1985, Deng again 
suggested Moscow first remove the 
Cambodian 'obstacle', the only one 
of the three not bordering China. 
During the October 1985 Sino-
Soviet normalisation talks in Beij-
ing, the Soviets proposed to 
withdraw and demobilise some of 
their troops on the Chinese border. 
Beijing was barely interested. "ln 
response the Chinese side said it 
would like to see some Soviet action 
in restraining Vietnam in Cam-
bodia," reported the Far Eastern 
Economic Review in 1985. Hanoi's 
April 1989 pledge to leave Cam-
bodia by September smoothed the 
way for the May Sino-Soviet sum· 
mit. 
China is preoccupied with Vietnam 
because it sees Southeast Asia as 
more vital than West or North Asia. 
In the South China Sea, for instance, 
China far extends its claims to the 
Paracel and Spratley Island groups 
there. Beijing has described that 
ocean expanse as its own 'territorial 
sea', legally equivalent to an inland 
Chinese lake. This extraordinary 
claim would enable China to flank 
the long Vietnamese and Philippine 
coastlines, even bringing China a 
'border' standoff with distant In-
donesia. 
In 1974 China seized the Paracel Is-
lands from the Saigon regime. By 
1988, Beijing was staging military 
exercises in disputed waters 'with 
increasing regularity' as far south as 
an offshore reef claimed by 
Malaysia. In March 1988, China at-
tacked Vietnamese positions in the 
Spratleys, sinking three ships and 
killing nearly 100 troops. But Hanoi 
held on to most of the islands. 
Beijing's attack came a decade after 
China had ended conflict over its 
eastern maritime border, agreeing 
with Japan to shelve the issue of 
sovereignty over the disputed 
Diaoyutai islands. There, moreover, 
China has claimed no vast 'ter· 
ritorial sea'. The contrast with its 
South China Sea claim is striking. 
Only in 1990, after Hanoi had 
proved difficult to drive out of the 
Spratleys, and China's international 
position had been weakened by the 
Beijing massacre, the Soviet 
withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay, and 
the Vietnamese withdrawal from 
Cambodia, did Beijing offer even to 
negotiate over the Spratleys. It 
proposed that all parties jointly 
develop them, ending Hanoi's 
military dominance there, while 
maintaining a non-negotiable 
Chinese monopoly over the 
Paracels. If published in the domes-
tic Chinese media at the time (it was 
not), the proposal might have sig-
nalled a first step towards abandon-
ment of China's claim to the whole 
South China Sea. But it would also 
advance China's current position the 
most, while requiring the most con-
cessions from Hanoi, to whom it 
directs claims by the Philippines 
and Malaysia. 
Anthony Barnett has suggested that 
China has its own Monroe Doctrine. 
Beijing eyes a Southeast Asian 
'backyard' replicating US hegemony 
in Latin America. Referring to Viet-
nam as 'The Cuba of the East', China 
{like the US) is frustrated by a former 
pet gone feral defending its 
doorstep. 
From early 1977, Khmer Rouge for· 
ces attacked undisputed Vietnamese 
territory, massacring over 10,000 
Vietnamese civilians and causing 
hundreds of thousands to flee their 
homes. Hanoi's account, cor-
roborated at the time by both US 
intelligence and Vietnamese 
refugees fleeing abroad from the war 
zone, has since been documented 
from both sides of the border. Before 
Vietnam had responded to these at-
tacks, China informed both sides 
that it supported Pol Pot's Cam-
bodia. In 1978, Vietnam offered to 
negotiate a ceasefire and settlement 
under international supervision. Pol 
Pot refused, and the war continued; 
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his Chinese support continued after 
Hanoi overthrew his regime in 1979. 
"I do not understand why some 
people want to remove Pol Pot," 
Dang Xiaoping said in 1984. "It is 
true that he made some mistakes in 
the past but now he is leading the 
fight against the Vietnamese aggres· 
sors." A Chinese diplomat con· 
curred: "One should not talk of 
compromise" on Cambodia. Beijing 
may see the Khmer Rouge and their 
two allies (Norodom Sihanouk and 
Son Sann) replaying China's own 
World War II anti-Japanese struggle, 
when the Chinese communist· 
united front tactics also gave bour-
geois allies two of 'three-thirds' of 
coalition posts. Sihanouk himself 
has attacked China's willingness to 
"fight to the last Cambodian". 
Since the collapse in the 1980s of the 
pro-Beijing communist insurgencies 
in Malaysia, Thailand and Burma, 
the Khmer Rouge is China's last in· 
ternational client force. Beijing will 
not be enticed to surrender them. 
Despite a previous undertaking to 
cut its arms supplies to them in 
return for Vietnam's withdrawal 
from Cambodia, Beijing sent the 
Khmer Rouge a large shipment of 
weapons in mid-1990. China 
provides the Khmer Rouge forces 
with US$100 million a year, accord· 
ing to American intelligence. When 
given the choice, China naturally 
blocks the isolation of the Khmer 
Rouge. It also resists moves towards 
regional concord, preferring a 
balkanised Southeast Asia with 
'many roads' to Beijing. Yet any 
agreement to isolate the Khmer 
Rouge between Vietnam and 
Thailand, if backed by ASEAN and 
the West, would be hard for Beijing 
to subvert. China would have to ac· 
cept a bipartisan Southeast Asian 
settlement. 
Precisely such a regional consen· 
sus-exclusion of the Khmer Rouge 
in return for the Vietnamese 
withdrawal-was shunted aside by 
the 1990 UN Security Council 
proposal for Cambodia. That 
weakened the Southeast Asian 
nations' 1988 provision against "a 
recurrence of the genocidal policies 
and practices of the Pol Pot regime". 
It now reads blandly: "Necessary 
measures should be taken in order to 
observe human rights and ensure the 
non-return to the policies and prac-
tices of the past." In effect, the UN 
bas condoned genocide. 
The UN's Human Rights Sub<ommis· 
lion immediately dropped from its 
egenda a draft resolution on Cam· 
bodia referring to "the atrocities 
188Ching the level of genocide com· 
mitted in particular during the period 
ofl<hrner Rouge rule", and urging all 
ltates "to detect, arrest, extradite or 
bring to trial" and "to prevent the 
return to government positions of 
those who were responsible for 
aenocidal actions during the period 
1975 to 1978". The sub<ommission 
dropped this text, according to 
Agence France Presse on 30 August 
1990, "after several speakers said it 
would render a disservice to the 
United Nations after the five per· 
manent members of the UN Security 
Council issued a joint plan this week 
aimed at ending the fighting ... " 
China dreaded a successful Viet· 
namese withdrawal from Cambodia, 
leaving an independent regime not 
hostile to Hanoi. But it happened, 
and the result has been a Chinese 
demand, with the West willingly co· 
operating, for a unanimous 'com-
prehensive settlement' -i.e. subject 
to the veto of China and the Khmer 
Rouge.lt involves outside constraint 
of the only Cambodian opponents of 
the genocide, Hun Sen's Phnom 
Penh government. 
1D late November 1989, Australia's 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans 
launched his peace proposal for 
Cambodia, calling for a UN ad-
ministration to replace Hun Sen. But 
Evans refused to take any initiative 
1pinst the Khmer Rouge, insisting 
011 a solution acceptable to China. 
The effect of this kowtow has now 
been revealed by China's ambas-
udor in London: from the beginning 
of January 1990, Beijing began send-
In& tanks to the Khmer Rouge for the 
first time in 12 years. A witness 
reports five Chinese T-59 tanks were 
banded over to the Khmer Rouge 
aear the Thai province of Trat on 21 
June. A total of 24 had arrived in 
Cambodia by October, according to 
Jane's Defence Weekly, which 
describes them as "the most sig-
nificant increase in firepower the 
resistance to the Vietnamese-in-
ltalled government has ever 
received". Gareth Evans has denied 
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this, claiming "there is no evidence 
available to the Australian govern-
ment that the Khmer Rouge has 
recently received tanks from China. 
Indeed, the consensus among the ex· 
perts is to the contrary." No such 
consensus exists. While some 
debate whether Thai forces have yet 
delivered some of the tanks to the 
Khmer Rouge, the Chinese definite-
ly despatched them in January 1990 
and the Khmer Rouge now have at 
least five and possibly as many as 28 
tanks. Evans was played on a break. 
In 1990 the Harvard Human Rights 
Journal obtained confidential Pol 
Pot speeches recorded in briefing 
notes taken by two Khmer Rouge 
commanders who defected in 1989. 
They show Pol Pot's conscious use 
of the veto that Evans and the West 
have given him over the negotiation 
process, through their push for a 
'comprehensive settlement'. In 
1988, Pol Pot secretly unfolded his 
plans to "delay the elections" until 
his forces "control all the country", 
when his officials "will lead the bal-
loting work". Khieu Samphan, his 
delegate to the negotiations, added: 
"The outside world keeps demand-
ing a political end to the war in 
Kampuchea. I could end the war 
now if I wanted, because the outside 
world is waiting for me, but I am 
buying time to give you comrades 
the opportunity to carry out all the 
tasks ... If it doesn't end politically, 
and ends militarily. that's good for 
us." Here Pol Pot interrupted, saying 
that "to end the war politically" 
would make his movement "fade 
away". "We must prevent this from 
happening." 
As I write, the Cambodian negotia-
tions remain stalled, and the UN 
fears to proceed against Khmer 
Rouge intransigence. Armed with 
ALR: FEBRUARY 1991 
this veto, the Khmer Rouge have bad 
a year's valuable time to pursue their 
-war aims. ln 1990 they seized large 
areas of northern and western Cam· 
bodia. They are in a much better 
position now than in 1989 both to 
disguise their military forces and to 
control the outcome of any elec-
tions. There is no assurance that the 
UN is serious about disarming the 
Khmer Rouge and ensuring a fair 
election in Khmer Rouge-controlled 
villages. As Evans himself puts it: 
"There can be no guarantee that they 
will not resume fighting after the 
transitional period with weapons 
which have been hidden from the 
UN monitoring process." But, he 
claims, "China will have given an 
international legal undertaking to 
cease arms supply to the Khmer 
Rouge, will be under close interna-
tional legal scrutiny to uphold that 
undertaking, and can be reasonably 
expected to honour it." Given 
China's broken promises in this 
regard, and the propensity of those 
promising 'international scrutiny' to 
cover for Beijing, no confidence is 
warranted here. 
Pol Pot said in 1988 that, in the event 
of a settlement, "our troops will 
remain in the jungle for self· 
defence". They are not prepared to 
lay down their arms. ln the same 
briefing, Pol Pot defended having 
massacred the defeated Lon Nol 
regime's officers, soldiers and offi. 
cials in 1975: "This strata of the im· 
perialists had to be totally 
destroyed." The Khmer Rouge 
predict their return with this 
slogan: "When the water rises, the 
fish eat the ants, but when the water 
recedes, the ants eat the fish." 
Wringing Cambodia dry for Pol Pot, 
the world enforces its economic and 
diplomatic blockade. In November 
1990, Gareth Evans did propose re· 
establishing an Australian 
diplomatic presence in Phnom 
Penh. But like the 1987 proposal to 
take Pol Pot to the World Court for 
genocide, this was rejected by Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke out of 
deference to China. If the Khmer 
Rouge returns to power, the Hawke 
government will share respon· 
sibility with China and the US. 
BEN KIERNAN la Associate Profet~aor of 
Hiatory at Yale University, and author of 
How Pol Pot Came to Power. 
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n n a centralised economy, albeit one that contains a market sector, the twin 
problems of slack demand and 
rising unemployment are, to say 
the least, unusual. Until these 
problems emerged economic 
'wisdom' had it that China has a 
suction-based economy that 
manifests scarcity, but provides full 
employment. 
Today China's economic planners 
find that they are faced with a situa-
tion where a significant number of 
enterprises are being merged with 
other enterprises or are closing, 
where an additional 130 million 
people will enter the workforce in 
the next ten years and, where 
economic policy must address the 
problem of a 'vicious circle' of over-
extended enterprise circulating 
funds created by slack demand. 
In an attempt in part, to unravel the 
current twin problems of a slack 
demand and rising unemployment I 
will begin by considering two fac-
tors- (i) the behaviour of advantaged 
state industrial enterprises, both 
during and after the decade of 
economic reform and (ii) the process 
of accumulation and investment 
Taking 
up the 
slack 
China's 'commodity economy' has thrown up some 
strange by-products. Kate Hannan examines the 
numerous problems of the rural sector. 
that took place during the decade of 
reform, particularly in the rural sec-
tor. 
During the decade of reform, China's 
economic planners assumed that 
reform policy would increasingly 
result in competition between 
enterprises and that this would be 
competition for profit. Indeed, 
economic reform policy did create 
competition between enterprises, 
but, rather than competing for profit 
per se, they competed for access to 
scarce production resources, the 
same resources now subject to 
demand slackness. 
Under China's economic reform 
policy, enterprises increased 
production and economised on 
resources, as intended, but they also 
continued to measure enterprise 
'success' by the size of production 
output. The latter is a characteristic 
of a suction-based economy where 
consumer demand does not inform 
production output, rather scarcity 
allows almost all products produced 
to find a willing consumer. As 
reform policy increasingly allowed 
enterprises to retain a significant 
portion of their profit, competition 
between ever-expanding enterprises 
took the form of competition for 
scarce production resources. In this 
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situation a cycle of shortage was fed, 
and advantaged state industrial 
enterprises gained an 'edge': an 
'edge' consisting of access to scarce 
producer resources through an 
ability 
- to pay above the formal price for 
scarce resources, 
- to barter for scarce resources, 
-to cultivate favour advantages, 
- to enjoy a relatively strong bar-
gaining position vis a vis ad-
ministrative authorities at all levels, 
- to provide private infrastructural 
resources (i.e. a coal-burning 
electric plant), and 
- to attract scarce technically 
trained labour-power. 
Given their competitive 'edge', ad-
vantaged enterprises were in a posi-
tion to reproduce and enhance their 
already favourable position and 
were generating a considerable call 
on funds over which enterprise 
management could exercise 
decision-making power unimpeded 
by the direct control of central plan-
ners. At the same time, state central 
planners, aware of above-price pay-
ment for scarce resources, aware 
that these prices were fuelling infla-
tion and aware that fixed-asset in-
vestment was escaping state 
planning control, attempted to exert 
.,. 
greater influence over the use of 
enterprise funds. In this context the 
advantaged enterprises came up 
with an economic innovation allow-
ing them to tap funds that, like 
nitained enterprise profit, lay out-
side direct central government con-
trol. Those were the investment 
funds of township enterprises. 
The advantaged enterprises' call on 
non-centrally controlled funds, 
then, led directly to the exploitation 
oftownship funds by state industrial 
enterprises. They were thirsty for 
ever-expanded production capacity 
(indicating enterprise 'success') 
leading to a need for more and more 
production materials to feed this 
capacity. 
At the beginning of the decade of 
reform, central government policy 
was to close the 'price-scissors'- the 
process whereby rural production, 
through the price system, provided 
accumulation for urban industrial 
development. But, in the last years 
of the reform decade, the ad-
vantaged state industrial enterprises 
significantly contributed to the un-
dermining of this policy by effec-
tively opening up a now channel for 
tapping rural accumulation for use 
in urban industrial development. 
This was done through gaining ac-
cess to township enterprise funds, 
themselves drawn in turn from a 
combination of rural agricultural ac· 
cumulation and Agricultural Bank 
and agricultural co-operative loans 
designated for rural sector develop-
ment. 
And, in time, tho policy of tapping 
township funds did not stop at chan-
neHing investment from the rural to 
the industrial/urban sector of the 
economy (indeed, it was accom-
panied by an urban consumption 
bias on a 2:1 ratio). During the period 
of economic contraction that has fol-
lowed the decade of economic 
reform, another legacy ofthis policy 
became all too evident: township 
unemployment. 
Clearly, futuro township unemploy-
ment was unforeseen. When 
township enterprises provided 
funds for advantaged enterprises, 
they saw themselves as investing 
funds in return for scarce produc· 
lion resources. They could not have 
known that in tho post economic 
reform climate of economic contrac-
tion and state anti-corruption con-
trol, advantaged enterprises would 
reduce their liabilities, not through 
reducing their core labour force, but 
through cutting their ties with satel-
lite township enterprises. This has 
been a policy that has significantly 
contributed to the situation where 
three million township enterprises 
have been closed or merged and 
where there has been a correspond-
ing decline in rural per capita in-
come. 
Under the economic reform policy 
the primary form of rural accumula-
tion came to be private household 
production. This form of produc-
tion provided funds for investment 
in the township enterprises, which 
most often manufactured industrial 
goods rather than processing 
agricultural produce. Some became 
satellite enterprises by entering into 
contract arrangements with urban 
based state industrial enterprises. It 
was, as noted above, a situation 
whereby township enterprises 
provided funding for a form of in-
dustrial development outside direct 
state control. 
Current [1990·91] policy has had to 
recognise that rural accumulation, 
instead of funding investment in in-
dustrial production, could be better 
used to support agricultural produc-
tion. By 1990 the State was investing 
more than twice the 1988 figure in 
projects aimed at increasing farm 
production and central planners' 
economic statements no longer 
glowed with accounts of China's 
richness in terms of rural labour 
power resources. The argument was 
no longer being made that: 
It is of great importance to 
transfer a large portion of 
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manpower away from farming 
to the secondary and tertiary 
industries and thus make full 
use of it ... to develop diversified 
rural economies ... 1 
The corresponding argument now 
used was that: 
The surplus labour force in 
agriculture should be absorbed 
and digested within the scope 
of agriculture. Agriculture is the 
foundation of national 
economic development. So long 
as agriculture continues to 
develop, it will be easier to 
arrange the rural labour force, 
and the cities will also find it 
easier to solve their 
employment issue .... 2 
Planners are now recognising that 
rural industries are having a rela-
tively "hard time". A 1990 survey of 
rural incomes showed that actual 
per capita income dropped by 4% 
and that for the first time cash in-
come from township and town 
enterprises experienced negative 
growth. The survey showed ihcst 
even such regions as Beijing, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong "whose economies 
have been developing rapidly a• a 
high level" showed decreases in per 
capita rural income. In the : .... e of 
this situation the Agricultural Bank 
of China has now been authorised to 
increase its lending to township 
enterprises by 11 billion yuan 
($A3.5 billion) to be used as working 
capital. 
China's planners are now arguing 
that "the rural contr11cted respon-
sibility system, based on the 
household and with remuneration 
linked to output, [the form of 
primary accumulation promoted 
during the decade of economic 
reform] should be further con-
solidated and improved"3 but that, 
the next accumulation and invest-
ment step promoted by economic 
reform policy, i.e., re-investment of 
funds accumulated in the course of 
private agricultural production or 
borrowed from rural bank and co-
operative sources, will be blocked. 
This, it is currently argued, is "be-
cause the capacity of township and 
town enterprises is limited". 
Currently planners have had to 
come to terms with a situation where 
"a part of the labor force they 
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[township enterprises) hired ... [is 
being] laid off and sent back to 
agriculture" and, a situation where, 
"with limited scope for jobs in 
cities", "a substantial number of 
surplus labor forces in the tradition-
al farming industry" must be ex-
pected.4 
Under the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
[1991-7), the focus has shifted from 
industrial development per se to 
developing agricultural production, 
especially any available rural export 
potential, together with 'basic 
industries' such as energy and raw 
materials. Current increased loans to 
township industries involved in in· 
dustrial production may thus be 
seen as paralleling past subsidies of 
the price of basic foodstuffs to urban 
workers, in the sense that they are 
loans designed to dampen the social 
dissatisfaction expected to accom-
pany loss of real income. 
Even allowing for the focus of the 
argument presented above, it would 
be wrong to blame all current un-
employment in China, or even all 
township unemployment, on the be-
haviour of advantaged enterprises 
vis a vis township enterprises 
during the decade of reform. Other 
important factors must be recog-
nised, the most important being 
problems of slack demand. 
Chinese planners' analyses of the 
cause of current slack demand fall 
into two categories. The first at-
tributes the problem to the recent 
substantial increase in savings 
deposits. The second, beginning 
from the premise that "reducing 
savings deposits will not help en-
liven the sluggish market ", at-
tributes it to a variety ofinter-related 
factors. These include: 
(i) harsh contractive measures taken 
in the early period of economic con-
traction; 
(ii) greater screening and rectifica-
tion of enterprise behaviour; 
(iii) effective measures to cut back 
government institutions' purchase 
of consumer goods; 
(iv) the current reduction in demand 
for materials for fixed asset develop-
ment. 
The second factor listed is, alone, 
recognised as having, by late April 
1990, led to the closure or incorpora-
tion into other entities of more than 
100,000 enterprises. 
Policy consequent on such analysis 
has, since the third and fourth 
quarters of 89, been based on the 
view that the enterprise 'debt chain' 
that has arisen from enterprise in· 
ability to sell their product and so 
pay their debts, should be the first 
issue addressed. Bank loans have 
been used as a 'starting device'. In· 
deed, these are loans made possible 
by the current increased level of 
savings. It is estimated that "of the 
increased loans offered [to 
enterprises) by banks and credit 
cooperatives, two-thirds came from 
savings deposits". 5 
'The topics of conversation 
nowadays' are mostly about how 
best to approach the problem of 
slack demand. But, in practice, 
policy has not consisted of the most 
discussed policy suggestions of 
readjusting the product mix, in-
creasing production of those items 
which are readily marketable and in 
short supply, and, cutting back 
production cost and promoting 
sales, especially in rural areas.8 In-
stead, it has taken the form of the 
bank loans noted above and, even 
more recently, a clearly defined 
period of enterprise debt clearance. 
The latter consisting of bank assis-
tance extended to enterprises 
specifically for clearing accumu-
lated enterprise debts of over 50,000 
yuan ($A15,000) incurred between 
1/1/89 and 31/3/90. It is assistance 
that carries with it very tight govern-
ment control of enterprise funds. 
A formal planning consequence of a 
decade of economic reform, fol-
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lowed by a period of centrally in· 
duced economic contraction, is an 
Eighth Five Year Plan that moves 
China's planning focus from rural 
industrial to agricultural develop-
ment and seeks to use the present 
period of economic contraction as 
"an opportunity" to influence in-
vestment in order to give priority to 
urban and rural infrastructure. But 
another consequence of this same 
period' is that Chinese planners, are 
faced not only with a situation of 
merging and closing enterprises, but 
also with the need to dampen the 
social effects of rising unemploy-
ment as well as trying to break out of 
the vicious circle of: 
Overspending of circulating 
funds-less investments in 
fixed assets for economic 
sectors short of 
funds ... -uncoordinated 
investment 
structure-unbalanced 
production structure-further 
increase in the spending of 
circulating funds ... 7 
The slack market that has led to this 
cycle together with the accompany-
ing unemployment are very unusual 
concerns within the context of a 
centralised economy. Indeed, they 
are so unusual that the established 
wisdom of the economists of 
centralised economies is unable to 
help. Clearly, new theses are 
needed. These will need to be in-
formed by an understanding of the 
effect of interacting central and 
private economic sectors within the 
frame of a centralised economy, 
together with perceptive analysis of 
the effect of centrally enforced curbs 
on fixed asset investment and on the 
corruption that "oils" a centralised 
economy. 
KATE HANNAN teachea in pollUca at 
MaDiuarie University, Sydney. 
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The 
force of 
wo s 
Chino's police take up a new weapon -old words -
against crime. Michael Dutton looks at the campaign. 
1!1 oll~ood moguls are not the only ones to ere· ate the illusion of a time warp. The Chinese 
public security forces are proving 
lo be something of a deft hand at 
fais also as their latest produc· 
lion-the campaign against moral 
and economic crime-amply 
demonstrates. 
Jn the Chinese production though, it 
Ia not Michael J. Fox who plays the 
leading rule but that 'unrustable 
ICI'8w', the boy scout of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Lei Fang, who 
sets star billing. Moreover, the 
Chinese production features no 
10phisticated futuristic machine to 
transport people across time. In-
ltead, it is the technologies and 
mechanisms of the past which are 
being 'transported' into the present 
to create the illusion of a socialist 
transition. 
The old Mao-style political cam-
paign and Maoist mass line 
ltrategies have made a comeback as 
policing strategies. They are joined, 
in the post-Tiananmen massacre 
period, by a renewed emphasis 
upon ideological work and the 
purity of the past. It is this ideologi-
cal purity which is now said to 
guarantee China's socialist future. 
The utilisation of past models and 
mechanisms to deal with new 
problems is not confined to the 
realm of propaganda. As mentioned 
previously it has also featured 
prominently in Chinese police 
strategies. Long before the massacre, 
Chinese police were resorting to a 
combination of Maoist-style mass-
line techniques and campaigns 
coupled with new draconian penal-
ties to deal with a rising rate of crime 
which they blamed on the economic 
reform program. New criminal 
forms seemed to be taking shape 
and, in order to deal with these, a 
number of innovations were at-
tempted, the most important of 
which were: 
• harsher penalties for those crimes 
which were targeted by the police, 
• intermittent large scale campaigns 
against these target crimes, 
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• the strengthening and extension of 
the role of the mass-line organisa-
tions. 
To redress the problem of city-based 
recidivism-said to have become 
serious in the economic reform 
period-a form of banishment was 
introduced: targeted criminals 
would be forced to remain at the 
prison site even after their sentences 
had been completed. While this 
policy was in itself nothing new, its 
more specialised use against certain 
target criminal activity was. In the 
early 1980s the targeted criminal 
group was the city-based recidivist. 
By 1984 a new target emerged-city-
based criminals who had been 
rounded up in the 1983 campaign 
against street crime and, after the 4 
June disturbances, political activists 
in Beijing were also reported to have 
been targeted. 
Attempts to introduce banishment 
as a means of solving target crime, 
however, were invariably short 
lived. There were two main reasons 
for this. Firstly, such measures were 
increasingly opposed by the prison 
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authorities themselves for such 
policies made the task of controlling 
the prison more difficult. After all, 
criminals targeted for this special 
treatment had little to gain from 
being model prisoners and instead 
quite often became disruptive. 
Secondly, for community police 
there was limited propaganda value 
in such measures. Because of their 
draconian nature and China's fear of 
international criticism such policies 
were never made public. As they 
remained secret the deterrent effect 
of such measures was limited. Con-
sequently, for the community, police 
publicly promulgated harsher 
penalties for target crimes coupled 
with politico-educational cam-
paigns around the issue as the way 
forward. It is this type of campaign 
style policing which was pursued 
throughout the reform period and 
has been a prominent feature of the 
post-4 June policing strategy. 
At the 3rd plenum of the 11th central 
committee in 1978, Premier Hua 
Guofeng signalled the end of mass 
style campaigns."Large scale tur-
bulent class struggle of a mass kind," 
he said, "had, in the main, come to 
an end." In saying this, Hua was only 
partly right. Since the 'technology' 
of the campaign found a new home 
in the mass-line policing strategies 
of the Public Security Ministry. The 
best example of this large scale tur-
bulent campaign style policing was 
the 1983 campaign against street 
crime. The 1983 campaign was 
predicated on certain legal changes 
designed to facilitate easier arrests, 
detentions and prosecutions of tar-
get criminal groups. Sections of the 
criminal code were suspended, the 
sentences for certain types of crime 
increased dramatically and the trial 
procedures speeded up. The right of 
defence and the right of appeal were 
limited. This campaign proved to be 
something of a model for later polic-
ing campaigns. 
There are clear indications that 
similar sorts of methods have been 
adopted both in the campaign 
against the pro-democracy move-
ment and in the long running cam-
paign against corruption. While few 
details of the former campaign have 
been officially announced, the party 
has been only too keen to highlight 
the scale and success of the drive 
against corruption. Consequently, 
the Chinese press reported that be-
tween January and June 1989, some 
64,584 cases of corruption were in-
vestigated leading to over 10,000 
convictions. In releasing such 
figures, the party hopes to 
demonstrate that it is actively cam-
paigning against one of the central 
concerns of the pro-democracy 
Tiananmen demonstrators: cadre 
corruption. The anti-corruption 
campaign, then, is part of a party 
campaign to re-legitimise its role in 
the aftermath of 4 June. Thus, while 
the anti-corruption campaign ap-
pears as a policing activity, its politi-
cal dimensions are never far from 
the surface. 
Similarly, the campaign against 'the 
six evils' (liu hai) cannot be regarded 
as apolitical. This campaign against 
the evils of prostitution. ·pornog-
raphy, trading in women and 
children, growing, using and trading 
in narcotics, gambling and engaging 
in superstitious activities should be 
seen as part of the party's attempt 
(along with the resurrection of Mao 
and Lei Feng) to reassert its moral 
leadership. By May 1989 the 'six 
evils' campaign and the drive 
against corruption were wed into a 
singfe and much bigger campaign; 
the yan da or severe strike campaign. 
This campaign is said by Amnesty 
International to be the "most severe 
crack-down on crime since 1983". 
While there is little doubt that such 
campaigns signal the erosion oflegal 
rights for the target criminal group 
there is much more doubt surround-
ing their long-term utility in reduc-
ing the crime rate. After all, the 
'campaign' as a technique by which 
to mobilise and politicise 'the 
masses' clearly wasn't all that suc-
cessful in the past. In hindsight, it is 
clear that the Maoist political cam-
paigns of the past had little long term 
effect upon those within the party 
said to be 'taking the capitalist road'. 
Similarly, the campaign style of 
policing currently employed ap-
pears to be having only a limited, 
temporary effect on the target 
criminal group. More importantly, 
in relation to the current drive 
against corruption, it is debatable 
whether the campaign style of polic-
ing is even a suitable response to this 
type of crime. After all, the 
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'campaign' as a mass line technique 
drawn from the maoist, populist 
past leads more toward the com-
munity than toward the higher 
echelons of the party. Yet it is 
precisely this latter domain that is 
most in need of policing if the 
popular complaints about cadre cor-
ruption are to be addressed. It is in 
this respect that one discovers the 
limits of the mass-line. Yet it is this 
mass line in policing which, in 
many respects, has become critical-
ly important in the period of 
economic reform. 
There is little doubt as to the impor-
tance of the so-called mass line or· 
ganisations in current policing 
strategies. The neighbourhood com· 
mittees, their public security com-
mittees and public security small 
groups and pacts play a critical role 
in community policing. They are, in 
fact, the backbone of local com· 
munity policing. An examination of 
China's policing figures explains 
why. China has an extremely low 
ratio of police to people: 6 per 
10,000 in the PRC as opposed to 
Taiwan with 26 (1985 figures) per 
10,000, the Soviet Union with 36, 
Britain with 25 and the United 
States with 28 per 10,000. The 
neighbourhood committee is there· 
fore an important instrument by 
which to maintain social order in 
China. This was the case before 
economic reform and there are clear 
indications that, as a result of 
economic reform, the duties ofthese 
committees have actually increased. 
As police workloads have increased 
and the nature of crime has changed, 
neighbourhood committees have 
been called upon to take over work 
previously the preserve of the 
regular police force. City based 
household registration is but one ex· 
ample; in many cities now it is the 
neighbourhood committees which 
more or less administer it. Apart 
from such mundane duties the 
neighbourhood committee has also 
been called upon to fulfil new roles. 
Now they are required by law to help 
maintain social order, help police 
the birth control policy and help 
educate the neighbourhood youth. 
One of the ironies of the economic 
reform process was that it resulted 
in the strengthening of the mass line 
organisations rather than their dis· 
appearance. It should be noted, 
however, that the mass-line in polic-
ing was strengthened, not as a result 
of the triumphant march forward of 
IOCialism but, on the contrary, of a 
crisis in policing brought on by . 
economic reform. 
Will such resurrections, then. lead 
China 'back to the future', back to a 
popular/populist form of socialism? 
Probably not, although these 
measures will continue to function 
adequately, to be maintained and 
even extended. Campaigns will 
lower-albeit temporarily-certain 
types of crime and the expanded role 
of the neighbourhood committees 
will aid the police in maintaining 
social order in the community. What 
the mass line in policing is less com-
petent at doing-and in the present 
political climate this is possibly a 
fatal flaw-is policing middle and 
high ranking party and government 
officials who are involved in corrupt 
practices. 
The ultimate question, then, is not 
whether we go 'back to the future' 
but whether the mass line in polic-
ing is capable of doing anything 
other than policing the masses. To 
construct a means of policing the 
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higher echelons of the party would 
require a degree of political move-
ment the current leadership is clear-
ly not willing to countenance. In 
place of reform, the current leader-
ship offers to resurrect Lei Feng and 
Mao. For all too many Chinese, how-
ever, Lei Feng and Mao are not a 
means by which China can go 'back 
to the future' but are themselves 
back in the past. For all too many 
Chinese, it's now time to move for-
ward. 
MICHAEL DtrrroN teachee in political 
ICienoe at Melbourne University. 
aintaining 
the rage 
A small voice of dissent 
can still be heard in 
·China, and, according to 
Undo Jaivin, it's 
becoming louder, 
without, it seems, the 
party cadres noticing. 
here's nothing like rock 
'n roll fever to wonn up 
those cold Beijing 
nights. last February, 
sleet and biting winds, 
fans packed the 18,000-seat 
Worbrs' Stadium two nights in a 
rfiW for China's first rock festival. 
Performing were six of the best of 
h ~piled's 30·odd local bands: 
h al-female Cobra, the heaT 
.tal Tang Dynasty, Breath, Ctr-
cumslances, ADO, and 1989. 
When Wei Hua,lead singer of Breath 
belted out her signature tune, "Don't 
Even Think of Stopping Me", the 
audience exploded. As the former 
Central Television newsreader sang, 
tears streaming down her face, "I 
will find a way to cast off these ropes 
and take a hold of life; the sun will 
shine down on me," the crowd 
waved burning matches, cigarette 
lighters and even flaming programs 
in response. 
There's no doubt about it, rock is hot 
in China. In a sense, yaogun (rock 'n 
roll) is to young urban Chinese today 
what 'misty poetry' was to Chinese 
youth of the early 1980s: a secret 
language defying comprehension by 
the adult establishment and a shared 
code for self-expression that im-
plicitly rejects the values of official 
culture. Even in its heyday, how-
ever, misty poetry enjoyed a limited 
audience at best; rock reaches the 
masses. And you can dance to it. 
Rock in China has come a long way 
since April1985, when British pop 
group Wham staged the nation's first 
rock concert and the few brave fans 
who tried to dance in the aisles were 
dragged off by police. Few observers 
could then have imagined that, 
within a few years, China would 
boast a fully fledged rock scene, 
complete with home-grown bands, 
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commanding legions of screaming 
fans. 
Cui Jian, China's No. 1 rock star, a 
one-man phenomenon in faded 
army fatigues and work boots who 
writes songs with titles like "Rock 
for the New Long March" was one of 
the sparks that ignited the prairie 
fire of rock. A former trumpeter with 
the Beijing Philharmonic, the baby-
faced Mr Cui appeared on Beijing's 
Central Television in November 
1985 singing what is still an endur-
ingly popular tune, "Nothing to my 
Name". 
I want to give you hope 
I want to help make you free 
But all you ever do is laugh at me, 
'cause 
I've got nothing to my name. 
A trend was born. Beijing quickly 
became the Jinggangshan of Chinese 
rock, a revolutionary bass area, if 
you will, from which the rock mes· 
sage was spread. While rock has 
reached many areas of the country, 
including Lhasa, it remains primari-
ly an urban phenomenon. The secret 
of rock's appeal was hinted at in the 
1988 short story "The Rock 'n Roll 
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Generation" by the army writer Liu 
Yiran. The story encapsulates the 
high-spirited mood of anti-
authoritarian rebellion that suffused 
the air one year later when the stu-
dents of Beijing took to the streets 
under the banners of democracy and 
freedom. In the story, breakdancing, 
sex and rock are the key to the young 
protagonist's search for personal 
liberation and fulfilment. His ir-
reverent antics at one point lead his 
relatively straight-laced girlfriend to 
ask him what was next-rocking 
into Zhongnanhai (the Communist 
Party's headquarters)? He never 
made it there, but the participants in 
the 1989 protest movement did: 
during the protests, breakdancing, 
rock and sex were part of life on 
Tiananmen Square, at the doorstep 
of Zhongnanhai. By day the 
protesters chorused the Internation-
ale; by night, they grooved to Cui 
Jian. 
Rock is, of course, a foreign import. 
Several of the most popular Beijing 
bands, such as 1989, even have 
foreign members. (ADO, Cui Jian's 
original band, recently disbanded 
when its foreign members left 
China.) In the capital, expatriates 
may also play a major role in arrang-
ing gigs, such as open, multi-band, 
mixed-crowd dance parties staged at 
such surprising locations as the an-
cient Observatory Tower. For all 
that, however, yaogun is definitely 
rock with Chinese characteristics. 
The Taiwan singer-songwriter Hou 
Dejian, who defected to China in 
1983 and was shipped back to 
Taiwan last year, was the first to 
introduce traditional instruments 
like the suona to Chinese rock arran-
gements; it's now almost a cliche. 
The films Yellow Earth and Red Sor-
ghum sparked a fad for Shaanxi folk 
music which has since melded with 
rock to form a new, hybrid genre 
known as the northwest wind. But 
even when, musically speaking, 
Chinese rock is indistinguishable 
from its Western counterparts, its 
lyrics reflect the special problems, 
feelings and concerns of contem-
porary Chinese urbanites. 
As in the Soviet Union. rock is a 
forum for social protest that may 
have no other safe outlet. This 
protest may be elliptical, as in Cui 
Jian's "Nothing to My Name" or it 
may be explicit, as in the raucous 
"Official Banquet Song", a witty 
description of cadre gluttony that 
doesn't miss a beat: 
I'm a big official so I eat.and 
drink, eat and drink. 
To the Mongolian restaurant we 
go for hot pot, 
To Quanjude for Peking duck. 
Anyway, it's not my money, 
So eat and drink and all be 
merry I 
The Communist Party of China 
hasn't figured out what it thinks 
about the rock revolution. It's done 
the twist a number of times already 
on musical issues. Having banned 
Beethoven and Debussy in the Cul-
tural Revolution, it was forced to 
rehabilitate them afterwards. In the 
early 80s it proscribed the seotimen-
tal love songs of Taiwan's Teresa 
Teng, but a few years later attempted 
to get her to play Beijing. By the time 
disco became the rage in China in 
the mid-80s-long after it was dead 
in the West-there was such 
ideological confusion that it was 
declared either spiritual pollution or 
excellent exercise for the elderly, 
depending on the commentator. 
Chinese disco reached its creative 
apex with the release of disco ver-
sions of the revolutionary model 
operas. Then Cui Jian, dubbed "the 
atom bomb of Chinese rock" by 
Taiwan's China 1Jmes Weekly, burst 
on the scene. Almost immediately, 
ideologues and cultural conserva-
tives swooped in with criticisms of 
his "extreme individualism" and 
"bourgeois liberalisation". His 
songs, they claimed darkly, had 
"negative ideological content". It's 
said that a high-ranking municipal 
official even denounced "Nothing to 
My Name" as absurd-how could a 
Chinese youth have nothing to his 
name when he had socialism? 
Today, despite ongoing purges in 
other areas of cultural and intellec-
tual life, the beat goes on. Some 
people in the party even seem to 
have concluded that if you can't 
fight 'em, co-opt 'em. The latest 
revolutionary model television 
series, On the Road: A Century of 
Marxism, the party's answer to the 
popular, controversial and now-
banned River Elegy, f~atures a title 
song sung by the rock star Liu Huan. 
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The lyrics are matched with images 
representing a short history of 
Chinese communism: Marx ("You're 
a seed of fire ... "). Lenin ("a 
prophecy"), Mao ("a banner") and 
Deng ("you spoke the truth ... "). Yeah, 
yeah, yeah. 
As a result of this sort of thing, one 
Beijing punk rocker practically spits 
when he hears the word yaogun be· 
cause "they use it now". He makes 
no compromises himself. Spewing 
beer over the heads of his audience 
and beating up on his bass player, 
his head partially shaven and a snarl 
on his face, he sings songs like "We 
Live in a Garbage Dump": 
The place where we live 
Is like a garbage dump. 
We're all insects 
Fighting and squabbling 
We eat our conscience 
And shit our thoughts ... 
Is there anything we can do? 
Nope. 
Tear it down. 
While Beijing remains the home of 
Chinese rock, even Guangzhou, 
where the mellower sounds of Hong 
Kong Canto-pop dominate the 
scene, has produced a major rock 
talent in Xie Chengqiang, composer 
of "What's the 90s Gonna Bring?". 
Mr Xie, a Shandong native who wu 
raised in Guangzhou, comes com· 
plete with all the standard rock star 
equipment: black clothing, dark 
glasses and a voice that was raked 
out of the gravel. In the underground 
music video of "What's the 90s 
Gonna Bring?" images of Sun Yat· 
sen, old people practising tai chi, a 
map of China burning, and 
Guangzhou street scenes alternate 
with visions of Mr Xie bound in red 
silk, tearing a seal of black tape from 
his mouth and smashing walls with 
his guitar. 
What is the 90s gonna bring for 
Chinese rock? It's anyone's guess. At 
an article in the Chinese-produced 
English-language magazine Nexu1 
observes, Chinese rock "like 
Chinese socialism, is still at ill 
primary stage". 
UNDA JAIVIN Ia a Canberra-b .... 
freelance Journalllt. She l• curnnlly 
wrltlllJ a book on linger Hou Dejiu. 
Thil piece i1 reproduced from All• 
Wall Street ]oumal with the penniulaa 
of the author. 
(Continued from page 22) 
The fragmentation of opinion on both the Left and Right 
• interesting. Since the 1983 election catastrophe (when 
Labour, fighting on a manifesto heavily influenced by the 
1Ift polled just 29% of the vote), and the miners' strike, 
Ideological conflict in the party has largely subsided, with 
11101t of the Left either reluctantly falling into line behind 
Jannock or (like former Greater London Council leader 
Ken Livingstone) completely marginalised. Mullin: 
•Labour has been very cautious, but it's caution that has 
come about because a massive section of the electorate has 
been bribed, and they are not in the mood for radical 
change. One of the things the leadership has been trying 
to convey is that if we are allowed back into office, we 
won't move the furniture around too much, and if there's 
any silver left, we'll leave it in the sideboard. Personally I 
don't think that's the right approach, but I understand it. 
Nobody wants to rock the boat." 
Mth the Left in this mood, divisions within the party have 
become increasingly and intriguingly cross-factional, par-
llcularly over the very issues of Europe and constitutional 
reform. Nowhere is the fault-line more jagged than on 
proportional representation. David Blunkett and Chris 
Mullin both reject it, though for slightly different reasons: 
Blunkett: "I think multi-member constituencies muddy the 
lsaue of accountability, democracy and identity very 
lbongly indeed. I'm more against it on those grounds than 
lam about the question of coalition, although that too 
Implies that there's never a government with a clear man-
date, and everything's a fix." 
Mullin's view is classically instrumental: "As far as I'm 
. concerned it means permanent coalition government. 
Now if the alternative is permanent conservative govern-
11\ft\t, then obviously that's attractive. But I'm not yet 
mdy to admit that the possibility of a Labour government 
II so remote; in fact I think it's likely that we'll win a clear 
majority at the next election. As regards the principle, I 
don't think there's any particular principle that I can think 
ol which says that the Liberal Democrats with maybe 30 
~eats should be in government and should be able to 
choose which of the other two parties should be in govern-
ment." 
But it's precisely this idea of coalition and consensus, and 
not just in parliamentary terms, which is the very principle 
underlying much of the agenda of Charter 88 and other 
would-be reformers. They argue that any credible Labour 
program must have broad-based support, and not just the 
4K or so which has sustained the Tories for the past ten 
years. Hirst: "Commitment to PR is an indication that you 
mean serious business in terms of political change, and the 
failure to endorse it means that you're relying on this idea 
ola traditional Westminster style of government." 
For all their recalcitrance on PR, the policy shifts pushed 
through by the Labour leadership in other areas have been 
IUbstantial and in many ways remarkable. On Scotland 
and Wales, for example, the debates seemed to be dead and 
buried after the failure of the 1978 referenda, while the 
abolition of the House of Lords had long been considered 
Christopher Mullin 
a pi pedream of the Left. What is striking about this change, 
is that it has been largely unaccompanied by any thorough 
or wide-ranging intellectual debate within the party - so 
much so that David Marquand has characterised Labour's 
approach as ' the silent road to power'. The explanation is 
that Labour remembers only too well the disastrous effects 
of the infighting of the early 80s, and has no desire to wash 
any more dirty linen in public. Nevertheless, the absence 
of an intellectually rigorous grounding for Labour's 
policies bodes ill for their coherence and stability if and 
when they finally get into office. As Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques noted in the December 1990 issue of Marxism 
Today: "intellectual revolutions are normally characterised 
by enormous energy, ... modes of thinking are transformed 
overnight accompanied by enormous excitement, a fer-
ment of ideas. All of this is missing from the Labour Party." 
It's a view shared by David Blunkett: "I don't think it's in 
any way undermining unity to say that we should debate 
values and ideology much more, not as an alternative to 
saying and doing the right things to win votes, but as a 
method of underpinning that, so that we were more clear 
ourselves how our policies relate to each other and how 
they could be built on each other." Paul Hirst goes further: 
"It's fascinating if you think about it, that the old Com-
munist Party of the 1970s and 80s was in a way far more 
of a thinking party of the centre-Left than Labour ever 
could be. The Labour Left just didn't want to think, they 
had decided on what they were doing and that was it. And 
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it's still true, the Labour Party simply isn't an intellectual 
party." 
What Hirst and others fear is that even if Labour were to 
win power at the next election (which is very far from 
certain), a Kinnock government would very quickly 
founder, not because its individual policies were ridiculous 
- in fact many of them are eminently sensible - but 
because it lacks a vision of the sort of society it wants to 
create, not to mention a broad base of support for working 
towards that vision. 
It's in the realm of economic policy, of course, that Labour 
will primarily be judged by the electorate-perhaps more 
accurately, by the small group of skilled and semi-skilled 
workers in key marginal constituencies who will effective-
ly decide the election. What has Labour learned from its 
last experience of government? The short answer seems to 
be that it has ditched any thought of a statutory incomes 
policy ("it simply would not work", according to 'Looking 
To The Future') in favour of credit controls as its primary 
anti-inflation measure. What it has not learned is how it 
might go about creating the kind of industrial consensus 
which exists in other European countries (Germany being 
the obvious example) and which demands the re-educa-
tion of both management and trade unions. For example, 
Labour's program for vastly improving the education and 
training of Britain's workforce depends crucially on the 
support of management, yet little thought seems to have 
gone into creating mechanisms for consultations between 
government, management and unions without going back 
to a style of corporatism involving only the peak bodies. 
The failure to foster consensus on the economic front (huge 
task though it is) is absolutely in tune with Labour's timid 
stance on constitutional reform, which displays a gaping 
hole where there should be an overarching vision of new 
forms of co-operation in society. Labour talks a lot about 
the divisions caused by Thatcherism, but in reality the 
divisions are part of Britain's outdated political and in-
dustrial structure, and will not be healed by a party cling-
ing to those confrontationist institutions and methods. 
When asked what it is about Labour's program which is 
now genuinely radical, MPs tend to respond with specific 
individual policies, rather than an overall thrust of the 
agenda which might fundamentally reshape society. Chris 
Mullin highlights measures to control media ownership, 
to reform the judiciary and on the funding of political 
parties. David Blunkett singles out the proposal for a na-
tional minimum wage (another indication of the yawning 
chasm between Britain and the rest of Europe); measures 
which recognise people as consumers as well as workers; 
moves towards preventive medicine. "What I would like 
us to do/ he says, "is to be much more radical on the 
industrial and manufacturing front. What's happened in 
Eastern Europe shows that there's no going back, we've 
got to look at new ways of social ownership and social 
involvement, ways of diverting resources into productive 
economic activity and not just service and financial 
centres." 
But time is running out for this sort of new thinking to take 
root. Paul Hirst believes that Labour is too hidebound by 
its traditions to be genuinely radical: "What's crucial about 
the party is not that it be centre-Left, but that it be radiazl. 
'Labour is not seized by a radical spirit. One of the reasons 
for this is fairly obvious: that the existing Labour Party had 
to get over the kind of Left sectarianism which by disen-
gaging with the mass of ordinary people, condemned itself 
to be irrelevant. But having walked away from that kind of 
disengaged radicalism, it hasn't been able to revive itself 
as a radical party. H 
Labour has a huge responsibility not only to arrest the 
changes wrought by Thatcher if elected, but also to build 
a credible and cohesive agenda which will have a good 
chance of seeing it through to at least a second tenn of 
office. Expectations are currently low, and Kinnock himself 
commands no great respect outside the party. Few believe 
that Labour in power would be much more than a holding 
operation, dissipating some of the worst effects of what by 
then could be nearly 13 years of Tory rule, but unable to 
drag Britain into the European mainstream, where it so 
clearly needs to be if it is not to become even poorer, dirtier, 
worse educated and more insular than it already is. As 
David Blunkett puts it: "there is no doubt whatsoever that 
the decision was taken by the leadership of the party to 
approach things in a softly softly manner, to make sure that 
people are no longer scared of the Labour party. The con-
sequence of that is that we are now seen in some circles as 
not having the kind of clarity and conviction which certain-
ly I would like us to display.H Certainly no-one is scared of 
the Labour Party. But the important question now is, is 
anyone inspired by it? 
MIKE TICHER, a member of ALR's editorial collective, 
recently returned to Britain for several months. 
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Last March the environment was an electoral panacea. 
Since then it's been pushed steadily to the political wings. 
Kitty Eggerking spoke to the ACF's Phillip Toyne about 
the rapid change of fortune. 
rn ecenUy various criticisms have been levelled at you. The environment movement has been called latter-day jeremiahs, the newest threat to social 
stability and is said to lack intellectual rigour. 
How do you respond to such claims? 
Unfortunately, more and more of those statements have 
been coming from the ALP- certainly senior economic 
ministers in the government. They belie the facts. We have 
consistently applied intellectual rigour to the positions we 
put so that even our critics in normal circumstances have 
been prepared to acknowledge that the document we put 
to the government on sustainable development was the 
only serious submission to grapple sufficiently with 
economic and ecological issues. The government's own 
discussion paper showed an abysmal understanding of the 
ecological imperatives that really need to underpin the 
question of how this country is going to earn its wealth 
without ongoing environmental degradation. 
The attacks are politically motivated, by and large. We are 
eeeing economic ministers who believe they have pre-
viously been rolled over by green issues now using the 
economic downturn as a good excuse for a backlash. 
Nobody who looks at the political debate of the last five 
years can argue that the greens have won so overwhelm-
ingly that we are the major contributors to the economic 
problems. It would be flattering to think that we'd had that 
degree of influence but unfortunately the facts don't bear 
it out. I suspect John Elliott, A Jan Bond and Holmes a Court 
have had significantly greater impact on the economy. 
So, to answer those critics, do you have an economic 
blueprint - a greenprint - for the future of 
Australia? 
We've got a pretty good philosophical outline for the 
process of working towards an economic blueprint, and 
it's unrealistic, I believe, to expect more at this stage. We've 
very vividly and professionally identified the level of en-
vironmental degradation. We've used economists to help 
us evaluate the current economic system and its account-
ing and show how they lead to an ongoing perpetuation 
of those problems. For instance, we don't take into account 
the loss of our natural capital when looking at profit and 
loss equations in the national accounts. Nowhere in those 
accounts is found the fact that an average of 200 tonnes of 
soil is lost per hectare per annum. We have not depreciated 
the paddocks in the account books to have a clear under-
standing of what the production of our wheat crop, say, is 
costing us, as opposed to earning us. We're very good at 
knowing what the profit lines are, but we're not very good 
at realistically spelling out the cost. 
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We've gone to great lengths to try and understand the 
economics of the situation, to see where it works and where 
it doesn't; we've tried to evaluate the economics of various 
industries, like forestry, which comes in with surprisingly 
awful economic returns on top of the environmental costs. 
Can you be more specific on that point? 
We're seeing a forest industry that's moving very dramati-
cally from being a saw-log industry to a woodchip one 
because most of the pulpwood is for export - the lowest 
value end-use of the forest product, say $60 a tonne. We're 
now importing papers from between $1500 and $5000 a 
tonne, and it therefore comes as no surprise that we've got 
a $1.7 billion a year deficit in forest products. Even if you 
evaluate the issue on the industry's own terms- that is, 
with a myopic economic agenda-you come to a negative 
conclusion. But add the environmental costs on top of that, 
then there's reason for concern. 
Do you have an alternative economic model for 
industry and the future of this country? 
Certainly we've been suggesting for some time that the 
national accounts ought to be expanded so that environ-
mental degradation is built in as a component of the ac-
counts. The Dutch are doing that; so are some of the 
Scandinavian countries and the Japanese are even factor-
ing in some of those accounts now. Clearly we have to. We 
can't use our capital as income without eventually becom-
ing bankrupt, both biologically and economically. 
Our document also establishes 13 principles, which we 
belieye are fundamental to the redesign of a biological and 
economic system that will see us through in a permanently 
sustainable sense rather than the short-term one we're 
running at present. .. 
Is there any evidence of an Australian industry 
sector adopting new ways of thinking and behav-
ing? 
Not on a broad sector-wide basis.There is no industry 
that's currently gearing up to a sustainable strategy, but 
there are some very encouraging indications within sectors 
that people are doing something. Twelve months ago there 
would have been roughly 50 land-care farmers' groups 
around Australia; the number is now closer to 500. That's 
exciting because even if the farmer is coming at the issue 
from an economic self-interest point of view he can see that 
ongoing substantial soil loss and increasing salinity are no 
good for his economic outlook. Farmers are therefore 
breaking new ground in their dealings with the conserva-
tion movement in a way that, say, the mining industry 
clearly isn't. The Australian Mining Industry Council 
[AMIC] represents what I would consider the last bastion 
of the defensive, bunker mentality that has characterised 
the industry over the last two centuries. There is no indica-
tion that government or industry has resolved to move 
swiftly to new directions. If anything there is now a tem-
porary backlash, a greenie-bashing exercise, which is 
meant to indicate that we've had our way too long, that the 
balance has swung too far in favour of the environment, 
that we now have to return to moderation, which means 
more economic activity unconstrained by environmental 
controls. There are more fragile farm lands being cleared 
and we know there will be soil loss as a consequence. There 
are more industrial processes in train that will result in 
pollution. For industry to suggest that everybody now 
wants a sustainable society and that everybody is environ-
mentally aware, but then to match that with actions that 
amount to more of the same, is to make a nonsense of 
what's being said about the greens at the moment. 
You've pointed out in your submission that it's no 
longer possible to take just an economics or an 
environment approach to planning, but rather that 
the two must go together. 
We have rejected out of hand the idea of balance as the 
appropriate concept, which carries with it the political 
evaluation of who should get what. The greens win some, 
industry wins some- that's the classic dispute-resolving 
mechanism that's always applied to, say, industrial rela-
tions, w,here both sides put up an ambit claim; the con-
ciliator is then forced to produce a middle course on which 
politicians will then glibly say 'it pleased no one and 
therefore it must be about right'. 
If we endorse that approach for managing our environ-
ment, the outlook is disastrous. The challenge is to work 
out how to generate wealth, to provide an adequate stand-
ard of living for people in this community, but to do it in 
ways that no longer produce an ongoing decline in the 
quality of our life through declining environmental stand-
ards. 
It must be enormously frustrating to you that in-
dustry keeps doing what it's always done and noth· 
ing will convince it to change. 
Things do convince it to change. They change if govern-
ment regulations require them to change. It is equally true 
that industries change very dramatically when green con-
sumerism comes to bear, and we've seen lots of good 
examples of this recently. A good negative example is how 
people's understanding of aerosols contributing to ozone 
depletion has resulted in a continuing drop in the aerosol 
market share, despite the fact that aerosols are no longer 
propelled by CFCs. They've changed the gas, but not 
people's perception. A positive example is the unbleached 
toilet paper market which was seen as a curiosity, a novelty 
niche, when it was first introduced. Now it's grabbed an 
enormous market share - 20% plus - and suddenly the 
manufacturers have had to scramble to provide a product 
that people are clearly demanding. You only have to look 
at the supermarket shelves to know that manufacturers are 
cottoning onto the notion that there's money to be made 
from environmental awareness. 
That's still traditional manufacturing. It's not 
making a leap forward - to look at new tech· 
nologies, at new techniques, at totally new 
products. 
Yes, and I'd say that it also manifests another ongoing 
problem: that no one is seriously challenging the ap-
propriateness of expanding consumerism. They're not 
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ll)'ing consume less; they're saying consume something 
that's less environmentally damaging. I suspect that 
100ner or later as a community we're going to have to 
consume substantially less per capita than we are now. 
Some people who see themselves u progressive 
would argue that we have to continue to have 
economic growth so that all sections of the com-
munity can have an equal standard of living. That 
raises the question of how much we need for a 
.ensible lifestyle. 
It also throws up the specious argument that we have to 
be wealthy to protect the environment, that we have to 
have growth economies if we're to achieve environmental 
tmgets, that we have to be a wealthy nation to have a clean 
environment. It is, to put it mildly, an extraordinarily 
eelf-serving proposition put by industry. There can be no 
doubt that abject poverty leads to environmental degrada-
tion and that overpopulation has got a link with poverty 
and therefore environmental degradation. There can be no 
doubt that raising standards of living in big populations 
has historically produced a slowing of population growth. 
Those things are well documented. But at the end of the 
day if these people seriously suggest that the only way that 
we can meet our environmental problems is - for our 
current global population, let alone the doubling of it 
which will occur before the end of the century- to achieve 
1 standard of living that we in the developed world enjoy, 
they have to be joking. We are clearly talking about an 
ecological consequence that is too awful to contemplate. 
How then do we get an agreed-upon agenda, and 
quickly? Are the government's sustainable 
development working parties going to help in that? 
There's one major flaw in the process- the government 
put up an inarticulate discussion paper and received 
leVeral hundred responses to that. Instead of trying to 
•imilate the response material into a position paper, the 
government set up the sectoral wortdng groups. They 
went immediately into a reductionist exercise of industry 
by industry discussions, when they'd left aside the ques-
tion of broad principles that should be applied. What are 
the national issues? What changes to the economic settings 
are needed? What should the national accounts reflect? 
What is the effect of the current federal system on our 
environmental problems? After much lobbying we have 
finally got a reference to the National Population Council 
on an ecologically sustainable population level for 
Australia, and that is the only thing the federal govern-
ment is doing to provide the big picture for the time the 
sectoral working groups are in operation. We're in eight of 
the nine working groups because we believe we can't 
afford not to be, in terms of trying to raise the level of 
ecological understanding. To simply stand aside is politi-
cally irresponsible. 
I wanted to ask you why the Wilderness Society 
decided not to participate in the working parties. 
It wu, of course, a party to our submission, and that was 
the first time the big four national groups had ever come 
together for a policy paper. They decided after a lot of 
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anguishing that they wouldn't be in the working parties. 
They believe decisions like logging in the south-east and 
Gippsland forests are pretty clear indications that the 
government doesn't have an understanding of or a com-
mitment to sustainable development. They believe that 
their efforts are better directed at community awareness, 
but I must say that while I respect their decision I think it's 
ill-conceived because we have made it a pre-condition of 
the working groups that an extensive community consult-
ation mechanism be built into the process, and we're com-
mitted to ensuring it's not mere tokenism. We want to 
ensure that the government isn't making major policy 
decisions in a vacuum, with a complete lack of community 
understanding of sustainable development. 
Is it possible to go beyond the old economic summit 
model, the consensus model, to shift the thinking? 
You've very dearly pointed out the different perspectives 
of the players in the game. The indu~ry groups, the 
government representatives, see it as a collective bargain-
ing mechanism. Because we're not going to settle for an 
outcome that's a pale imitation of what the process calls 
for, we're likely to see a collapse of at least some of those 
working groups in the same way as the Salamanca agree-
ment fell apart in Tasmania. The world view of the green 
participants carries with it a great urgency, a great deal of 
anxiety about what we've done to the planet. We're not 
talking about whether 2% of some forest goes into a nation-
al park or whether Coronation Hill goes ahead or not. 
We're talking about re-establishing the criteria upon which 
our economic plans are developed, so that the plans will 
meet a biological test. 
In the last election it pleased people to be seen in 
your company. Are you anxious about the backlash 
and what do you do to rebuild that? 
My anxiety does not go to whether we're the flavour of the 
month in Canberra or whether cabinet thinks we're the 
good guys. I wish they'd be honest enough to project 
accurately what our influence on the election was. We did 
influence the outcome but some people are choosing to lie 
about it. My anxiety is not nearly as acute as the situation 
might suggest in the sense that we have to have the longer 
view. There's absolutely no doubt that changes are sweep-
ing the globe, and we're in the vanguard of these. They are 
irreversible; demands are being placed on governments 
and industry to be environmentally responsible. They will 
continue to exist and continue to be an election issue and 
at the forefront of community priorities. As far as winning 
back the battle, I suspect that we can readily get to people. 
Peter Garrett's going to be a key player. His band commit-
ments, which have kept him out of action for a year, are 
coming to an end, and he's very keen to be right in there 
as ACF president over the next year of so. That will 
produce a dramatic shift. And we're now doing things 
smarter than previously. The big national organisations 
combining forces is a clear indication of that response. 
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Some people would say: you've proved yourselves 
as lobbyists; when are you going to stand up and 
become a political party? 
ACF never will. I've consistently said that ACF should be 
non-party political. Peter Garrett shares that view. So did 
his predecessor, Hal Wootton. That's because ACF has a 
role and function of its own. It's true that there's a growing 
disillusionment among environmentalists in the com-
munity and they will be looking to any option other than 
supporting Labor in the next election. Labor has to accept 
that as a result of the cynicism they've shown since the last 
election. Whether that translates into the establishment of 
a green party or an affiliation with some other progressive 
party or an involvement with the Democrats remains to be 
seen. The Democrats have certainly been very vigorous in 
their attempts to attract the environment movement, but 
that's been resisted. The Democrats are clearly picking up 
many, many votes from the disaffected in the community. 
Some people would also say that there's a fun. 
damental shift coming in politics. Do you share that 
view? 
Environmental issues now occupy the centre place in the 
progressive agenda to the great disadvantage of 
Aboriginal, social welfare, social equity, women's and 
other issues. I suspect that is because environmental con-
cerns strike a chord with everybody. I suspect that other 
issues will wax and wane, but environmental issues will 
stay with us. Whether that translates into a long-term 
viable base for a political party I don't know. 
Were you surprised by the fuss that occurred before 
the government took the decision over emission 
level targets? 
It reflected a couple of things. Industry ministers and 
industry clearly believed it had the potential to overturn 
their growth economic agenda. They want Australia to 
develop, get bigger, do more, produce more and therefore 
consume more energy and contribute more to greenhouse. 
What they hadn't done, and displayed a woeful lack of 
information about, was to look at the studies prepared for 
the Commonwealth by the likes of Amory Lovins from the 
United States, and Denny Green from Victoria, which 
showed that 20% reduction targets could be met on an 
economically cost-beneficial basis by saving energy. To 
save 20% is substantially cheaper than to generate another 
20%. So the result was heavily conditional; it won't happen 
if it r.roduces commercial disadvantage. The reason we 
didn t get steamed up is that we're more than satisfied that 
they can do it on a commercially advantageous basis. It's 
fairly clear that once you go beyond 20% to fiercer reduc-
tions you begin to get into the area of economic pain. 
There's nothing in this whole mechanism that provides the 
broad overview, the long-term vision. I think the ACF is 
good at that. We have people who are specifically given the 
responsibility to maintain the long-term view. Our re-
search and policy analyst is meant to be looking at what 
things will be like in 20 years time, not after Christmas. As 
this decade goes on, we'll be setting more and more of the 
agenda. 
Yo~'ve been working with trade unions. Has that 
relationship been fruitful? 
With individual unions and Trades Halls, it has. We can 
always find areas of common interest, especially in areas 
like occupational health and safety, hazardous chemicals, 
transport-related issues. We got a joint submission up on 
the VFT. But when we deal with institutions like the ACTU 
the relationship is hostile and shows no likelihood of com. 
ing good. The union movement ignores the fact that nearly 
half of all trade unionists are now white collar workers. A 
huge proportion are teachers or public servants, and they 
constitute the largest membership group we have, yet their 
environmental concerns are basically ignored by the 
ACTU. They have consistently sided with industry on 
issues like forestry, pulpmilJs. 
They consistently reject environmentalism as a middle· 
class wank, with nothing to do with the real gutsy workers' 
issues. They consistently ignore the fact that while their 
recruiting campaign targets women and young people it is 
these people that are joining our organisation. They are 
missing a major community seed change, and that's to their 
great discredit. Our ttlations have been quite hostile, and 
on their part quite vitriolic. 
I suspect the ACTU will come around when it has its first 
woman president, when it has a substantial rethink of its 
role and constitution. There's absolutely no doubt that it's 
becoming marginalised. It's essential that we end up with 
the trade unions on side, where they don't treat economic 
growth as the underpinning of their objectives to the ex-
clusion of everything else, where they start to address the 
issues that are relevant to their membership. 
And what about other organisations? 
We've now expanded our capacity to deal with Aborigines. 
We've got one Aboriginal woman working with us, and 
we're likely to have another one based in Queensland 
shortly. That's a vital link. It's critical if for no other reason 
than Aboriginal people are now the land owners of some 
of the most important nature conservation and wilderness 
areas in Australia. There can be no doubt that we are going 
to rely on them increasingly as sound managers of their 
environment. 
We've got a clear interest in youth and youth affairs. Our 
youth delegation to the Ozone Conference in London this 
year is the high-water mark of my time at ACF. Young 
people are going to be immeasurably stronger environ-
mentalists than we are. 
Linking farmers through the rural liaison positions has 
been another vital breakthrough. It's given us the capacity 
to deal with farmers on a much closer basis and, given the 
conservatism of rural society, that's an essential element of 
the success. 
KITIY EGGERKING it ALR'• production editor. 
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A Woman's 
CURSE 
Psychiatrists often treat women as inherently disordered. 
The latest candidate for female disorder, 
reports Denise Russell, is pre-menstrual syndrome. 
For some psychiatrists I PMS is the cause of everything 
from bank robberies to domestic violence. 
~ 
sychiatry has functioned in the past to 
support notions that women are some-
how inherently disordered. While this 
function continues today, its focus has 
changed in keeping with developments in the 
theorising of female criminality. 
Until the 1970s at least, women were viewed as disordered 
u a reflection of sex-role stereotypes. A mentally healthy 
woman differed from the adult (male) standard of mental 
health by being more submissive, less independent, less 
adventurous, less aggressive, more excitable, more emo-
tional and less objective. Such a description amounted to 
saying that there is a logically necessary link between 
women and disorder. A slow erosion of the sex-role 
stereotypes has taken place, especially with the increased 
participation of women in the workforce-even into tradi-
tional male domains within the workforce- and, to a 
lesser extent, with the rising female crime rate. As the 
stereotypes break down so too does the basis for concep-
tualising women and disorder. 
In the mid 20th century the diagnosis of depression really 
arne into vogue as the mental illness that large numbers 
of women suffer from. Depression was usually thought to 
have a biological base, related to faulty neuro-transmitter 
functioning, probably with a genetic component. How-
ever, the genetic studies have come under heavy criticism, 
and the evidence for neuro-transmitter malfunctioning 
was only ever indirect. In the late 70s, studies pointed to 
social factors such as women's marital and employment 
status. For instance, married women with no employment 
outside the home and parenting pre-school aged chi1dren 
ran a much higher risk of depression than other people. 
Four very large longitudinal studies-in Sweden, Canada 
and the US -now suggest that men are just as likely to 
suffer from depression as women. The researchers at-
tribute this shift to various occupational factors such as 
increasing male unemployment (Sweden), expansion of 
women's participation in the workforce (Canada) and par-
ticularly in traditionally male-dominated areas (US). These 
studies support the earlier notion that depression is an 
artefact of socially-imposed restriction on the female role. 
While there are still strong adherents to a biological factor 
in depression, a recent survey of biological psychiatry 
claims that identification of a biological abnormality may 
have no causal significance, and there is a growing caution 
in assertions relating to the biological base of depression. 
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PMS - defined 
I<atharina Dalton, a major English theorist on PMS, 
claims that the term PMS covers a wide variety of 
symptoms which regularly recur in the same phase of 
each menstrual cycle followed by a symptom-free phase 
in each cycle. This phase may be anywhere from ovula-
tion to four days into menstruation. She explains that the 
term PMS was chosen at a time when it was not realised 
the symptoms can occur at menstruation and ovulation. 
Dalton claims the term premenstrual tension covers only 
the psychological symptoms-depression, lethargy and 
irritability. PMS includes these and somatic symptoms, 
e.g. asthma, epilepsy and migraine. In the book. Once a 
Month, Dalton elaborates on the psychological 
symptoms. She says that "the image of women as fickle, 
changeable, moody and hard to please" and our periodic 
irrationality can be explained in terms of the "ebb and 
flow of the menstrual hormones". 
Dalton claims that the symptoms of PMS are at their 
worst during the four days prior to menstruation and the 
first four days of menstruation. She used the term 
'paramenstruum' to cover these eight days. These days 
are linked with low levels of progesterone, and she 
regards PMS as a progesterone-deficiency disease. 
Judith Bardwick supports the view that depression, ir-
ritability and hostility form part of the PMS but says they 
are "predictable, normal, emotional states in ·women"-
another variant of the theme that it is normal for women 
to be disordered. 
If it is the case that depression is primarily a disease that 
women experience and if depression is also very common, 
then the assumption that women are inherently disordered 
seems to receive some support. However, if depression is 
experienced almost equally by men and women and if the 
rates are dropping for women, then support for the as-
sumption about women's disorder is undermined. If, too, 
it is accepted that depression can be understood in relation 
to social factors rather than biology then the previous high 
rates of depression in women can be explained in tenns of 
their occupations-almost exclusively housekeeper and 
child-rearer. 
Some psychiatrists and doctors have now shifted their 
gaze to aspects of women's normal reproductive function-
ing-e.g. menstruation and menopause-and are claiming 
that these are linked to mental disturbances and that they 
constitute disorders or diseases of a psycho I physical kind. 
This is a variant of the old theme: that it is normal for a 
woman to be disordered, again according to a male norm. 
Men are more aggressive than women, so it is disordered 
to be submissive. Men do not menstruate, so it is disor-
dered to do so. An attempt is being made to provide a 
general understanding of women's disorder then in terms 
of reproductive functioning. Depression has acted as a 
'catch-all' diagnosis for those discontented with their lives. 
In a 1985 survey of the literature and clinical experience 
concerning PMS, Halbreich and others state that" at least 
200 symptoms and complaints have been reported to 
occur premenstrually" and some of the symptoms are 
positive, for example, increased affection and sex. They 
call this the Increased Well-Being Syndrome. To their 
credit, they use this finding to distance themselves from 
calling PMS a disorder. They prefer to talk about pre-
menstrual changes. 
Rubinow and others in another survey in the same year 
claim that over 150 symptoms representing every organ 
system have at one time or another been attributed to 
PMS and that there are no symptoms which are either 
necessary or sufficient for the diagnosis. 
They offer the following operational definition of PMS: 
"a cyclic disorder with symptoms that are of sufficient 
severity so as to interfere with some aspect of living and 
that occur with a consistent and predictable relationship 
to menstruation" but they point to the wide variability 
of claims regarding which time is supposed to be 
relevant. The catch-all nature of the definition then starts 
to emerge. Thus, it is not surprising that some put the 
incidence of PMS at 100% of women. It is strange that 
PMS went undetected for so long, since it is not sup-
posed to be a product of social circumstances but rather 
our biology. Dalton claims that "very few of the doctors 
in practice today had any training in diagnosing or 
treating what we now know is the world's commonest 
disease ... ". 
Just as this diagnosis is applied to fewer women, another 
is announced, one that can only apply to women: the 
pre-menstrual syndrome (PMS). Most of the Western 
world accepts the American Psychiatric Association's 
(APA) system of psychiatric diagnosis, and in its 1987 
revised classification PMS-technically called Late Luteal 
Phase Dysphoric Disorder-is listed as a mental disorder. 
Some psychiatrists are currently writing about PMS as 'the 
world's commonest disease', with claims that it is ex-
perienced by 80-100% of women. 
Biological distortions are now more commonly used to 
explain women's criminality. Since 1980 the APA has clas-
sified all criminal behaviour-whether or not it is accom-
panied by mental disturbance-as a psychiatric disorder 
(including petty theft, truancy, vagrancy). It is not surpris-
ing then that new theories of women's crime should be 
linked to the rising importance of PMS (see box above). 
Psychiatry provides women with opportunities to concep· 
tualise their discontent in various ways and gives them 
hope for an answer. In the absence of other social forces 
offering solutions, it is likely that psychiatry will continue 
to be viewe<;i as playing a positive role. There is complicity 
in the theory linking women' s crime to PMS. The use of a 
defence on the basis of PMS has only very recently been 
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introduced into legafactions and it is the defence lawyers 
who medicalise the criminality. From a broader perspec-
tive this works against women's interests since the so-
cial/political motivations for crime are overlooked. I 
tontend that the diagnosis of PMS has been introduced to 
strengthen the idea that women are disordered and to 
apecify more precisely the biological basis of women's 
crime. 
JfPMS is a widespread biological fault, why is it only now 
being recognised, especially as some report the incidence 
lobe 100% of women? Is it now being recognised or is it 
DOW being invented? I want to reject both those answers 
and argue that the high incidence of PMS is produced by 
a combination of factors: 
• Some women do experience cyclical changes in mental 
and/ or body states. 
• The subjects in PMS studies do not constitute a random 
sample of women. Rather, they are women seeking the help 
of the medical profession or being tried in criminal courts. 
If the former, then they may have a psychiatric problem 
Which is mistakenly diagnosed as PMS. 
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It is possible that the patient will comply with this diag-
nosis for a variety of reasons: acceptance of expert opinion, 
desire to medicalise problems to avoid other means of 
handling them, wanting an excuse for anti-social acts and 
so on. Women criminals may ha~e an additional motive to 
medicalise their crime in the hope of a more lenient sen-
tence. 
• Beliefs and expectations may produce experiences of our 
bodily states which may differ with changing beliefs and 
expectations. Diane Ruble conducted studies in which she 
purportedly convinced one group of women that they 
were in their 'premenstrual' phase and found that they 
reported higher levels of menstrually-related pain than did. 
those who had been told that they were in the middle of 
their cycle. This, coupled with the background assumption 
that we believe or expect the premenstrual time to be 
painful is taken to show that beliefs about the menstrual 
cycle can influence women's descriptions and experiences. 
(I find the gullibility of these subjects hard to accept, but 
the general idea that beliefs and expectations influence 
experience is well supported in other areas-for instance 
the placebo effect. It is quite possible then that some 
women's experiences of PMS are produced by evolving 
cultural beliefs about the premenstrual time.) 
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PMS and criminality 
Icard, writing in 1870, claimed disorders of menstruation 
gave rise to kleptomania, pyromania, homicidal mania, 
suicidal mania, lying, etc. Otto Pollack. writing in the 
book. The Criminality of Women, in 1961 also suggests a 
strong link between women 's crime and menstruation 
especially for shoplifting, arson, homicide and resistance 
against public officials. Dalton refers to these criminal 
categories and relates them to the premenstrual phase or 
to menstruation. She adds to the list: suicide attempts, 
citing a lecture given by Pollitt to the Royal Society of 
Medidne in 1976 where he said that the timing of suicide 
attempts helps to explain their failure: "Killing oneself is 
not easy, success requires careful planning. Women in 
the premenstrual phase show a marked tendency to be 
careless, thoughtless, unpunctual, forgetful and ab-
sentminded. This inefficiency at a time when they are 
more likely to try to end their lives may result in a 
disproportionate failure." 
Dalton also relates assault to PMS: "There are those cases 
of assault where in a sudden fit of temper the woman 
throws a rolling pin at her neighbour, a typewriter at h~r 
boss, or tries to bite off a policeman's ear. There are the 
cases of baby-battering, husband hitting .. and so on." 
Theft, being drunk and disorderly and all crimes of 
violence are related, by Dalton, to PMS, and she claims 
that information from the courts and police in the UK. 
US and France support her view. The phenomena of 
'battered husbands' seems of particular interest to her. 
She sympathetically reports the claims of two US re-
searchers that there are 12 million battered husbands in 
the US, that it is the "most unreported crime", affecting 
20% of husbands. 
Judy Lever in the book The Unrecognized Illness adds wife 
battering to the crimes of violence attributed to PMS. 
• Nearly all the studies on PMS have used retrospective 
data. Yet recent studies employing prospective and 
retrospective data indicate that retrospective ratings over-
estimate symptoms experienced or that symptoms do not 
turn out to have any relation to the menstrual cycle. This 
suggests that data on PMS are produced by a particular 
method of collection, and if the method was changed the 
reported incidence of PMS would drop significantly. 
• A spokesperson for the US National Women's Health 
Network stresses that a lot of PMS is 'iatrogenic'; that is, it 
is caused by medical treatment. It often appears for the first 
time after a woman has stopped taking birth-control pills, 
after tubal ligation or even after a hysterectomy. 
• Some researchers claim that women experiencing PMS 
may not actually be aware that they are doing so. Accord-
ing to Judith Bard wick. "'one seems to see the cyclicity of 
This occurs when the wife provokes the husband by her 
own violent behaviour when suffering from PMS. 
In two English court cases in 1981, Dalton gave 'expert 
evidence' that PMS diminished the responsibility of the 
women killers. The judge accepted PMS as a strong 
mitigating factor, and the women walked out of the court 
with no punishment. In other cases of arson and assault 
where Dalton appeared as an expert witness, PMS was 
accepted in pleas for mitigation of sentence. PMS has 
been used in plea bargaining in the US and is recognised 
in the French legal system as temporary insanity. 
In the courts, PMS has been brought in only to explain 
crimes of violence-and then only were the violence is 
out of character or atypical of stereotypical female be-
haviour: (A normal woman could not behave like this; 
she must be sick.) This suggests that the courts are 
adhering to male/female stereotypes that are breaking 
down in other areas. There is a trend to see violent 
criminal women as doubly disordered-by not comply-
ing with the female role and as suffering from PMS. 
The apparent rise in the female crime rate has been one 
factor leading to the need to develop a theory of women's 
criminality. Yet if the changed incidence of female crime 
is accepted then it would be reasonable to assume that 
such crime must depend on some factor which has 
changed rather than some constant factor such as biol-
ogy. It might be relevant, for example, that more oppor-
tunities have been opened up by women's changing 
social role for women to organise robberies. It is also 
worth noting that nearly all the crimes referred to by the 
PMS researchers involve aggression. Aggression could 
be taken as a protest against injustice. To medicalise it 
means that the injustice remains unquestioned; the 
woman is kept in her place. 
the affect response more clearly in measures which are less 
self-aware or conscious probably because people per-
ceived themselves as being more consistent than they ac-
tually feel". This perspective means that a great deal of 
scope is given to the doctor to read the syndrome into the 
woman's experience and thus inflate the incidence rates. 
Because of all these compounding factors in the diagnosis 
of PMS, we have no way yet of knowing how many women 
do suffer from a biological malfunction that is labelled 
PMS. It may, in fact, be quite rare. The popularity of the 
diagnosis cannot then be explained by appeal to biology, 
but there are ideological factors that make sense of it. 
That there has been a move away from the diagnosis of 
depression in women and that attitudes about the mental 
health of women are shifting leads to a need to reconcep-
tualise women and disorder-if you believe that women 
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Causation of PMS 
Many theories concerning the cause of PMS have been 
advanced, the three main contenders in the 
psychiatric/ medical area being: 
1. A progesterone deficiency disease. The reasoning here 
Is as follows: cyclical changes occur in women, they are 
worse when progesterone is low, hence it is 
progesterone deficiency that causes the cyclical changes. 
Dalton introduced this view before accurate measure-
ments could be made of hormone levels, but she claims 
support for her view in observing the effectiveness of 
progesterone as a cure for PMS. 
Recent developments in the testing of hormone levels 
have not supported Dalton's hypothesis. Women with 
high degrees of cyclical mood change have not shown 
any difference in progesterone level from women with 
low degrees of cyclical mood change. Also a fairly con-
sistent finding is that progesterone is no more effective 
than a placebo as a therapy for PMS. 
2. A surge of testosterone production premenstrually: 
Judith Bardwick and others attempt to link PMS with 
fluctuations in this androgen, a perspective which fits in 
neatly with recent psychiatric theories about male 
criminality. These theories attempt to explain criminal 
behaviour biologically by relying on a postulated 
relationship between aggression and crime. Some 
theorists further claim that the male hormone, tes-
tosterone, affects the level of aggression. The basis given 
Is that castration seems to have a calming effect and that 
males are more aggressive than females. 
There are many problematic features in this approach. 
Not all crimes committed by men are related to aggres-
sion, and it is not the case that all males are more aggres-
sive than all females, even though all males in the 
reproductive-age group produce much greater quan-
tities of testosterone than females. Recent more accurate 
chemical tests have not backed the theory that tes-
tosterone production is linked to PMS. 
3. Neuro-transmitter malfunctioning. Many theorists 
suggest that psychotropic drugs may alter the neuro-
are disordered. A new diagnostic category is produced that 
will help fulfil these needs. The label sounds quite specific, 
disguising its catch-all nature. The weakness of the theoris-
Ing used to support the notion of PMS as a diagnostic 
category is underplayed. 
It defuses the political impact that women's crime might 
have had. It provides justification for women's unequal 
position in the workforce. Dalton asserts that "the cost to 
industry of menstruation is high" and then details the 
harmful effects in various industries in Sweden, the UK 
and US before recommending that employers handle these 
transmitter functioning. Although this package of theory 
and treatment recommendations is also adopted by 
many, no direct evidence has been found linking PMS 
with neuro transmitter-malfunction nor cures for PMS 
with psychotropic drugs. 
None of these theories concerning the cause of PMS are 
well enough supported to provide a convincing answer 
to the appropriateness of the grouping of characteristics 
that are supposed to be a sign of PMS. 
Halbreich and others writing in the Canadian ]aurnal of 
Psychiatry state: "An evaluation of the literature ... leads 
us to the conclusion that at present there is no solid 
evidence for any of the hypothesised pathophysiological 
mechanisms of pre-menstrual condition." 
Rubinow and Roy-Byrne state in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry: "Despite 50 years of study there is still 
surprisingly little known about menstrually-related 
mood disorders; questions of etiology and treatment are 
largely unanswered." 
Both the major British medical journals have published 
editorials emphasising the doubt that exists about the 
scientific basis for claims made about PMS. 
Comments such as these should not be taken as indica-
tions that psychiatry will drop the attempt to explain the 
disorder of women in terms of PMS. They would most 
likely be read as challenges for theoreticians to come up 
with more convincing causal theories. This has been a 
typical pattern in the relationship between papers in 
psychiatric journals and ideas propagated in psychiatric 
texts and through practitioners. 
So the fact that there is no solid evidenCe for the cause of 
PMS will probably drive psychiatrists into new theoreti-
cal approaches and this theoretical activity, independent 
of the content of any particular theory, may have the 
effect of in fact bolstering ideas about the reality of PMS 
as a psychiatric disorder. 
problems by giving women time off or assigning us to less 
skilled jobs. Employers might be encouraged by such 
reasoning not to employ women at all. 
The diagnosis of pre-menstrual syndrome is carrying the 
ideological weight which the diagnosis of depression used 
to bear. The full impact of this shift has not been ex-
perienced in Australia. It would be heartening if, on this 
issue, we didn't follow these overseas trends. 
DENISE RUSSELL teaches in the Department of General 
Philosophy, University of Sydney. 
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Indian Summers 
I 
Australian cricket's relationship with the 
Indian sub-continent has been marred by 
prejudice and mistrust. Rodney Cavalier 
spoke to the author of a new book on the subject. 
fter nearly eight 
hours at the crease, 
Dean Jones' physiol-
ogy was falling apart. 
The humidity in the Chepauk 
Stadium at Madras was drain-
ing the energy. The sun was 
blazing. The stands blocked 
whatever relief there might 
have been from a stray breeze 
off the Bay of Bengal. An open 
sewer ran right past the ground. 
Jones had accumulated a cen-
tury by then, carried on past 150, 
and now he was begging to get 
back to the pavilion. 
Throughout the innings, Mike 
Coward, one of the tiny Australian 
press corps, had trained his binoculars 
on Jones from the shaded but steamy 
pressbox. He was witnessing the 
prelude to the astonishing finish to 
this First Test against India in 1986-87. 
It was just another day too, a day spent 
watching cricket, writing and filing 
against deadlines made impossible 
for the Australian newsmen by the 
difference in time zones. 
Coward had been reporting cricket 
full-time during the 80s in a career that 
began as a copyboy in 1963. Writing 
cricket was what he had always 
wanted. By the end of the West Indies 
tour of 1988-89, cricket had become 
more than he had ever wanted. Mike 
Coward was burned out professional-
ly, the summers had become endless 
as he followed the Australian crick-
eters across the hemispheres. Well 
before the West Indies tour ended, he 
had been telling colleagues the season 
was going to be his last. 
He would endure one more Indian 
summer. He had a book in mind, a 
history of Australian cricket on the 
Indian sub-continent. 
Even for a sport that deifies a scholarly 
interest in its arcana, the project was 
pushing specialisation to new fron-
tiers. Allen & Unwin, publishers, 
blessed with a certifiable cricket 
fanatic as its managing director, was 
offering every encouragement. The 
Sydney Morning Herald granted a 
year's leave of absence. In June 1989 
Coward took up residence in a fishing 
village 20 kilometres south of Madras, 
armed with a Brother EP22 typewriter 
and several reams of thermal paper. 
He might have written his book based 
on his extensive notes of past tours 
and interviews with the Australian 
players in each era. That was not the 
point. 
"I wanted to do as much as I could in 
the environment," he explained back 
in his inner-Sydney study. "It was a 
big house, bigger than I needed. I 
would try to discipline myself to start 
early because of the heat in the south 
of India. If I was having a run I would 
keep going; 8 to 10 hours would not 
bother me. Some days I could be 
pacing up and down and getting very 
angry, talking to the geckos on the 
wall or doing any damn thing. Of a 
night, if I had a good productive time, 
I went down to the beach and played 
cricket with the kids." 
Coward was particularly keen to 
search the files of Tlte Hindu 
newspaper for details of Australia's 
unofficia11935-36 tour, of which little 
was known in AustraHa. "I had the 
help of everyone at Tltc Hindu to go 
through the files. I wish you could see 
the library at The Hi11du, it is just 
remarkable. It is a very, very old build-
ing: the old manila files piled high. 
They dwarf these six or eight men 
who sit around, some still with 
eyeshades-it is like taking a leaf from 
the midst of the Raj, filled by warm 
and fascinating people going at a 
tempo we have forgotten about." 
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It was not unti11956-57 that Australia 
made its first official tour of India and 
Pakistan, and by the 80s three-Test 
series on the sub-continent were a 
regular feature of the overseas calen-
dar. Between 1935 and the 1980s the 
knowledge of Australian cricketers on 
the sub-continent was limited to im-
pressions gathered by short strolls in 
port cities and to perspectives formed 
in cricket fields, hotels and airports 
and the journeys between. The crick-
eters had firm preconceptions of local 
conditions before ever setting foot on 
the sub-continent, etched by dressing 
room lore, horror stories of wasting 
diseases that struck down players in 
their prime. Partly in reaction, well 
into the 1980s, the Australian 
authorities sent a doctor with the 
team. Now a lone physiotherapist ac-
companies the team, and team photos 
confirm that players are now more 
adventurous in their wanderings. 
Coward's book, Cricket Beyond the 
Bazaar (Allen & Unwin, $24.95) is a 
comprehensive history of the 12 tours n 
by Australian teams to Pakistan and 
India, plus the one Test against Sri 
Lanka in 1982-83. A !though he 
provides great detail of the matches, 
Coward's real fascination is with the 
society that produced the cricketers 
and cricket supporters. 
"There has been a shift in the sphere 
of influence in the world of cricket/ 
Coward says. "England's influence is 
diminishing on and off the ground, 
year in, year out. Suddenly, the greater 
Asian cricket basin has emerged. I 
thought it an interesting and impor· ~ 
tant time for the book to be written. 
There is no doubt that there is an un· 
willingness in this country to embrace 
the Third World. We are frightened by 3 
it, we are uncertain about it, it seems 
an alien culture. The cricketers reflect 
that. There has been a greater emo-
tional maturity in recent tours." J. 
Coward reflected carefully before 
responding to questions about the al-
leged cheating of Pakistan umpires: 
"There is no doubt they have had 
some appalling umpires over the 
years. Yet 1 find cheating very hard to 
believe. You cannot get away from the 
fact that Indian and Pakistan societies 
are very different. There is corruption 
at all levels. There is corruption at all 
levels of our own society. Whether it 
extends to cricket, I can't say. I've 
made five tours there, I've dealt a lot 
with the officials and the umpires, and 
I've had no reason myself to believe 
that there is corruption or graft at the 
top level of cricket." 
Why then did such avowed 
traditionalists as Australian coach 
Bob Simpson and manager Colin Egar 
react as they did-by accusing the 
umpires of bias? 
•I believe that they behaved as they 
would not have behaved in any other 
country. I don' t know why: Bob 
Simpson has been there before as a 
captain; he has had great success 
there. To me it was inexplicable. The 
most damning thing is that in 1982 the 
same umpires stood in the First Test 
and the Australians were so pleased 
with them that they asked for them to 
be reappointed. 
•you ask yourself: this time there were 
exactly the same two officials, exactly 
the same secretary of the board, why 
did they not go to them at the end of 
SPECIAL 
OFFER 
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cause it was a sensitive time in the 
history of international cricket 
"This was ignored. It was a delicate 
time because the West Indies wanted 
extreme action for contact with South 
Africa." 
Coward possesses a fine narrative 
style: it is a considerable pity thatthere 
is not regular space in an A ustraiian 
newspaper for him to reflect on the 
implications of modem cricket, here 
and overseas. He is, as well, a notable 
mimic and humourist, though he has 
restrained this bent here. 
the match and say that they were not 
satisfied with them, that they didn' t 
want them reappointed? 
This is not a book of pretences; it 
makes no claim that cricket is a sub-
stitute for diplomacy or war. Interna-
tional cricket is not going to be the 
bridgehead for cultural 
breakthroughs. One incident says it 
all: Coward met a child at Peshawar, 
near the Khyber Pass, who recognised 
him as a person from "Border's 
country". The child had not heard of 
Australia. 
"Malcolm Gray, the Chairman of the 
Board, had flown to Brisbane before 
the Australians left and appealed to 
them to temper their remarks, to be 
thoughtful, diplomatic and caring be-
RODNEY CA V ALlER is a freelance 
journalist and cricket acolyte. 
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The Rights of Nature 
By Roderick Frazier Nash 
•A wonderful book. It Is a history of the world's green thinkers and 
of environmental ethics - a journey that began two millennia ago• 
Bob Brown, Green Independent, Parliament of Tasmania 
Recommended price $24.95 
Descent of Spirit 
Edited by Dorothy Green 
Grant Watson (1885-1970) is a rare breed, a 20th century 
polymath and renaissance man. As a superb writer of English 
prose he describes the wonder and beauty of biological 
adaptations. Illustrated with original wood engravings. 
Recommended price $19.95 
Writer Reader Critic 
By Dorothy Green 
This inspiring book shows that Green has never been mesmerized 
by academic fads or fashions. She belongs to no critical school 
and has never feared to question the behaviour or beliefs of the 
powerful and arrogant. 
Recommended price $14.95. 
Patrick White Speaks 
The passionate public life of Australia's most acclaimed novelist 
and Nobel Prize recipient - outspoken on the subject of human 
rights, a fierce campaigner for international nuclear disarmament, 
avid Republican, and committed environmentalist. 
Recommended price $16.85. 
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Fall of the House of Ten 
Commercial TV is in the doldrums. 
Meanwhile, American TV has been striking 
out in new directions. David Nichols reports. 
I 
n July 1989, the Ten 
Network's Sydney 
studios were the 
scene of a sumptuous 
luncheon-cum-press con-
ference; print media repre-
sentatives were flown in from 
all over Australia for one day at 
Ten TV Australia as it would be 
known from that day onwards. 
The occasion was, of course, 
new station manager Bob 
Shanks' announcement of his 
revamping strategy to give the 
network stronger ratings and 
greater financial stability. 
This reporter left half-way through 
the proceedings; the questions went 
on interminably. I don't think I missed 
much- and, anyway, it was only a few 
months before Shanks' lowbrow (he 
used a different term which meant 
much the same thing) reprogramming 
was deemed a failure. 
At the time of writing, only two of 
Shanks' changes remain on air. One is 
the inner-city soap E Street which he 
'glamourised'. The other is the 
Australian Candid Camera. And if Ten 
TV Australia was in a spot of trouble 
pre-Shanks, it is now in decidedly dire 
straits. Even the once top-rating 
Neighbours is now coming a sad fourth 
behind ABC News. The Lane Cove 
studios where Shanks' pronounce-
ments were so confidently made are 
now empty and about to be torn down 
for a shopping complex, or to be 
bought by Channel 9, which wants 
cheaper premises - depending who 
you believe. 
More recently, in its city offices, Ten 
has seen even more upheavals. Direc-
tor of programming Vicki Jones 
recently got the boot after her many 
attempts to implement an 'entertain-
ment network' concept were rejected 
by the cautious powers-that-be at Ten. 
It was a grim year for commercial TV 
finances all round. While we can 
speculate on the downfall of magnates 
like Skase and Bond, as well as the odd 
Steve Cosser, the fact remains that TV 
last year was full of the same old crap. 
But the exceptions, surprisingly, have 
been excellent. The speculation that 
Ten would become a 'quality' station 
along the lines of Britain's Channel4 
(this line of thinking ran concurrently 
with Jones' entertainment station) 
may have brought wry smiles to some 
viewers' faces, but the truth is that Ten 
has already tried and failed with some 
excellent shows. American shows, 
like Married With Children and thir-
tysomething. 
Both these shows turn American TV 
conventions on their head. Married 
With Children attacks not only the 
American sitcom family but the real 
family with a collection of the crudest 
misfits ever seen on the screen. The 
show rated better than any other on its 
home turf last year. Here, Ten 
publidty couldn't quite grasp it, nor 
could the critics, who seemed to take 
it entirely at face value. 
Thirtysomething is a different kettle of 
fish but, in its own way, attempted a 
new reading of an old story; it's an 
'issues' soap in the Big Chill vein. 
Somehow, Ten forfeited its right to 
screen thirtysomething after Shanks 
gave it the boot, and the Seven Net-
work is now reluctantly in charge of 
it. 
These two shows were essential to 
American Network TV. Faced with 
competition from cable stations and 
video stores, the networks were 
forced to tinker with the unprece-
dented: the notions .of quality and 
depth. 
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'Quality' is, of course, highly subjec-
tive, and this is reflected in the phrase 
'good TV', usually taken to mean little 
more than 'action-packed' or 'easily 
consumed' TV. Many ALR readers 
would rarely stray beyond SBS or 
ABC when they're looking for 
'quality'; and the idea of commercial 
TV featuring watchable shows in 
prime-time might seem ludicrous to 
them. Things are different in the US 
where there is no government net-
work and ratings are the top priority 
for all stations. In a search for a new 
twist to the old routine, programmers 
found a new kind of TV: tv made for 
a nation brought up entirely on TY. 
Hence, It's Garry $handling's Shaw, a 
sitcom about a stand-up comedian 
running a sitcom - that is, a show 
about a show about a show, or-more 
obliquely-Murphy Brown, a comedy 
about a current affairs news team, 
peppered with references to real 
events. 
But the great success story of 
American TV in 1990 was The 
Simpsons, which Ten hopes to launch 
soon. The Simpsons are Married With 
Children's Bundys taken one step fur-
ther; they' re a cartoon family but 
they're an adult cartoon family. One 
episode deals with mother Marge's 
affair with her bowling instructor. 
Another has the Simpsons accept an 
Armenian exchange student who 
spies on the nuclear power plant 
where father Homer Simpson works. 
Another had a children's TV clown 
become the centre of a mass witchhunt 
when he apparently robs a 7-11 store! 
The Simpsons was created by car-
toonist Matt Groening, best known for 
his Life in Hell strips. 
Comedy is the main area for bursts of 
TV originality because comedy's al-
ready surreal and by nature allows 
easy ridicule of TV tradition. David 
Lynch's Twin Peaks- another program 
Ten is hoping to use to recapture lost 
audiences - was described at its 
launch as "Blue Velvet meets Peyto11 
Place". Lynch directed only three of 
the first seven Twin Peaks episodes, but 
the show has his particular vision 
stamped all over it. It's a murder 
mystery that took America by storm, 
'lltleccentric Nadine Hurley (Wendy Robie), one of the stars of Twin Pealc.s 
with the question "Who killed Laura 
Palmer?" on everyone' slips. There are 
1 possible 20 or so suspects, each of 
them particularly weird and each in-
volved as well in bizarre sub-plots. 
lading the show is CIA man Dale 
Cooper, played with usual aplomb by 
Kyle McU1chlan. Right down to its 
deliriously infections theme music, 
7toin P&lks is the must-see event of 
1991. One only hopes Ten can shake 
llsell from the doldrums long enough 
to entice the Australian public into 
watching it. 
On the homefront- where each station 
Is required by law to screen a certain 
amount of local drama - Ten barely 
mmpetes in the drama ratings these 
days, and the Nine network doesn't 
even enter the running. The failure of 
Nine's great hope Family and Friends 
leaves The Flying Doctors as its only 
regular production. Seven's Home and 
Away is doing well despite large cut-
backs, and A Country Practice, certain-
ly the most liberal and informative 
soap Australia has ever seen, is still 
rating well after nearly a decade. 
Seven was less lucky with its police 
drama Skirts: in fact, Skirts typifies 
what is wrong with the whole of 
Australian commercial TV drama. It 
was neither good realistic TY, nor was 
it good soap. In fact, for something 
that aimed for the pseudo-reality of 
English TV drama The Bill, the closest 
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thing Skirts had in common with real 
life was its dullness. One almost got 
the feeling that its producers got 
scared while making it, and quiclcly 
ransacked some old Cop Shop scripts 
for the correct measures of cliche and 
tired storylines. Whatever the reason, 
Skirts' cast did a good job with very 
uneven material. Not that the 
programming helped at all - Skirts 
(what a name!) was floundering in its 
timeslot. 
Meanwhile, Ten's drama offerings 
have been even less popular than 
usual. The most loyal of Neighbours 
fans would have to admit that the 
show these days is a complete bore. 
Recent storylines had Gemma being 
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sacked from her job in a dress shop 
and Ryan teased for wanting to be-
come a policeman. Still, the South 
American con-woman hell-bent on 
manying Paul to get citizenship was 
interesting, especially her closing 
speech after being unmasked; it car-
ried reminders of the glory days of the 
time Helen was abducted and locked 
in a shed in the cemetery by an es-
caped prisoner posing as a priest. 
Ten is hoping that its recent car-
bomb I gun-shot wounds/ shipwreck 
storylines will work for E Street, for 
my money the best Aussie soap in 
many a moon. E Street has everything, 
in classic soap tradition. The love of 
the Reverend Bob for Elly as she 
recovers from gunshot wounds to the 
head; teenagers Harley and Tony 
crave constantly for each other's 
bodies (unfortunately this tends to 
mean falling off the couch a lot, but we 
can use our imaginations!), the 
religious virgin policeman Max and 
the high-on-life Alice ... Well, they're 
my favourites. But, sadly, even E Street 
has been under constant threat of can-
cellation due to low ratings- here's 
hoping it finally 'takes off' (rather 
than' gets taken off') in 91. 
But, ultimately, what do people want 
from TV? Obviously the stations don't 
know, and perhaps viewers don't 
either. Whatever it is, it's certainly not 
more of the same. Perhaps the first 
step would be to ask them directly. 
Both Britain's lTV and BBC have 
developed intelligent, watchable 
shows on which members of the view-
ing public appear live or on pre-
filmed segments to criticise programs 
shown the previous week. Often, they 
have the chance to take the program's 
director or writer to task; station 
management can get dragged into the 
argument, too. This is no ABC Back-
chat, with the snide Tim Bowden 
chuckling over viewers' letters read 
out in funny voices. This is genuinely 
accountable television. 
But it's the high price of everything -
programs, presenters, executives -
that is causing Australian TV its major 
headaches at the moment. TV execu-
tive salaries are notoriously inflated. 
Or take Mike Gibson who, until his 
recent sacking presented the Sydney 
show on Channel Ten. He is reported 
to have defected to Ten from Nine for 
$5 million. Call me naive, but I can't 
see that anyone is worth $5 million to 
Australian TV. It's a huge gamble 
since Sydney didn't rate at all-it was 
one of the programs targeted by Vicki 
Jones for the chop. 
Drama, too, has budgets far beyond 
the comprehension of mortals. Judg-
ing by the excellent films produced by 
Australian film schools every yea.r on 
next to no money, the stations must be 
employing the wrong people. Maybe 
a desire to spend on a par with the US 
has overridden any reasonable con-
sideration of what would make good 
(or funny or thrilling) viewing. 
The one thing, of course, that no one 
has ever seriously considered is that 
many Australians are tired of sitting 
in front of the' instrument' for most of 
their conscious lives. 
Well, maybe, but it's been a remarkab-
ly loyal34-year love affair. For most of 
us bom after the mid-50s, television is 
the main source for cultural reference 
and identity. No. We're just waiting 
for something new on the screen. 
DAVID NIOiOLS is a writer for teen 
magazines. 
What the readers said 
If the results of our recent readership survey 
(ALR 122) are anything to go by, our readers, 
on the whole, are satisfied with the style and 
content of ALR. 
D he majority said that ALR' s main strength lay in its features (66%) and that it was 
unnecessary to carry shorter 
items (67% ), though the number 
of existing columns was ade-
quate (60%). 
Most found ALR's writing accessible 
(76%) and it wasn't a chore to read the 
magazine (74% ). Only 28% perceived 
ALR' s design as too conservative. On 
the whole, our sample of readers felt 
that the magazine did not pay undue 
attention to economic issues (80%) 
and did not want to increase "cul-
tural" content over political (68%). 
They did, however, want to see 
greater coverage of environmental 
(43%) and Asian-Pacific issues (67%). 
Rather interestingly, the sample (hap-
pily, 100) did not perceive the need for 
devoting additional space to women's 
issues, and did not categorise ALR as 
"a boy's magazine"'. 
These findings are explained in part 
by the nature of the sample: 70% of the 
respondents were male- considerably 
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higher than a cross-section of the sub-
scription base as a whole. 
From the sample emerges the portrait 
of the average ALR reader as aged 
between 21 and 40, unmarried, 
university-educated and working 
most often in the public sector. 
He/ she is predominantly 
heterosexual and Anglo-Australian. 
He/ she does not belong to,a political 
party and has been reading ALR for 
less than two years. He I she often eats 
in a restaurant, buys a book regularly 
- most usually on politics or current 
affairs - and sees a film at least once 
a month. 
Thankstoeveryonewhorespondedto 
the survey, and congratulations to 
David Mehan of Chippendale, NSW, 
the winner of the survey draw-$100 
worth of books from the International 
Bookshop, Melbourne. 
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A Verdant Vigil 
Waiti11~ directed by Jackie Mc-
Kimmie. Opening in Sydney on 1 
March at the Academy Twin and 
Walker St cinemas; coming soon to 
Melbourne. Reviewed by Jeremy 
Eccles. 
Film-maker Jackie McKimmie 
and the actor and arts 
spokesperson Noni Hazlehurst 
can be assumed to be on the 
same wavelength when it 
comes to personal politics. 
They've now made four films 
together-the award-winning short 
Sllltions, the almost unknown feature 
Australian Dream, a dramatised 
documentary on child abuse Breakiug 
Through and, finally, Waiti11g. I've seen 
only the two features, and they have 
similarities in both being broad 
women's satires on family and society. 
And, while both are tinged with 
feminism, there's no way that even the 
basest phallocrat could be upset by 
ltatements of the "my gender, right or 
wrong" sort. In fact, some of the firmer 
feminists might be upset. 
Given Noni Hazlehurst's increasing 
profile as a nominee (at least) for the 
Chair of the Australia Council, as a 
Kuting Fellowship winner, as a board 
member of Film Australia and as a 
founder of Australian Artists' Films, 
one would have to say she was brave 
to take parts like Fran or the Mc-
limmie pair which explore women's 
illues without necessarily following 
the approved path through them. 
Mcl<immie's films, for instance, are 
frequently funny! 
Australiau Dream, for instance, gave 
Craeme Blundell his best part on or off 
stage or screen for years as a 
Queensland butcher desperate to get 
National Party pre-selection for par-
liament. Noni, as his wife, doesn't 
limply see through his pathetic per-
aonal and political ambitions as a 
result of reading Germaine Greer (as 
happens in the play, Walljlowering) but 
Is actually led astray by a spunk of a 
sex-aids salesman. The film ends with 
Blundell's dreams in tatters, and Noni 
in the back of a panel van with spunky 
John Jarrett, still unsatisfied, demand-
ing, "Is that all there is?". 
Noni's subsequent marriage to Jarrett 
and the birth of a son may have played 
more than gossip column roles in 
Waiting. For the gloriously pregnant 
mother was captured swimming 
naked for the film some two years 
before the script was finished and the 
rest put on celluloid. And Noni' s sum-
mation from the earlier time that 
"you're away with the pixies for the 
last couple of weeks of pregnancy", 
certainly lies at the heart of a film that 
Noni Haulhurst 
lays waste to such trendy theones as 
the open marriage, surrogacy without 
emotion, wimmin's film-making, and 
the joys of Nimbin-like rural 
hideaways. 
Four old school-girlfriends are gather-
ing for the last act of a nine-month 
long project which will see the birth by 
Clare (Noni Hazlehurst) of a surrogate 
baby for Sandy and Michael (sired by 
the latter-a willowy Frank Whit-
ten-with some difficulty, but 
desperately desired by Sandy-a 
bossy Helen Jones), filmed by Therese 
(Fiona Press) as final proof of the su-
perfluousness of male medical exper-
tise, and witnessed by the trendily 
successful Diane (Deborra-Lee Fur-
ness). Unfortunately, Clare's rural 
hideaway is bogged in mud, her 
painting career has just taken off with 
the Moet et Chandon Award to spend 
Aut: FEBRUARY 1991 
a year in Paris, and a wandering 
boyfriend who may well have been 
the father anyway. Although contrac-
tions have started, the birth is 
psychologically delayed by the need 
to resolve at least some of the out-
standing issues - such as Sandy and 
Michael's rocky marriage, and the ar-
rest of their adopted kids for joy-
riding. But Therese has nicked her 
film equipment and needs to get it 
back by the end of the weekend, and 
Diane has brought along a lover, who, 
secretly, is a doctor! 
Set-up scenes to establish this melange 
are frankly too brief and incomplete in 
detail. But much can be forgiven as 
director of photography Steve Mason 
makes the most of last summer's exces-
sive wetness to capture the Hunter Val-
ley in bellbirded mistyness. And 
around the chaotic house, one can't find 
a better description than Noni 
Hazlehurst's (in an earlier interview): 
"Jackie's always painting pictures. The 
camera may only glimpse in the back-
ground what is the message of any shot, 
while in the foreground she has the 
courage to put situations that you 
wouldn't think you'd believe". And by 
far the strongest belief to emerge from 
Waiting is Sandy's that motherhood is 
the only career she ever wanted, and 
her eventual loss of the SO% owned 
baby that she'd even been to pre-natal 
classes to prepare for feels like quite 
a tragedy. 
Stand-out performances, though, 
come from Fiona Press as the 70s 
throwback film-maker, and her punk 
daughter (Noga Bernstein) who fights 
against the denial of femininity that 
her mum's imposed by dying to do the 
cooking! Good old Ray Barrett is 
wonderful, too, as the wry neighbour-
ing farmer observing all and deliver-
ing the baby with aplomb at the end. 
Will women see this film in which 
men are basically passengers dif-
ferently? I can't see queues at the 
cinemas - but many will sneak a look 
when it comes on the ABC (who are 
co-producers) later. 
JEREMY ECCLES ia a Sydney theatre 
• c:ritic:. 
60 REVIEWS 
A Lech of vision 
Solidarity and the Politics of 
Anti-Politics: Opposition and 
Reform in Poland Since 1968, by 
David Ost. Temple University 
Press, 1990. Reviewed by Paul 
Hockenos. 
It is all the more unsettling 
today to look at the early 
Solidarity movement. 
A decade after the radical trade 
union's first efforts to forge a par-
ticipatory civil society in communist 
Poland, the recent presidential elec-
tion ended in an embarrassing 
debacle for the country. Manipulating 
a brand of populist demagoguery 
only slightly less vile than that of his 
opponent, Solidarity leader Lech 
Walesa ensured himself a landslide 
victory. 
How differently it all started. In his 
superb book Solid4rity and the Politics 
of Anti-Politics, political scientist 
David Ost chronicles the trajectory of 
the Polish postwar opposition from its 
roots in the fascist resistance to 
Solidarity in 1989. The author, a cor-
respondent from Warsaw during the 
80s, astutely bridges academic dis-
ciplines, interweaving social theory 
with intellectual and political history 
to explain the underlying raison d' etre 
of Solidarity. While a number of excel-
lent sources document the union's 
breath-taking debut on the world 
political stage in 1980, the Ost book 
goes a critical step further to address 
the movement's theoretical founda-
tions. It is a step that is essential for 
coming to grips with the logic of the 
opposition movements throughout 
Eastern and Central Europe. 
In all of the East bloc states, the 70s 
was a grim time for the democratic 
opposition. The Prague Spring crack-
down in 1968 reverberated 
throughout the communist countries, 
putting an end to the opposition's 
hopes for a progressive socialist alter-
native to the single party state. After 
decades of resistance and debate 
aimed at transforming the state struc-
tures, activists were finally convinced 
of the system's inherent unrefor-
mability. The "post-ideological" na-
ture of the Eastern systems, said dissi-
dents such as Adam Michnik, 
precluded Left arguments that tried to 
initiate change by contrasting real, ex-
isting socialism with socialist ideas. 
"The bond,"' wrote Michnik in the 
early 70s, "tying the revisionist intel-
ligentsia to the party was definitely 
severed." 
It was clear that the opposition had 
reached an impasse. The essence of 
the system was the monopolisation of 
public life on every level. The single 
party state's claim to the 'unlversal' 
representation of its subjects' interests 
underlined all forms of pluralist social 
activity. Reform appeared impossible, 
opposition was outlawed, and yet, the 
dissidents knew, resistance was still 
imperative. 
A new theory of politics was needed 
to bypass the entrenched bureaucracy. 
The answer to the impossibility of 
politics came in the fonn of "anti-
politics". Led by 68-schooled intelJec-
tuals like Michnik, the opposition 
redirected its efforts toward civil 
society itself, the independent social 
space that the state denied. Rather 
than an outright negation of politics, 
anti-politics relocated the politics' 
public from the state to the social 
sphere. The strategy left "politics as 
usual" to the ruling elites, claiming 
civil society, or the" public sphere", as 
philosopher Jiirgen Habermas has 
tenned it, as the exclusive realm of the 
opposition. 
The democratisation of society from 
below, the oppositionists reasoned, 
would expose the State's ultimate il-
legitimacy, although not necessarily 
alter its intransigent stand. If con-
ducted on a mass scale, the people 
could ignore the state, acting as 
citizens without its permission. 
"Every independent social initiative," 
wrote veteran radical Jack Kuron, 
"challenges the monopoly of the State 
and thereby challenges the basis upon 
which it exercises power." "Civil 
society" was the central category of 
the Left in the 70s and Solidarity in 
1980. A "permanently open 
democracy", initiated by an in de-
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pendent and self-conscious citizenry, 
charted a "third road'" between the 
stalinist systems in the east and the 
parliamentary democracies in the 
West. For the young trade union, the 
goal was an alternative neither 
capitalist not socialist, neither Eastern 
nor Western, but an original model 
that appropriated the positive ele-
ments of both systems. While the 
strategy blurred the classic left-right 
distinction, the goals of early 
Solidarity, argues Ost, perhaps a little 
too strongly, were solidly Left in their 
emphasis on self-organisation and 
participatory democracy. 
The birth of Eastern Europe's first in-
dependent trade union, however. ob-
viously breached anti-politics' strict 
·division of the political and social 
spheres. "As soon as the [anti-politi-
cal] program reached its fruition," 
writes Ost, "it became obsolete." The 
euphoric days of late summer and 
autumn 1980 were short-lived. Before 
long, Walesa and Solidarity aban-
doned the anti-political plan and were 
negotiating overtly political deals 
with the government 
While Solidarity continued to track 
the opposition through the 80s, the 
discussion of early Solidarity's roots 
constitute the study's most original 
and intriguing chapters. At the same 
time, the author leaves some key iJ.. 
sues surrounding the nature of the 
Polish opposition movement unad-
dressed. What the book falls to pro-
vide is a socio-historical context for 
Polish political culture that might 
shed some light on the vast discrepan-
cy between Solidarity's radical begin-
nings and the reality of political 
consciousness throughout post-com-
munist Eastern Europe. Ost portrays 
the anti-political movement in Poland 
as one embraced by "millions of 
r,e?Ple'" and the Polish autumn as the 
kind of world that has always been 
close to the dreams of the left", com-
parable to 1968 Paris or Barcelona in 
1936. 
PAUL HOCKENOS it a freelance 
jounW11tin Budape1t. 
REVIEWS 61 
Esoteric Exile 
Exit: A Romanian Story by 
Richard Wagner, Verso $24.95. 
Reviewed by McKenzie Wark. 
The remarkable thing about 
Wagner's novella about 
everyday life as a writer in 
Ceausescu' s Romania is its 
quiet, clear, matter of factness. 
Rather than attempt to shock or 
alarm the reader with tales of 
horror and woe, Wagner 
recounts small stories laced 
with telling detail. 
The unfortunate truth is that shocking 
and disturbing Eastern European 
writing ceases to shock or disturb after 
a while. In the West, we are all too 
accustomed to tragic stories about 
other people's misery. It is our unique 
and privileged form of barbarism to 
pay such things passing attention for 
a while and drift off, bored and list-
less, looking for something else. 
Wagner's svelte little book manages to 
slip into the reader's consciousness 
precisely by avoiding spectacular ef-
fects. 
The full horror of Ceausescu' s regime 
hangs heavily over this volume, but it 
does so precisely through its absence. 
Rather than offer the reader a revela-
tion of the true story behind the old 
lies, Wagner simply but clearly 
recounts life in its concreteness and 
inconsequence. Nothing is revealed 
and that is precisely why Exit is a ter-
rifying book. It shows vividly the ex-
tent to which a barbaric regime can 
penetrate the very pores and fabric of 
everyday life, not by putting its 
totalitarian stamp on everything, but 
by fostering a festering culture of 
petty power, pointless principle and 
blank indifference. 
Wagner's story, which has an 
autobiographical feel to it, concerns 
the last days in Romania of the poet 
Stirner. Stirner doesn't realise it, but he 
is preparing to leave Romania, headed 
for the West. The striking thing about 
Stimer's passage to the West is its 
complete lack of heroics or self-jus-
tification. Stimer is a man of principles 
and does his best to stick to them. All 
the same he dryly notes his own petty 
compromises, taking a line out of a 
poem to get it past the censor. He is a 
dissident of sorts, marginal but 
tolerated. His books come out in tiny 
editions on pulpy grey paper. He has 
no idea who reads them-perhaps 
only the police. He muses without 
irony on the conjecture that the entire 
print run of his book will be pulped 
and recycled, ready for the next dif-
ficult poet who will be printed and 
pulped again, unread. 
Stimer does not want to be a tolerated 
dissident. He knowsonlytoowell that 
the dissident plays the same game as 
the official writers and ends up even 
more compromised. He ruminates 
with disgust on those cautious writers 
who slip vague anti-government al-
lusions into their poems. Allusions so 
erudite and obscure that qnly their 
greatest fans and most diligent 
readers will detect their nuance and 
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flavour. The most dedicated connois-
seurs of dissidence are, after all, the 
police. Although they are an apprecia-
tive and remarkably attentive 
audience, they are not the audience 
Stimer craves. He wants readers who 
might sustain for him his own seH-
image as a writer, which is dissolving 
into nothing in his last days in 
Romania. We can onl>_' wait with inter-
est to see if Stimer s caustic minia-
tures on Eastern life are 
complemented with an equally astute 
reading of everyday life in the West. 
McKENZIE WARK is on the editorial 
board of Editions. 
~~~~~~~ 
Sybylla Prell, the Melbourne-
baaed feminiat publlahing 
group, plana to publlah a collec-
tion of contemporary writing by 
women In late 1911. 
The collection may Included fic-
tion and non-fiction In a variety of 
forms: stories, playscrlpts, poetry, 
critical articles, extracts and so on. 
The focus of the collection will be 
on how key stories, at particular 
times, Inform people's sense of 
Identity. Sybylla Is particularly 
keen to collect writing which chal-
lenges or rewrites traditional ver-
sions of personal and collective 
Identity. 
Our hope Is that this collection 
will generate alternative and politi-
cally enabling ways of thinking 
about ourselves and social 
change. 
Send your submission (and a 
stamped self-addressed envelope 
for return) direct to Sybytla Press, 
or write to us for further Informa-
tion: Ross House, 247 Alnders 
Lane, Melbourne, 3000. 
Submiaaiona close 31 March 
1891. . 
62 COLUMNS 
CORRECT 
LINE 
COOKING 
The Elevated 
Spud 
Potatoes have been much on my 
mind (and in my mouth) recently. 
A friend virtually shrieked in a res-
taurant at finding them on her 
plate; such is the unfortunate 
reputation of this vegetable as a 
corruptor of the thin. Potatoes are 
often seen by those who seek to 
reduce themselves as on a par with 
beer and dripping, chocolate 
eclairs and pav. 
It is time for lovers of the poignant 
and useful vegetable to speak out 
in its defence. It is a vegetable 
replete with goodness, both 
vitamins and minerals. In its un-
processed form, the potato is surely 
the most beautiful of vegetables, 
whether at a petite adolescent size 
or in the fulf, sprawling Rubens-
like folds of a really big one. 
I am not the only person to have 
been beguiled by the dimpled 
potato. Redcliffe Salaman devoted 
40 years of his life to spudology, 
culminating in the definitive (ie, 
very long) The History and Soc:Ull In-
fluence of the Potato. This passionate 
book looks at the potato from all 
angles, from its origins in South 
America (some would dispute this) 
to a chapter on the Potato in the 
Realm of Art. 
Salaman also looks at the use of the 
potato as a form of social control by 
the English in Ireland. The 
nutritious nature of the potato was 
used as a means for maintaining 
subsistence wages for labourers; 
Salaman shows that it was "desig-
nedly forced" on workers with a 
view to reducing wages. When the 
potatoes were hit by disease, 
English domination of the area got 
even more of a boost, and the use of 
food as part of colonial or neo-
colonial strategy is with us still. 
None of us is likely to be solely 
reliant on potatoes for our nutrition-
al needs. Which is just as well when 
we consider how they are usually 
served up today. The round beauty 
of the potato which speaks of earth 
and dirt is sacrificed to packaging 
needs, so that "fries" greet us, and 
pre-cooked and fat saturated potato 
snacks await us in the freezer section 
of the supermarket. The vitamins 
have been washed away, and the 
price bears no relation to the cost of 
the main ingredient. Redcliffe 
Salaman would tum in his deep-
hoed grave at what has been done to 
his beloved tuber. 
I now present two recipes for the 
potato. One is healthier than the 
other, but both revel in the taste and 
texture of the wholesome spud. For 
if the shape of the potato is enough 
to make even the thick-skinned mar-
vel, its taste and smell are surely 
portents of heaven's air-condition-
ing system. 
The Healthier Recipe 
This is one of my own, although not 
without precedent and in deference 
to the author of The History and Social 
Influence It the Potato, I have named 
it Redcliffe' s Revenge. 
Take four large potatoes and 
scrub/wash clean. Do not remove 
the skins. Bake, until quite soft. Let 
cool a little and then cut them in half. 
Using a spoon or fork, take out some 
of the flesh from each half potato 
and mash it about a bit. Mix with a 
small amount of ricotta or feta 
cheese (feta has a stronger flavour), 
some cooked and chopped silv~r 
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beet or spinach and some pine nuts 
and lots of pepper. Fill the potatoes 
with the mixture, heaping it over the 
top. Put back in the oven until the 
stuffing is heated through. These 
make a great meal with salad or 
green vegetables and the wonderful 
&ulk of tne potato shines through. 
The Less Healthy Recipe with a Dif-
ficult Name: 
Dauphinais Potatoes. 
First catch your dolphin. Seriously, 
folks, put that driftnet away, dig up 
some potatoes and peel them. You 
could leave the skins on, but the 
whole raison d'etre of this recipe is 
to be unhealthy, like French royalty. 
Cut the potatoes into thin slices and 
arrange them in a well-buttered 
baking dish, in overlapping layers. 
Sprinkle with two crushed cloves of 
garlic, dot with butter, and cover 
with grated cheese and some 
ground pepper. Fill the pan with 
milk to tne level of the top potatoes. 
Milk flavoured with cloves is quite 
nice, but you would have to do this 
beforehand. Bake the dish until it 
~oes brown and almost solid. It is 
mdescribably good. 
Potatoes are cheap and delicious 
vegetables which can substitute for 
other foods, as in pies where they 
can take the place of pastry, or ther 
can be the central item in a mea 
Potatoholics like myself mourn the 
fact that many people wrongly 
malign this sweetest of foods. We 
should all be distressed by the sight 
of Australian farmers forced to 
plough tonnes of potatoes back into 
the ground because our government 
wants competition, but the "com-
petition "' is subsidised to the hilt. 
The souls of these potatoes, 
sacrificed on the altar of world trade 
are now with the angels, who are 
plump and prefer eating to harps. 
The eyeful, faithful potato beckons 
you to paradise, for a few cents a 
serve. 
Next month: Gender and food-
one-pot meals for the boys. 
Penelope Cottier. 
LETTERS 
Too many myths 
Your columns these days are full of 
references to freedom and 
democracy, and there is a distinct 
danger that the general public will 
actually come to believe in these 
mythical concepts. The freedoms to 
be unemployed and on the bread-
line, and the freedoms to exploit 
Te(/ us 
{CAfure 
fAe 
of 
and manipulate are freedoms we 
ought to be resisting with all our 
strength. 
The foundation of democracy is 
knowledge (of what is going on in 
society) and a population of voters 
that is so patently ruled by its media 
certainly takes the concept of 
democracy into the realms of 
mythology. It has been proved that 
dereS1Jlated business is a licence to 
rip off and exploit. Can some of 
your academic contributors now 
come down to earth and make it 
dear that the basic political issue is 
between conservative parties 
which will remove the power of 
government (and of the people) to 
control the exploiters, and those 
parties which still have a social con-
science-however much members 
like Hawke and our king of the yup-
pies, Keating, may on pragmatic 
grounds feel it necessary to curry 
favour with big business (and the 
Americans) in order to retain office. 
Please let's get the basics right. 
Don Cochrane, 
Penguin, Tas. 
COLUMNS 63 
A political aperitif 
Just a note of welcome to your new 
column "Correct line cooking". 
A little uncertain as to what I was 
about to read, I found on venturing 
in a neatly trussed parcel of 
(un)palatable points about food 
and politics and Australian society 
(or, at least, odours of the same). 
Ilookforward to watching Ms Cot-
tier guide us firmly but politely 
through her kitchen-and sharing 
her recipes with us-and suspect 
that the sweetness of her tones will 
be offset by some tart facts. I hope 
sol 
Definitely not just another food 
column. I await the next issue: with 
ethical dilemmas about these mat-
ters so close to our stomachs jos-
tling for space on the plate with the 
foodstuffs in question. 
Peta Cotton, 
St Lucia, Qld. 
WAere dt"d 
~ou jef f~e 
Tke~'re 
Joa" 
Kirner's e"rrqi Is ? 
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DEAR DR 
HARTMAN 
Professional 
Upstarts 
Hello patients, 
I've been having problems with the 
nursing lassies lately. Actually the 
little bitches have been showing 
signs of restlessness for quite some 
time. 
Last week I saw a sticker on a car in 
the staff section of one of my clinics. 
It said, "Nurses care-about wages". 
I sacked the girl on the s~t. A few 
days later, at a major pubhc hospital, 
I saw a notice for a staff meeting on 
the Casualty noticeboard. It was ad-
dressed to the "rank and file nur-
ses". What next? Matron Norm 
Gallagher?! 
As you can imagine I felt quite un-
nerved by this symptom of the 
socialist cancer within our midst, 
but a patient was expecting me, so I 
went mto the ward. (I was treating 
this patient on a private feec-for-ser-
vice basis, I can assure you.) As I lay 
my healing hands on the patient, 
whowaslyingin whatwasleftofthe 
public hospital system, the nurses 
treated me almost as an equal. We 
even shared the same tea room after 
theatre. Astonishing, isn't it? 
It used to be so different. Just a few 
years ago I would walk briskly 
down the long hospital corridors, 
my shoe heels clicking on the highly 
polished floors. As I entered the 
ward to do my rounds, a young un-
derling nurse would spot me ap-
proaching, and I'd hear her hushed, 
urgent whisper, "Doctor is coming!" 
Suddenly there would be a flurry of 
activity. All would be tidied and 
washed before me. Unsightly body 
fluids would be removed, and the 
nurses and patients would line up 
for a military-style inspection. The 
1st year nurse would have one blue 
star on her cap, the 2nd year nurse, 
two blue stars, and so on. We all 
knew where we stood. Everyone 
was secure. 
What's it like today? 
Why, now you're lucky if you can 
even find a Sister to welcome you 
onto the ward! And if you can find a 
"Sister"' , there's every chance 
"'Sister"' will have a beard, because 
men do nursing these days. It's ter-
ribly unnerving. Yes, ,Patients, nur-
ses have changed. Th1s is the result 
of a series of catastrophic mistakes; 
mistakes which must be rectified. 
Mistake number 1: Too much educa-
tion. Originally prospective nurses 
could leave school very early, and 
then leam their place on the wards. 
. It was good clean back-breaking 
work ana it prepared them for a life 
of selfless toil. Then the meddlers 
got involved, and the lassies were 
required to finish high school before 
we handed them a bed pan. This is 
where the trouble started. Now the 
situation is completely out of con-
trol, and we're sending them off to 
pseudo-universities to become 
mock cream professionals. No 
wonder they're getting ideas above 
their station! 
Solution: Get them straight back into 
the wards, with as little formal 
education as possible. I know 
medicine is very high-tech these 
days, and working in intensive care 
is like flying a 747. But we doctors 
can change the light bulbs on all 
those flashing machines. The nurses 
needn't worry their pretty little 
heads about them. 
Mistake number 2: The standard of 
uniform has deteriorated. Interest-
ingly enough, the Catholic Church 
made the same mistake when they 
let the nuns take up the hems of the~r 
habits and wear sandals. 
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I myself first became aware of a 
decline of standards in uniforms 
when I saw a busload of schoolgirls 
from my old private school. It was a 
shocking sight. No panama hats, no 
ties, no gloves and, most frightening 
of alL tneir socks were turned up! 
These days the staff in McDonalds 
look more professional and impres-
sive than any nurse. Those little 
microphone systems at the mouth of 
the supervisors really inspire con-
fidence. But take a look on any 
hospital ward. Where are the caps? 
Where is the starch? Where are those 
detachable buttons? 
Solution: Student nurses should be 
forced to use buckets of starch and 
wear a large, ornate metal belt, 
which must be cleaned daily. 
Mistake number 3: The lack of role 
models for young nurses. Florence 
Nightingale is no longer ap-
propriate. Historical research has 
shown that Florence was an U,Ppity 
bitch who was over-confident m her 
organisational abilities, and who 
spoke back to doctors under fire in 
the Crimean War. 
Solution: The nurses should look to 
the New Testament and adopt Mary 
Magdalene as a role model for 
young nurses. 
Of course, in her early life Mary suf-
fered from a dubious sexual reputa-
tion, but this is more in keeping with 
the average young woman of the 
90s. In later life Mary embodied the 
spirit of the handmaiden. She never 
once questioned the healing 
methods used by the Apostles and 
Jesus. Remember that lovely image 
in Luke: Chapter 7, where Dr Jesus 
and the 12 Interns are sitting around 
a table. Nurse Magdalene ap-
proaches carrying an alabaster jar of 
exquisite ointment. Without a word, 
she kneels and washes the feet of Dr 
Jesus, using her hair to wipe the pre-
cious ointment from his feet. 
This image should be displayed in 
every hospital across Australia. 
Send your problems to Dr 
Hartnum's secretary, ]ulu 
McCrossin, care of ALR. 
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ALLEN & UNWIN 
New Books on LA., Politics and Feminism 
JACQUES LACAN 
A feminist introduction 
Elizabeth Grosz 
AUSTRALIA & IMMIGRATION DISSENTING OPINIONS 
able to gruw? Feminist Explorations in lAw & Society 
Edited by Michael Easson Edited by Regina Graycar 
Australia and Immigration: able to 
grow? is an ambitious collection 
of essays addressing the pros and 
cons. of Australian immigration 
policy. 
Elizabeth Grosz has written a criti-
cal overview of La can' s work from 
a feminist perspective, introducing 
and discussing his major texts and 
providing a much needed back-
ground to many of his arguments. 
A number of the chapters focus on 
Elizabeth Grosz is the author of theeconomic issueswhichareatthe 
Sexual Subversions: Three French heart of much of the debate. Other 
Feminists. Fonnerlyseniorlecturer 
in the Department of General Phi-
losophy at the University of Syd-
ney, she is currently lecturing in 
History of Consciousness, Univer-
sity of California. 
chapters address humanitarian, 
historical, cultural, social and in-
dustrial relations issues. 
Michael Easson is the Secretary of 
the Labor Council of NSW. 
Allen & Unwin February 1991 Pluto Press December 1990 
ISBN: 00444 226236 Pb $19.95 ISJ3N: 0949138517 Pb $14.95 
Since the 1970s feminist scholar-
ship has brought new perspectives 
to the analysis of areas of study 
previously thought to be some· 
how 'gender-neutral'. 
Dissenting Opinions summarises 
the 'state of the art' of the femimst 
analyses of the law in its dealings 
with women. The book canvasses 
a broad range of issues, including 
legal equality, feminist criminol-
ogy, social control theory, housing 
policy, family law, social security 
and custody law. 
Regina Graycar is a senior lecturer 
in law at the University of New 
South Wales. 
Allen & Unwin December 1990 
ISBN: 0044422407 Pb $17.95 
US HEGEMONYUNDER SIEGE CITY OF QUARTZ WORDS AS WEAPONS 
Class, Politics and Development in Excavating the Future in Los Angeles Selected Writing 1980-1990 
Latin America Mike Davis Paul Foot 
US influence in Latin America is 
not only under siege from the im-
poverished masses of increasingly 
unstable states; it is also threatened 
by intensifying superpower com-
petition as Japan and a unifying 
Europe mount their challenges for 
world dominance. 
James Petras teaches in the Sociol-
ogy Department at the State Uni-
versity of New York. Morris 
Morley is a lecturer in Politics at 
Macquarie University. 
Verso January 1991 
ISBN: 0860919951 Pb $29.95 
In this new book, Mike Davis re-
counts a lurid tale of the greed, ma-
nipulation, power and prejudice that 
has produced what is at once the 
mostcosmopolitanand the most class 
divided city in the US. 
City of Quartz chronicles LA's past 
and present and looks at the political 
economy of urban redevelopment, 
the politics of gangs and drugs, the 
decline of the white working class 
and the immigrant community. 
City of Quartz takes the pulse of 
American society in the last decade 
of the 20th century, and offers a 
guarded diagnosis for its chances of 
survival. 
Mike Davis writes for LA Weekly. 
He is joint editor of the Verso 
series The Year Left. 
Verso February 1991 
ISBN: 0860913031 He $45.00 
In this sparkling collection of his 
writing over the past decade, Foot 
moves from ferocious salvoes 
against the Tories and their friends, 
through the Labour Party's feeble 
opposition to portraits of dissent-
ers in English radical history. 
Paul Foot speaks in different voices 
to different audiences but under-
pinning all his work lies a respect 
for the power of the written word 
to right injustice, to expose cor-
ruption and to puncture the hy-
pocrisy of a self-righteous, con-
spiratorial elite. 
Paul Foot writes a weekly page 
for the UK Daily Mirror. He won 
the Journalist of the Year Award 
twice (in 1972 and 1989). 
Verso February 1991 
ISBN: 0860915271 Pb $29.95 
Avai Ia hie from all good booksellers or from Allen and Unwin 
PO Bux 7M North Sydnt•y NSW 2059 ph: (02) 922 6399 
